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ABSTRACT 
 My dissertation explores the effect of information sources (especially the media) 
on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations and their subsequent 
voter choice in comparative perspective. I examine whether the level of democracy and 
level of economic development are associated with the effect of information sources on 
economic voting across nations. The results indicate that consolidated democracies and 
countries with middle income (GDP per capita: $1,000~$9,999) are most strongly 
associated with both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations. 
However, the level of democracy and economic development are not associated with 
voter choice. The comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan substantiates the claim 
that countries with consolidated democracy can have a stronger effect on national 
economic evaluations than those with a lower level of democracy. Given that Taiwan has 
a higher level of democracy (the polity score of Mexico and Taiwan are 8 and 10 in 2012 
respectively), the media effect on economic voting is more influential in Taiwan than in 
Mexico. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This research explores how information sources (the media and talking about 
politics with others) influence economic voting in comparative perspective and offers a 
comparative case study of Taiwan and Mexico. The pioneering study of economic voting 
can be traced back to national election studies in the United States, where it has been 
demonstrated to be significant (Gomez and Wilson, 2006; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001; 
Powell and Whitten, 1993; Chappell, 1990; Erikson, 1989; Fair, 1978; Hibbs, 1977). 
Generally speaking, economic voting centers on the relationship between 
retrospective/prospective economic evaluations and voter choice. When the U.S. 
economy is good, voters reward the incumbent; when the economy is poor, voters are 
likely to punish the incumbent and cast votes for the challenger (Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 
1971). Economic voting has been demonstrated to be a significant determinant for voter 
choice in the United States. 
Outside the United States, however, the significance of economic voting is 
controversial, and quite diverse across nations. Take Lewis-Beck’s (1990) research, for 
example. He discovered that retrospective national economic evaluation (sociotropic 
voting) influences people’s voting behaviors in established democracies such as the 
United States, Britain, France, and Italy. In contrast, personal economic evaluation 
(pocketbook voting) is not significant in those countries. In addition, some scholars find
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that retrospective national economic evaluation is not salient in most new democracies. 
Especially in developing countries, voters do not punish the incumbent for poor economic 
performance. One possible explanation is that voters know they “must suffer hard times 
in the near future if they are to enjoy prosperity later” (Miller and Niemi, 2002; Weyland, 
2002; Stokes, 1996, 2001). In other words, they may still look forward to the economic 
prosperity promised by the incumbent and believe he or she will do a good job with the 
economy in the future. It seems that economic voting is not necessarily a significant 
factor in voter choice in new democracies. Although voters do not blame the incumbent 
for the bad economy in new democracies, they are still looking forward to a prosperous 
economy in the future and believe the incumbent party will do a good job with the 
economy. Does this phenomenon imply that prospective economic evaluation is more 
important than retrospective voting in new democracies? What may cause the differences 
in the significance of economic voting across countries? Why would this be the case? I 
seek to answer these important questions in my dissertation. 
Why do information sources (especially the media) possibly play an important 
role in economic voting? Dalton(2008) claims that the rise of the media has increased 
people’s level of political information and the rise of education has increased voters’ 
political skills for processing political information in advanced industrial societies. 
Hetherington (1996) demonstrates that media consumption has influence on voters’ 
retrospective national economic evaluation in the United States. In other words, media 
consumption may enhance people’s knowledge about the national economic condition, 
and in turn people may evaluate the national economic condition according to the 
political information provided by the media. Moreover, Mickiewicz (2008) and Moser 
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and Scheiner (2012) contend that new democracies have less well-developed media 
institutions than established democracies. In this sense, level of democracy may influence 
the media effect on economic voting, and it is essential to take the media’s role into 
consideration since it is an important source of political information that can heighten 
voters’ level of political information about the national economic condition. 
The significance of economic voting is controversial and quite diverse across 
nations. Is economic voting really associated with level of democracy? This research tries 
to establish a general explanation about the relationship between media consumption and 
economic voting across countries and attempts to explore whether economic voting varies 
with macro-level factors. In other words, I would like to discover whether there is a 
nomothetic explanation of the relationship between media consumption and economic 
voting globally or if it still varies across countries. 
This introduction chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I review the relevant 
literature on media effect and economic voting. The theory of media effect is the agenda-
setting theory in political communication. It mainly explores how the media activates the 
salience of the issue among the public, the attributes of the issues, and political behaviors. 
The literature on economic voting is mainly individual-level in comparative perspective. 
Second, I consider the theory of the effect of information sources on economic voting. In 
addition to the media, talking about politics with family members, friends, and colleagues 
is also an important information source and is taken into consideration. Level of political 
sophistication is the ability of voters to attribute economic conditions to the government 
and is discussed in the model as well. The third part of this chapter deals with 
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methodology, including hypotheses derived from the theoretical arguments, data, 
statistical methods, and variables, etc. The fourth is the chapter outline of the dissertation. 
1.1 RELEVANT RESEARCH 
Literature researching the media effect and economic voting abounds. The 
seminal works are as follows. I review media effect and economic voting separately and 
respectively. 
1.1.1 Media Effect 
Studies of media effect substantiate that mass media can influence public opinion 
on current issues. In other words, the media agenda sets the public agenda (McCombs, 
2004). Five issues are salient: foreign policy, law and order, economics, public welfare, 
and civil rights (Ibid.). Foreign policy and economics usually rank as the most important 
issues in terms of both the media agenda and the public agenda. In this sense, media 
consumption enhances public attention to economics. In other words, the media can 
prime the economic issues (Lenz, 2012; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 
1987; Iyengar et al., 1984). Moreover, the media can also enable us to recognize how we 
think about some objects (McCombs, 2004). In other words, the media’s focus on 
particular aspects of an issue affects public opinion about the issue. Therefore, the media 
can affect how people evaluate the national economic condition. The stimulation of the 
debates and evaluation of the issues by the media is called issue framing (Gamson, 1992; 
Iyengar, 1991). This is also the second level of agenda-setting, also known as attribute 
agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004). J. B. Hester and R. Gibson (2003) demonstrate that the 
news media does have a certain amount of influence on people’s national economic 
evaluations. More negative coverage of economic news can shape people’s negative 
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evaluations of the national economy. Hetherington (1996) also contends that when there 
is more negative than positive coverage of economic news, it negatively shapes people’s 
national economic evaluation. In this sense, the media not only prime the issue of 
economy but also frame opinions of the economy by the public. 
In addition, studies of media effect also demonstrate that media can shape 
people’s opinions and in turn their behaviors, such as electoral choice (McCombs, 2004). 
Baek (2009) contends that the institutional setting of the media, which reduces 
information cost, can boost turnout. Sheafer and Weimann’s (2005) study on Israeli 
elections and Lenz’s (2012) study on the U.S. presidential election show that media effect 
can influence voter choice. Hetherington’s (1996) research on the U.S. presidential 
election in 1992 proves that the mass media negatively influences voters’ retrospective 
national economic evaluation and that the negative evaluation, in turn, affects their vote 
choice. The effect accounts for George H.W. Bush’s defeat in 1992. 
The media can also enhance people’s levels of information. Dalton (2008) shows 
that the rise of the media can help people acquire more political information since media 
(especially television) is a main source of political information in established 
democracies. He also claims that the process of “cognitive mobilization” -- the ability to 
acquire political information and the ability to process political information -- heighten 
people’s level of political sophistication. Compared with established democracies, new 
democracies usually have less well-developed media institutions (Moser and Scheiner, 
2012; Mickiewicz, 2008). In this sense, there may be less reliable information from the 
media in new democracies. Voters usually have a low level of political information, and 
their political behaviors, such as voting behaviors, are less influenced by the media (Ibid.). 
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Because voters may have low level of political information, their level of political 
sophistication will be probably low as well. 
It is evident that the media is an important source of information for voters, and 
the level of information may be associated with the degree to which the media institution 
is established along with the level of democracy. Moreover, voters’ level of information 
can affect their level of political sophistication. I therefore surmise that media 
consumption and level of political sophistication affect how people evaluate the 
retrospective and prospective national economy and in turn influences people’s voter 
choice. 
1.1.2 Economic Voting 
U.S. elections have been a pioneering source for studies on economic voting. 
Many have emphasized economic conditions as main determinants of U.S. election 
outcomes, especially U.S. presidential elections (Gomez and Wilson, 2007; Nadeau and 
Lewis-Beck, 2001; Chappell, 1990; Erikson, 1989; Fair, 1978; Hibbs, 1977). That is, this 
body of work shows that the better the economy, the more votes cast for incumbents; the 
worse the economy, the fewer votes cast for incumbents (Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 1971). 
Voter choice is based on the economic evaluation in the past, and this is known as the 
retrospective national economic evaluation or sociotropic voting. 
Some scholars also contend that prospective economic evaluation is an important 
determinant for voter choice. If voters believe that a certain party or candidate will do a 
good job with the economy in the future, they will vote for that party or that candidate 
(Downs, 1957; Achen, 1992). Kuklinski and West (1981) and Lewis-Beck (1988) 
demonstrate that prospective national economic evaluation is an important determinant in 
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U.S. congressional and presidential elections. Moreover, Mackuen et al. (1992) and 
Lockerbie (2008) find that prospective national economic evaluation is more important 
than retrospective national economic evaluation in determining voter choice. Similarly, 
prospective voting is significant instead of retrospective voting in the 1996, 2000, and 
2004 presidential elections in Taiwan (Wan, 2005; Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou, 1998). Lewis-
Beck et al.(2008) claim that retrospective voting is more important than prospective 
voting when the incumbent runs for the election; prospective voting becomes more 
important than retrospective voting when no candidate runs for the election.  
In addition, Fiorina’s (1978) and Markus’s (1988) micro-analyses demonstrate 
that pocketbook evaluation (personally better/worse off) can influence voter choice in a 
presidential election. Moreover, Markus claims that voters are more sensitive to 
sociotropic evaluation than pocketbook evaluation, as is evident in Kinder and Kiewiet’s 
research (1979, 1981). However, according to Clarke and Stewart’s (1994) analysis using 
an error correction model, both sociotropic evaluation and pocketbook evaluation are 
equally crucial. 
From these aggregate and individual-level analyses, it is evident that both 
sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations are influential on people’s electoral behaviors. 
Therefore, I assume such effects as plausible and will construct my model accordingly. 
From the comparative perspective on economic voting, Miller and Niemi (2002) 
contend that voters in new democracies usually do not punish incumbents when the 
economy is in bad shape. In other words, voters vote for the incumbents despite the bad 
economy because they recognize they “must suffer hard times in the near future if they 
are to enjoy prosperity later” (p. 181). In her case study on Argentina, Stokes (2001) finds 
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that voters do not punish politicians when they enact unmandated policies because 
outcomes are good; in contrast, voters do not support unmandated policies when 
outcomes are bad, as in the Venezuela case. Weyland’s (2002) research on neoliberal 
reform in Latin America also demonstrates that people tend to support leaders who enact 
drastic reforms in order to recover the status quo when they are suffering from economic 
recession such as hyperinflation. In this sense, in new democracies, voters seem not to 
blame politicians for a bad economy. They instead support incumbents who enact bold 
economic reforms because they are looking forward to future prosperity. It seems that 
prospective economic voting is more salient in Latin America than retrospective 
economic voting. 
Moreover, some pundits contend that party identification and candidate evaluation 
are associated with national economic evaluation (Gerber and Huber, 2010; Achen and 
Bartel, 2006; Anderson, Mendes, and Tverdova, 2004; Bartels, 2002; Niemi and 
Weisberg, 2001). Fiorina (1981) claims party identification is a “running tally” of 
retrospective evaluation of political parties and candidates. In addition, Achen and Bartel 
(2006) contend that a high level of information can reinforce the influence of party 
identification on national economic evaluation. In this vein, it is evident that the level of 
political information is also an important determinant of national economic evaluation. 
Much research on economic voting in Mexico and Taiwan has been undertaken. 
Studies having to do with Taiwan, include Huang’s(1994) study of legislative elections in 
Taipei county; Hsieh, Dean, and Niou’s (1998) analysis of the 1996 presidential election; 
Wang’s (2002) research on Taiwan’s economic voting from 1996-2001; Wan’s (2005) 
research on presidential elections; and Lin’s (2008) research on the 2004 legislative 
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elections. As mentioned above, prospective voting is more salient than retrospective 
voting in Taiwan’s presidential elections. Despite this, economic voting has not been the 
dominant determinant of voter choice in Taiwan; rather, nearly all research on economic 
voting in Taiwan demonstrates that national identity is always the most important 
determinant of voter choice (Huang, 1994; Hsieh, Dean, and Niou, 1998; Wang, 2002; 
Wan, 2005; Lin, 2008; Hsieh and Jang, 2009; Niou and Lacy, 2012). 
As to the study of economic voting under one-dominant-party regime, there is 
some literature exploring economic voting in Mexico and Taiwan, which both have 
experienced a-one-dominant-party system.1 Aldrich and Magaloni (2006) show that 
Mexican voters did not punish the incumbent for a short-term economic recession 
because they had experienced long-term economic growth under a one-dominant-party 
regime. Choi (2010) also finds that the better-educated in Taiwan, who experienced long-
term economic prosperity under a one-party regime, did not punish the incumbent KMT 
(Nationalist Party or Kuomintang) in the 1996 presidential election for a short-term 
economic recession. In contrast, people who had experienced long-term economic 
prosperity under a one-dominant-party regime punished the incumbent DPP (the 
Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan from 2000-8) in the 2004 presidential election 
for a short-term economic recession. Mongenstern and Zechmeister’s (2001) research on 
the 1997 midterm election in Mexico finds that risk-acceptant individuals are more likely 
to cast a vote for the opposition party when the economy is bad. In contrast, risk-averse 
individuals still tended to vote for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
despite the poor economy, because they were less likely to vote for the opposition party, 
which had less experience in office. It is evident that there were quite a few voters in the 
                                                          
1 Both Taiwan and Mexico ended one-party rule in 2000. 
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one-dominant-party regime who did not punish the incumbent even though the economy 
was bad. 
Based on the research questions and relevant literature above, it is evident that the 
media can influence how people think about the national economic condition and its 
subsequent voter choice. In this sense, I try to connect the effect of information sources 
and the economic voting in my dissertation and explore the effect in comparative 
perspective. The theory of the effect of information sources on economic voting is 
establish as follows. 
1.2 THEORY OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON ECONOMIC VOTING 
I derived my theory of information sources on economic voting from my research 
questions and relevant literature (please see figure 1.1). My theory follows 
Hetherington’s (1996) study; I surmise that voters’ level of information can affect their 
national economic evaluation and subsequent voter choice. In addition to the main 
information source--the media--the other important information source is talking to others 
about politics. Hetherington (1996) claims that talking about politics with others provides 
important information to voters. In addition, level of education can enhances people’s 
ability to process political information. This “cognitive mobilization” can heighten the 
level of political sophistication (Dalton, 2008). The level of political sophistication can 
affect how voters attribute economic conditions to government (Gomez and Wilson, 2003, 
2006). In particular, Gomez and Wilson discover that highly sophisticated voters are 
more likely to engage in pocketbook voting. In other words, a high level of political 
sophistication may be a prerequisite for those who evaluate government performance 
according to their personal economic condition. Godbout and Belanger (2007) replicate 
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Gomez and Wilson’s research and find that level of political sophistication is associated 
with sociotropic and pocketbook voting when incumbents run for reelection. 
It is evident that the effect of economic voting varies across nations. Even within 
in a certain nation, it is not necessarily significant across all elections. In some countries, 
prospective voting is more important than retrospective voting, while in others, 
pocketbook or sociotropic voting is more important. The only possible nomothetic rule is 
that, in new democracies, voters do not punish incumbents for economic downturns and 
expect economic prosperity in the future (Weyland, 2002; Stoke, 2001; Miller and Niemi, 
2002). In other words, in new democracies, voters probably emphasize prospective 
evaluation over retrospective evaluation. In addition, in the United States, the effect of 
economic voting can be different according to the changing historical context. Powell and 
Whitten (1993) contend that macroeconomic factors especially the GDP growth rate and 
unemployment rate can affect the vote share of the incumbent party in comparative 
perspective. In addition, Lin (1999) in his time-series analysis contends that economic 
growth is associated with variations of economic voting in United States. In this sense, I 
assume that level of democracy and level of economic development may be associated 
with variations of economic voting in comparative perspective. 
 Media effect may be concerned with level of democracy and level of economic 
development as well. Literature of political institution claims that it is essential for 
countries to meet a threshold of economic growth and level of democracy in order for 
political institutions, such as electoral systems, to produce their expected effects (such as 
the number of parties, women’s representation, and minority representation) (Moser and 
Scheiner, 2012; Matland, 1998). Established democracies have better-established media 
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institutions than those in new democracies. Thus, voters have a higher level of political 
information and their voting behavior is affected more by the media (Mickiewicz, 2008; 
Moser and Scheiner, 2012). Level of democracy and level of economic development are 
therefore associated with voters’ level of political information. People may have high 
level of political information in countries with high level of democracy and economic 
development. 
Summing up, it is still difficult to derive a generalizable explanation of economic 
voting given that there are variations of the significant of economic voting both within 
nations and across nations. Nonetheless, it has been substantiated that media cannot only 
prime but also framing issues and there are some research discovering that information 
sources (especially media) can influence voters’ national economic evaluation and its 
subsequent voter choice. Based on the arguments that countries should reach the 
threshold of level of democracy and level of economic development in order for their 
political institutions to have their expected effect and level of democracy and level of 
economic development may be associated with variations of economic voting, I articulate 
my theory of information sources on economic voting in both cross-national analysis and 
the comparative case study as follows.  
I surmise that level of democracy and level of economic development are 
associated with variations of economic voting. Since it is still difficult to allege whether 
pocketbook voting or sociotropic voting is more important than the other, both 
pocketbook and sociotropic evaluation are controlled in the voter choice model 
accordingly to figure out which one exerts more effect than the other. In addition to 
variables of economic voting, media consumption, talking about politics, level of 
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education, and level of political sophistication are independent variables which may 
influence voter choice. Level of democracy and level of economic development are the 
two national level variables. This research expect to explore a nomothetic explanation of 
economic voting and make contribution to controversies and debates of economic voting 
-- to establish the relationship between level of democracy and level of economic 
development and economic voting in comparative perspective. The following section 
delineates the model specification. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
My methodology section encompasses data, variables, statistical methods and 
model specification, and hypotheses. The model specification of cross-national analysis 
and comparative case study are discussed separately. 
1.3.1 Data 
Both cross-national analysis and comparative case study use individual-level 
survey datasets. For cross-national analysis, my data is composed of survey respondents 
from first-round national surveys (2003-7) across 58 nations from Global Barometer 
(Table 1.1) and 2010 Latino Barometro national surveys from 18 Latin American 
countries (Table 1.2).2 The Global Barometer survey data is used to measure 
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations.3 The 2010 Latino 
Barometro data is used to estimate voter choice because voter choice is only available in 
Latino Barometro surveys. Please refer to appendix A for questions used for Global 
Barometer and appendix B for questions used for Latino Barometro. 
                                                          
2 Global Barometer: www.jdsurvey.net/gbs/gbs.jsp ; Latino Barometro: www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp 
3 Global Barometer is composed of national surveys from Asia Barometer, Latio Barometro, Afro 
Barometer, and Arab Barometer. The wordings are different for each question, but the meanings are the 
same. Please refer to Appendix A to see the different ways of asking respondents for each question. 
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   For comparative case study, I use Mexico Panel Studies, including the 1997, 2000, 
2006, and 2012 panel studies (Lawson, Chappell et al. 2007).4 Except for the 1997 panel 
study which is the Mexico City election, these are presidential election surveys (see 
questions in Appendix C, D, E, and F). The last wave of each survey conducted 
immediately after Election Day, is used for analysis in order to establish a comparison 
with the cross-section datasets for Taiwan. The datasets for Taiwan are from the Center 
for Survey Research in Academia Sinica and Taiwan’s Election and Democratization 
Study (TEDS) at National Chengchi University (see questions in Appendix G, H, I, J, and 
K).5 Post-election independence samples are used. Although TEDS has panel studies as 
well, they are quite different from the ones I used for Mexico. Instead of interviewing the 
same respondents before and immediately after a particular election, the TEDS studies 
interview the same respondents from one election to the next (Wu and Lin, 2012). 
Therefore, I chose to use the cross-section data only. 
1.3.2 Variables 
Because my dissertation contains cross-national study and comparative case study, 
there are national-level (level 2) variables and individual-level (level 1) variables. 
Answers such as “don’t know”, “forget it”, “decline to answer”, and missing values are 
all recoded as missing values. All variables are described in detail as follows. 
  
                                                          
4 Senior project personnel for the Mexico panel study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen 
Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Kenneth Greene, Joseph Klesner, Chappell 
Lawson (principal investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poiré, 
and David Shirk. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0517971) 
and Reforma newspaper; fieldwork was conducted by Reforma newspaper’s polling and research team 
under the direction of Alejandro Moreno (http://mexicopanelstudy.mit.edu/). 
5 The Taiwan survey datasets were conducted in different institutions. The survey of the 1996 presidential 
election was obtained from the Center for Survey Research in Academia Sinica. With the exception of the 
1996 survey dataset, all survey data was obtained by TEDS at National Chengchi University, Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
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1.3.2.1 National-Level Variables 
 Level of democracy (polity score) and level of economic development (GDP per 
capita) are national level variables which have been entered manually in the dataset.  
 Level of democracy is the macro-level variable referring to the polity score for 
each country according to the year in which the survey was conducted. The score is from 
10 (most democratic) to -10 (least democratic).6 
Level of economic development can be explained by the economic index. The 
natural log of Gross Domestic Product Per capita (GDP) of each country is used in this 
research.7 
1.3.2.2 Individual-Level Variables 
 Voter choice asks respondents who they voted for in the last presidential election. 
This is the dichotomous variable in Latino Barometro and in some Mexico Panel Studies 
and the TEDS studies if there are only two presidential candidates in the elections. For 
Latino Barometro, the voter choice is recoded as a dummy variable (0= the opposition 
party; 1= the incumbent party). The voter choice in Latino Barometro is a hypothetical 
question which asks respondents which party would they vote for if elections were held 
this Sunday (please see Appendix B). For Mexico voter choice and the voter choice in 
1996 and 2000 presidential elections in Taiwan, there are at least three presidential 
candidates and the voter choice is the nominal one which does not have a unique ordering. 
 Retrospective economic evaluation asks respondents about the national economic 
condition over the last year. This is the dependent variable in measuring the model of 
retrospective economic evaluation and it is the independent variable in voter choice. 
                                                          
6 Polity score website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
7 GDP per capita is from the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
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Prospective economic evaluation asks respondents about future national economic 
evaluation compared with current economic evaluation. This is the dependent variable in 
measuring prospective economic evaluation and it is the independent variable in voter 
choice. 
 Pocketbook evaluation (personal or family economic evaluation) refers to whether 
the respondent is personally better or worse off in the last year or so and is usually used 
to measure pocketbook voting. This variable is based on the idea that whether people 
think the national economic condition is good or not depends on whether they are 
personally better or worse off (Weatherford, 1983; Pomper, 1993; Hetherington, 1996). 
In this sense, personal economic evaluation can influence national economic evaluation. 
Both retrospective and prospective pocketbook evaluations are included. 
For both sociotropic evaluation and pocketbook evaluation, they are ordinal 
variables which may range from much worse (-2) to much better (2) or from worse (-1) to 
better (1). 
Media consumption which is an ordinal variable refers to how much time 
respondents spend with television. Hetherington (1996) contends that more consumption 
can lead to negative national economic evaluation. His assumptions and findings are 
based on the idea that there is more negative news coverage about the national economic 
condition on television. In other words, more consumption of negative news coverage 
regarding the national economy can influence voters to evaluate national economic 
condition negatively. However, it is difficult to explain why more consumption of media 
can lead to either positive or negative national economic evaluation since whether there is 
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more positive or negative news coverage of the national economy on television is 
unknown unless content analysis is conducted. 
In order to conquer that challenge, I use a different measurement (variable) in 
comparative case study. It asks respondents which television channels or programs they 
usually watch. In Mexico, there are two main media networks, Televisa and Televisión 
Azteca; they represent 90% of the viewership in Mexico. Televisa is more likely to lean 
toward the PRI, while the newer Televisión Azteca network tends to be more sympathetic 
toward the National Action Party (PAN). Neither of the two networks is in favor of the 
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) (Lawson and McCann, 2005; Venezuela and 
McCombs, 2007). In Taiwan, television stations are categorized into two camps 
according to their partisan bias: the pan-blue camp (Taiwan Television, China Television, 
Chinese Television System, TVBS, Chung-tien Televsion, and ETTV) and the pan-green 
camp (Formosa Television and San-lih E-Television) (Lo, 2013). Studies of political 
communication in both countries claim that television news is usually the main sources of 
information and can affect political behaviors (Lawson and McCann, 2005; Venezuela 
and McCombs, 2007; Chen, 2013). 
Talk about politics which is also an ordinal variable is interpersonal 
communication that serves as an additional important source of political information 
(Hetherington, 1996). It mainly asks respondents how often they discuss politics with 
family members, colleagues, and friends during election. 
Political interests asks how interested are respondents in politics? Political 
interests and level of education together are used to be the interaction term in lieu of 
political sophistication since items of political sophistication are not available either in 
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Global Barometer or Latino Barometro. I assume that people who have a high level of 
political sophistication have high interest in politics and have better ability to process 
political knowledge they obtain. 
Education is the respondent’s highest level of education. It can range from 
“illiteracy” to “graduate school” (please refer to appendixes). Scholars contend that level 
of education can influence voter ability to attribute responsibility for economic condition 
to the government. Therefore, level of education has been demonstrated to be a 
significant determinant for national economic evaluations (Gomez and Wilson, 2006; 
Choi, 2010). 
Political sophistication refers to “incorporating an individual’s level of political 
awareness and cognitive integration” (Luskin, 1987). It is a bundle of concepts: to be 
concerned about politics, to have political knowledge, and to recognize major positions 
on issues and interrelationships between those positions (Gomez and Wilson, 2006; 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991). Gomez and Wilson (2006) claim that individuals 
at different levels of political sophistication have different abilities to link problems and 
their sources. Voters who are highly politically sophisticated are better able to attribute 
responsibility for economic change to the government. Unfortunately, there are no items 
regarding political sophistication available in Global Barometer. For cross-national 
analysis, I use the interaction term of political interest and level of education (both are 
ordinal variables) as an alternative to measure political sophistication. 
In comparative case study, there are specific survey questions designed to 
measure the political sophistication of respondents in order to allow researchers to 
explore political sophistication directly. Respondents may be asked whether they know 
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the name of the president and prime minister, the leaders of the main political parties, the 
congressional candidates in the respondents’ districts, the number of years in a 
congressman’s term, the ruling party of the government, the unemployment rate, and so 
on. In the comparative case study of Taiwan and Mexico, I use factor analysis for those 
items and take the first factor score in the model. 
Party identification asks respondents which political party they feel closest to. In 
electoral behavior studies, party identification is always the most important determinant 
of voter choice. Party ID is available in Latino Barometro only. It is a dichotomous 
variable (1= the incumbent party and 0= the opposition party). In comparative case study, 
both weak and strong partisans are recoded as one category. In Mexico, I treat each party 
as one dummy variable according to most of studies in Mexico. In Taiwan, I recode party 
identification as an ordinal variable according to each party’s position on cross-strait 
relationship. 
The specific variable in the Mexico case is ideology (left vs. right). In Mexico, the 
PAN is the right-wing party and the PRD the left-wing party (Dominguez and McCann, 
1996; Hart, 2013). 
The specific variable in the Taiwan case is national identity. National identity 
refers to people’s attitudes about the relationship between Taiwan and China. As 
mentioned before, national identity is an important determinant of voter choice in Taiwan. 
Typically the survey question asks respondents whether they prefer independence for 
Taiwan, unification with China, or the status quo. The DPP (or pan-green camp) supports 
independence while the KMT (or pan-blue camp) occupies the middle ground between 
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the status quo and unification. National identity is an ordinal variable from 0 
(independence) to 10 (unification).  
1.3.3 Statistical Methods and Models 
For statistical analysis, my dissertation mainly uses survey data. Given the nested 
nature of the data and the violation of the independence assumption, traditional ordinary 
least square (OLS) and analyses of variance (ANOVA) data are not appropriate for cross-
national analysis. Because the cross-national analysis dataset contains individual 
observations nested within nations, I use multilevel models (or hierarchical linear models 
and mixed effects models). The fundamental goal of a multilevel model is to examine the 
influences of independent variables from several contexts (individual and national levels). 
In other words, the goal of a multilevel model is to predict values of some dependent 
variables based on a function of a predictor variables at more than one level. Multilevel 
data include multiple units of analysis, one nested within the other (Steenbergen and 
Jones, 2002). 
The multilevel models in my dissertation measure whether the effect of 
information sources on national economic evaluation and subsequent voter choice varies 
across countries with different levels of democracy and levels of economic development. 
In other words, I would like to explore if level of democracy and level of economic 
development can exert different effects of information sources on economic voting. Some 
research on electoral behavior and democratization argues that level of economic 
development and level of democracy are associated with the number of parties and the 
level of women’s and minority representation (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Coppedge, 
1997; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). It is necessary for countries to meet the threshold 
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of economic growth and level of democracy for their political institutions, such as 
electoral systems, to produce their expected effects, such as the number of parties, 
women’s representation, and minority representation (Moser and Scheiner, 2012; 
Matland, 1998). In this sense, level of democracy and level of economic development are 
highly associated with electoral behaviors, and I assume these effects as plausible and 
specify my model accordingly at the national level. I am going to run multilevel ordered 
logit models to estimate both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations 
and multilevel logit models for voter choice. The basic form of hierarchical linear model 
is as follows: 
Level 1 (individuals)     𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗    
Level 2 (nations)          𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑍𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗   
                                  𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11𝑍𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗 
Where: i = 1, 2,….., 𝑛𝑗  for the number of individual (level 1) within a given 
nation unit (level 2: j = 1,2…., J). Individual i is nested within nation j. 𝑋𝑖= individual 
level variables and 𝑍𝑗 = national level variables 
After substituting the Level 2 effects into the Level 1 equation, we obtain: 
              𝑌𝑖𝑗 = [𝛾00 +  𝛾10𝑋𝑖𝑗 +  𝛾01𝑍𝑗 + 𝛾11𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑍𝑗] + [𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗]  
                            Fixed Effects                         Random Effects 
For my comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan, I use ordered logit models 
for retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation and logit models or 
multinomial logit models for voter choice. Multilevel ordered logit models, multilevel 
logit models, and models for comparative case study are described in the following 
sections. 
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1.3.3.1 Multilevel Ordered Logit Models 
Multilevel ordered logit models are used to measure retrospective and prospective 
national economic evaluations, which are ordinal variables (from -2 much worse to 2 
much better). The multilevel ordered logit model, which is an extension of the single-
level ordered logit model, measures cumulative comparisons of the ordinal response 
(Hedeker, 2007). A random intercept cumulative logit model is specified as: 
log [
Pr (𝑌𝑖𝑗≤𝑐)
Pr (𝑌𝑖𝑗>𝑐)
] = logit(𝛾𝑐𝑖𝑗) = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗    c =1, …C-1 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the ordinal outcome for individual i in group j and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is an 
individual-level explanatory variable.  𝑢𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) is the level 2 random effect or 
residual (Steele, 2011). 
The multilevel ordered logit model for retrospective and prospective national 
economic evaluations (with intercept only) is specified as: 
Level 1 Let   𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑐) 
log [
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐
1−𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐
] = 𝑟𝑐 − [𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽2𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗)+𝛽3𝑗(𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4𝑗 (𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5𝑗(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽6𝑗(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽7𝑗(𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗) ]   (c=1, …, C-1) (1) 
Level 2    𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + µ𝑖𝑗    (1a) 
 Where: i = 1, 2, …., 7𝑗  level 1 units nested within j = 1, 2, ….., J level 2.  𝛾𝑖𝑗  is a 
fixed intercept and µ𝑖𝑗 is a random intercept. 𝑢𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) is the level 2 random effect or 
residual. The model with C-1 strictly increasing model thresholds  𝛾𝑐(i. e. , 𝑟1 < 𝑟2 … . <
𝑟𝑐−1). 
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Then the random coefficient model (e.g., group variable: polity score) in level 2 is 
as follows (equation 2 is the same as equation 1): 
Level 1  log [
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐
1−𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐
] = 𝑟𝑐 − [𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽2𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗)+𝛽3𝑗(𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4𝑗 (𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5𝑗(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽6𝑗(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽7𝑗(𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗)]  (c=1, …, C-1) (2) 
Level 2  𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 +  𝛾𝑖1(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗) +  µ𝑖𝑗 (2a)     
The random coefficient model which allows the intercept and slope (polity score) 
to vary across nations assumes that the random intercept and slope are independent across 
nations and independent of the covariates 𝑥𝑖𝑗. Also the random intercept and slope have a 
bivariate normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix shown as follows 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012): 
Ψ = [
𝜓11 𝜓12
𝜓21 𝜓22
]       𝜓21 =  𝜓12 = 0  
The likelihood ratio test which compares the random intercept model with the 
random coefficient model can demonstrate which model is more appropriate than the 
other. If the test is significant (the asymptotic p-value <.05), the random coefficient 
model is more appropriate. The likelihood ratio test can also compares the random 
coefficient model (with uncorrelated variance) with the random coefficient model (with 
correlated variance). If the test is significant, the random coefficient model with 
uncorrelated variance is rejected in favor of the random coefficient model with correlated 
variance. 
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1.3.3.2 Multilevel Logit Models 
In models of voter choice, the retrospective and prospective economic evaluations 
are added in the models as independent variables. Voter choice is a dichotomous variable 
in which the incumbent party is coded 1 and the opposition party is coded 0. The 
multilevel logit model of voter choice is written in terms of the log odds of the 
probability of voting for the incumbent party (the answer is 1), which is denoted 𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
Pr (𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1). In addition, the question of party identification is available in Latino 
Barometro and is added in the model. In the same way as voter choice, party 
identification is a dichotomous variable (incumbent party = 1, opposition party = 0). The 
two-level random slope model (with intercept and slope varying only) is as follows: 
Level 1  log {
𝑃𝑖𝑗
1−𝑃𝑖𝑗
} =  𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽2𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗)+𝛽3𝑗(𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4𝑗 (𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5𝑗(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽6𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽7𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽8𝑗(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽9𝑗(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽10𝑗((𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 (3) 
Level 2  𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + µ𝑖𝑗        (3a) 
 Where: i = 1, 2, …., 10𝑗 level 1 units nested within j = 1, 2, ….., J level 2.  𝛾𝑖𝑗  is 
a fixed intercept and µ𝑖𝑗 is a random intercept. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  is the level 2 variable. 
 The likelihood ratio tests are conducted for multilevel logit models to compare the 
random intercept model with random slope model and compare the random slope model 
with uncorrelated variance with the model with correlated variance to figure out which 
model is more appropriate than the others. 
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1.3.3.3 Models in the Comparative Case Study 
    The ordered logit models are used to estimate retrospective and prospective 
national economic evaluations. Ordinal responses in ordered logit model assumes that the 
intervals between adjacent categories are equal (Long, 1997). In addition, ordered logit 
model which specifies the cumulative probability of a response is in a higher category 
than s, given a covariate 𝑥𝑖, be structured as 
             Pr(𝑦𝑖 > s|𝑥𝑖) = F(𝛽2𝑥𝑖 − 𝑘𝑠)     s=1, ……., S-1  
 F(．) is a standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the ordered 
logit model. Then the probability for a specific category s can be specified as (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012): 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖) = Pr(𝑦𝑖 > 𝑠 − 1|𝑥𝑖) − Pr(𝑦𝑖 > s|𝑥𝑖) = 𝐹(𝛽2𝑥𝑖 − 𝑘𝑠−1) − 𝐹(𝛽2𝑥𝑖 − 𝑘𝑠) 
The multinomial logit models and logit models are used to estimate voter choice. 
The nominal variable is a categorical variable which is not ordered or does not have a 
unique ordering. In this sense, the multinomial logit models measure elections which 
have at least three candidates. In the case of s candidates which is usually coded 1, 2, …, 
S ), the probability of category s is specified as (Ibid.): 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖) =  
exp (𝛽1
[𝑠]
+𝛽2
[𝑠]
𝑥𝑖)
1+exp (𝛽1
[𝑐]
+𝛽2
[𝑐]
𝑥𝑖)
      s=1, 2, ……, S 
Where the index c takes the values (1, 2, …., S) to produce the required s terms in 
the sum in the denominator. The coefficients display log odds-ratios for the odds of each 
category versus the baseline category (Ibid.). In other words, multinomial logit models 
can be regarded as simultaneously estimating binary logits (probits) for all possible 
combinations of responses. For example, multinomial logit models with three categories 
26 
(1, 2, 3) are similar to simultaneously measuring three logit models (e.g. estimating three 
combinations: 1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, and 2 vs. 3). 
The logit model which estimates elections which have only two candidates; 
therefore, the outcome should be dichotomous. In contrast to linear regression which the 
expectation of the response is modeled as a linear function ( E(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖) of the 
covariates, the expectation of a dichotomous response (0 or 1) is just the probability that 
the answer is 1. The nonlinear function is specified as follows (Ibid.): 
E(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) = ℎ(𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖) 
Where h is the inverse logit function of the linear predictor. 
  The models for Mexico and Taiwan are as follows: 
1.3.3.3.1 Mexico Case 
 The ordered logit models for both retrospective and prospective national economic 
evaluation for Mexico are specified as follows: 
 logit [Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > s|𝑥𝑖)] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +
𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝐼 + 𝛽8𝑃𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑅𝐷 +
𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 Since there have been three main parties (PRI, PAN, and PRD) in 1997 Mexico 
city election and presidential elections, I use multinomial logit models to measure voter 
choice in Mexico. The multinomial logit models for voter choice in Mexico are specified 
as: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖) =
exp(𝛽
1
[𝑠] + 𝛽
2
[𝑠]𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3
[𝑠]𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽12
[𝑠]𝑥12𝑖 + 𝛽13
[𝑠]𝑥13𝑖)
∑ exp (𝛽
1
[𝑐] + 𝛽
2
[𝑐]𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3
[𝑐]𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽12
[𝑐]𝑥12𝑖 + 𝛽13
[𝑐]𝑥13𝑖)
3
𝑐=1
 
27 
S=1, 2, 3 Where 𝑥2𝑖 is retrospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥3𝑖 is 
prospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥4𝑖 is talking about politics, 𝑥5𝑖 is media 
consumption, 𝑥6𝑖 is ideology, 𝑥7𝑖 is retrospective pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥8𝑖 is 
prospective pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥9𝑖 is level of education, 𝑥10𝑖 is political 
sophistication, and 𝑥11𝑖, 𝑥12𝑖, and 𝑥13𝑖 are the party identification (PRI, PAN, and PRD) 
dummies. The index c takes the values (1, 2, …., S) to produce the required s terms in the 
sum in the denominator. 
1.3.3.3.2 Taiwan Case 
 The ordered logit models for both retrospective and prospective national economic 
evaluation for Taiwan are specified as follows: 
 logit[Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > s|𝑥𝑖)] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +
𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷 
Since there were four presidential candidates in 1996 presidential election and 
three candidates in 2000 presidential election, the multinomial logit models are used to 
estimate voter choice in 1996 and 2000. The multinomial logit models are specified as 
follows (take the 1996 presidential election for example): 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖) =
exp(𝛽
1
[𝑠] + 𝛽
2
[𝑠]𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3
[𝑠]𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽10
[𝑠]𝑥10𝑖 + 𝛽11
[𝑠]𝑥11𝑖)
∑ exp (𝛽
1
[𝑐] + 𝛽
2
[𝑐]𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3
[𝑐]𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽10
[𝑐]𝑥10𝑖 + 𝛽11
[𝑐]𝑥11𝑖)
4
𝑐=1
 
S=1, 2, 3, 4 Where 𝑥2𝑖 is retrospective pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥3𝑖  is prospective 
pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥4𝑖 is retrospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥5𝑖 is 
prospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥6𝑖 is level of education, 𝑥7𝑖 is political 
sophistication, 𝑥8𝑖 is media consumption, 𝑥9𝑖 is talking about politics, 𝑥10𝑖 is party 
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identification, and 𝑥11𝑖.is national identity. The index c takes the values (1, 2, …., S) to 
produce the required s terms in the sum in the denominator. 
The logit models for 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections in Taiwan are 
specified as follows: 
logit {Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖)}
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑖 + 𝛽3RetroPocketbook3𝑖 + 𝛽4ProsPocketbook4𝑖
+ 𝛽5Media5𝑖 + 𝛽6Political sophistication6𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘7𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦8𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐼𝐷9𝑖
+ 𝛽10Retrospective evaluation10𝑖 + 𝛽11Prospective evaluation11𝑖 
1.3.4 Hypotheses 
My hypotheses are based on the theory of information sources on economic 
voting in 1.2. The media institution is more well-established in established democracies 
and it is necessary for level of democracy and level of economic development to meet the 
minimum threshold for political institutions to produce the expected results. In this sense, 
voters in established democracies are better informed and their voting behaviors are more 
affected by the media than those in countries with low level of democracy and economic 
development (Matland, 1998; Mickiewicz, 2008; Moser and Scheiner, 2012). Hypotheses 
for cross-national analysis and comparative case study are as follows. 
1.3.4.1 Cross-National Analyses 
The hypothesis for multilevel ordered logit model: 
 The level of democracy and level of economic development can impose strong 
influence on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations across 
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countries. In particular, countries with higher level of democracy and higher level of 
economic development can have stronger effect on national economic evaluations. 
The hypothesis for multilevel logit model: 
The level of democracy and level of economic development can exert significant 
effects on voter choice across countries. In particular, countries with higher level of 
democracy and higher level of economic development can produce stronger effect on 
voter choice. 
1.3.4.2 Comparative Case Study 
I hypothesize that the media may not have any influence on economic voting 
before 2000, when the media and political systems were not entirely open and free in 
both countries. Even after 2000 the media institutions may still be less developed, and 
thus the media might not have influenced economic voting between 2000 and before the 
second change of party in government and in opposition. After the second change of 
party in government and in opposition, the media can better influence economic voting 
since the media and political institutions are totally free and open. 
Here are hypotheses for Mexico case: 
Hypothesis I: The media did not have any influence on economic voting in the 
1997 Mexico City election, in which the media and political systems were still not totally 
open and free. 
Hypothesis II: The media effect on economic voting may not be significant in 
either 2000 or 2006 since the media institutions were still not entirely developed. 
Hypothesis III: The media can influence economic voting in 2012 since the media 
system was well established. 
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Here are hypotheses for Taiwan case: 
Hypothesis I: The media did not influence economic voting in 1996, in which the 
media and political systems had not been totally open and free yet.8 
Hypothesis II: The media effect on economic voting may not be significant in 2000 
and 2004 either since the media institutions were still developing. 
Hypothesis III: The media influenced economic voting in 2008 and 2012 because 
the political and media systems were free and open and were well-established. 
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 1 is the research design of this dissertation, including research questions, 
literature review, the theory of information sources on economic voting, methodology, 
hypotheses, and chapter outline. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are cross-national analyses using 
multilevel models. Chapter 2 explores the effect of information sources on retrospective 
national economic evaluation. I run ordered logit models for each country before running 
multilevel ordered logit models to compare them with multilevel models and demonstrate 
that macro-level effect is significant and it is essential to measure the effect of 
information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation by multilevel ordered 
logit models. The random intercept and random coefficient models are measured first. 
                                                          
8 In Taiwan, most newspapers and TV news stations have partisan bias, and people’s partisanship can affect 
their choices (Lo et al., 1998; Lo and Huang, 2000; Lo, 2013). The questions asked “which newspaper do 
you usually read or TV news channel do you usually watch?” It depends on which question is available in 
the survey. The media consumption in 1996 and 2004 asked respondents “which newspaper do you usually 
read?” In 1996, there was no pan-green news TV channel so I chose the question of newspaper for analysis. 
In 2004, the TEDS survey did not ask a question about news TV channels. For the elections in 2000, 2008, 
and 2012, I used the TV news channel which respondents usually watched. Generally speaking, there are 
two categories: pro-KMT (blue camp) and pro-DPP (green camp). I categorized TV stations and 
newspapers into two groups (pan-blue camp and pan-green camp). For TV stations, the pro-blue camp 
includes TVBS, Era Communication, TTV, China TV (CTV), Chinese Television System (CTS), ETTV, 
and Chungtien Television (CTT); the pro-green camp includes Formosa TV (FTV) and Sanlih E-televison 
(SET). For newspapers, the pro-blue camp includes China Times, United Daily, Central Daily News (CD 
News), and Chinese Daily; the pro-green camp includes Liberal Times, the Commons Daily, Taiwan Times, 
and the Independent Daily News. 
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Then the subset of Polity score and GDP per capita dummies are estimated. Chapter 3 
focuses on the effect of information sources on prospective economic evaluation. The 
procedure is the same as chapter 2. I run ordered logit models first and then multilevel 
models. Chapter 4 focuses on the effect of information sources on voter choice. 
Retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations are added as independent 
variables to estimate voter choice. Similar to chapter 2 and chapter 3, I run logit models 
for each country before running multilevel logit models to verify that it is necessary to 
use multilevel logit models to estimate the effect of information sources on voter choice. 
Then I proceed to examine the random intercept and random slope models and the subset 
of Polity score and GDP per capita dummies.9 The subset of polity score and GDP per 
capita dummies in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 can help to discover which level of democracy and 
level of economic development explain the between-country variance on national 
economic evaluations and voter choice. Chapter 5 is the comparative case study of 
Mexico and Taiwan. I first explain why it is important to do a comparative case study. 
Then I analyze the Mexico and Taiwan cases, respectively. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of 
the dissertation. In addition to briefly summarizing the findings of the previous chapters, I 
also discuss the limitations of this research and the relevant promising issues that deserve 
further exploration in the future. 
                                                          
9 Please refer to Leckie (2010) for the subset of categorical dummies in multilevel models.  
  
3
2 
Table 1.1 Countries in Global Barometer with Level of Democracy and Level of Economic Development (2003-2007) 
Country Polity Score Income 
group 
Country Polity Score Income 
group 
Country Polity Score Income 
group 
Japan 10 H Guatemala 8 M Nigeria 4 L 
Hong Kong - H Honduras 7 M Senegal 8 L 
Korea 8 H Mexico 8 M South Africa 9 M 
China -8 M Nicaragua 8 M Tanzania -1 L 
Mongolia 10 M Panama 9 M Uganda -1 L 
Philippines 8 M Paraguay 8 M Zambia 5 L 
Taiwan 10 H Peru 9 M Zimbabwe -4 L 
Thailand -5 M Uruguay 10 M Bangladesh 6 L 
Indonesia 8 M Venezuela 6 M India 9 L 
Singapore -2 H Benin 6 L Nepal -6 L 
Vietnam -7 L Botswana 8 M Pakistan -5 L 
Cambodia 2 L Cape Verde 10 M Sri Lanka 5 M 
Argentina 8 M Ghana 8 L Jordan -2 M 
Bolivia 8 L Kenya 8 L Palestine - L 
Brazil 8 M Lesotho 8 L Algeria 2 M 
Colombia 7 M Madagascar 7 L Morocco -6 M 
Costa Rica 10 M Malawi 6 L Kuwait -7 H 
Chile 9 M Mali 7 L Lebanon 7 M 
Ecuador 6 M Mozambique 6 L    
El Salvador 7 M Namibia 6 M    
1. H: high income (GDP per capita＞＝10,000 USD); M: middle income (GDP per capita: 1,000~9,999 USD); L: Low income (GDP 
per capita<1,000 USD) 
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Table 1.2 Countries in Latino Barometro with Level of Democracy and Level of 
Economic Development (2010) 
Country Polity Score Income group 
Argentina 8 MU 
Bolivia 7 ML 
Brazil 8 H 
Colombia 7 MU 
Costa Rica 10 MU 
Chile 10 H 
Ecuador 5 ML 
El Salvador 8 ML 
Guatemala 8 ML 
Honduras 7 ML 
Mexico 8 MU 
Nicaragua 9 ML 
Panama 9 MU 
Paraguay 8 ML 
Peru 9 MU 
Uruguay 10 H 
Venezuela 1 H 
Dominican Republic 8 MU 
1. H: high income (GDP per capita＞＝10,000 USD); MU: upper middle income (GDP 
per capita: 5,000~9,999 USD); ML: lower middle income (GDP per capita: 
1,000~4,999 USD) 
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Figure 1.1: Framework of cross-national analysis of information sources on economic voting
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON RETROSPECTIVE 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EVALUATION 
This chapter explores the effect of information sources on retrospective national 
economic evaluation in comparative perspective by using multilevel modeling. First, I 
run single-level ordered logit models for each country to discover differences among 
countries. I then run multilevel ordered logit models. Two-level random intercept and 
two-level random slope models are estimated and interpreted to see the country-level 
effect. The models analyze how much level of democracy and level of economic 
development can influence retrospective national economic evaluation. The third and the 
fourth parts of the chapter further analyze the two-level random coefficient models, and 
level of democracy and level of economic development are explored respectively. In 
particular, level of democracy and level of economic development are treated as 
categorical to estimate what levels explain the between-country variance more than others. 
In other words, random coefficients on a subset of polity score and GDP per capita 
dummies are estimated to discover which level of democracy and level of economic 
development can have the strongest effect on retrospective national economic evaluation. 
Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the effect of information sources on 
retrospective national economic evaluation. I contend that consolidated countries and 
countries with medium GDP per capita have the most substantive effect on retrospective 
national economic evaluation.
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2.1 SINGLE-LEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS IN EACH COUNTRY 
Table 2.1 presents ordered logit models of the effect of information sources on 
retrospective national economic evaluation for each country.10 The media effect on 
retrospective national economic evaluation is not necessarily statistically significant in all 
countries, although coefficients in most countries are negative. In other words, watching 
more television leads respondents to believe national economic condition has become 
worse over the past year. Talk about politics with others is not statistically significant 
except in Brazil, Guatemala, Panama, Lesotho, and South Africa. The effect is different 
across those five countries as well; the relationship can be positively or negatively 
correlated. Retrospective pocketbook evaluation is positively correlated with 
retrospective national economic evaluation in all countries. When people believe they 
have personally become better off over the past year, they are more likely to believe 
national economic condition has also become better over the last year. However, the 
influence of prospective pocketbook evaluation is quite different from that of 
retrospective pocketbook evaluation. Prospective pocketbook evaluation is less influential. 
It is not significant in every country. The other three variables -- education, political 
interest, and political sophistication (the interaction between education and political 
interest) -- are less influential. 
With the exception of retrospective pocketbook evaluation, which has the most 
substantive effect on retrospective national economic evaluation, the effect of information 
sources is quite different across countries. It is difficult to derive a general rule about the 
                                                          
10 A total of 23 countries (districts) are not included in the single-level ordered logit models in table 2.1 
because of missing values in some variables. They are Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, China, Mongolia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, and Lebanon. 
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effect of information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation when only 
ordered logit models for each country are estimated. I wonder whether level of 
democracy and level of economic development can account for these differences across 
countries. As I mentioned in the first chapter, traditional ordinary least square (OLS) and 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) data are not appropriate for cross-national analysis 
because individual observations are nested within each country and the independence 
assumption is violated. Because the cross-national analysis dataset contains individual 
observations nested within nations, multilevel models (also known as hierarchical linear 
models and mixed effects models) are more appropriate for estimating the effect of 
information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation on both the individual 
and the national level. 
2.2 MULTILEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS 
Table 2.2 presents multilevel models of retrospective national economic 
evaluation. I run one random intercept model (model 1) and five random slope models 
(models 2 through 6). The interpretation of the six multilevel models is as follows. 
2.2.1 Random Intercept Model 
Model 1 is a random intercept model, which allows the model intercept to vary 
randomly across countries. For fixed effects coefficients, retrospective and prospective 
pocketbook evaluation, media consumption, and talking about politics with others are 
individually significant. When respondents positively evaluated their past and future 
personal economic evaluation, they were more likely to believe national economic 
condition had become better over the past year. The more time they spent watching 
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television, the more negatively they tended to view retrospective national economic 
condition. 
Figure 1 presents the effects of media consumption on retrospective national 
economic evaluation by each country on fixed effect. The figure shows that more media 
consumption does not increase the probability of positive retrospective national economic 
condition. In contrast to media consumption, talking more about politics with others leads 
to positive retrospective national economic evaluation. The intercept variance is 0.291. 
The likelihood ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is 
between-country variance across countries. In other words, the variation of retrospective 
national economic evaluation can be attributed to between-country factors. 
2.2.2 Random Slope Models (Models 2 thorough 6) 
The random intercept model in model 1 shows significant between-country 
variance in retrospective national economic evaluation. Models 2 through 6 are random 
slope models, which allow the effects of level of democracy (polity score) and level of 
economic development (GDP per capita) to vary across nations. Models 3 and 5 allow the 
random intercepts and slopes to co-vary (as opposed to the default, in which they are 
uncorrelated). 
2.2.2.1 Random Coefficients of Polity Score (Models 2 and 3) 
Model 2 is a random slope model that allows polity score to vary across countries. 
There is no difference in the fixed effects coefficients and standard errors in models 1 and 
2. In model 2, the intercept variance is the same as in model 1, and the random coefficient 
of polity score is close to zero. Apparently, polity score does not explain much of the 
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variance across countries. In other words, level of democracy in general may have little 
influence on retrospective national economic evaluation. 
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. Most of the fixed 
effects coefficients are the same as those in model 2. The coefficients of prospective 
pocketbook evaluation and political sophistication change slightly, but only prospective 
pocketbook evaluation is individually significant. The between-country variance as a 
function of polity score is as follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢8𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢8𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢8𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2  
              = 0.024 − 0.10 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 0.09 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2  
Figure 2.2 shows the graph of the between-country variance as a function of 
polity score. The between-country variance increases rapidly as a function of polity score. 
The likelihood ratio test can determine whether polity score can explain any of the 
between-country variance of the effect of information sources on retrospective national 
economic evaluation. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 
2 is nested within the correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It 
implies that the correlated variance model (model 3) is not necessarily more appropriate 
than the uncorrelated variance model (model 2). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test 
(assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation 
model 3) is also not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). The two likelihood ratio tests confirm 
that the random effect for polity score is not significant and does not account much for 
between-country variance of retrospective national economic evaluation. 
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2.2.2.2 Random Coefficients of GDP per Capita (Models 4 and 5) 
Model 4 is a random slope model that allows GDP per capita to vary across 
countries. Compared with model 1, only fixed effects coefficients of prospective 
pocketbook evaluation and political sophistication change slightly. The intercept variance 
in model 4 is close to zero, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.313. That 
indicates that GDP per capita probably explains some of the variance across countries. 
Model 5 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects 
coefficients are the same as those in model 4. The intercept variance of model 5 (0.006) is 
greater than that in model 4, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita increases from 
0.313 to 0.978. The between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita is as 
follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢9𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢9𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢9𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗
2  
             = 0.006 − 0.154 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 0.978 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗
2  
Figure 2.3 is the between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita. The 
between-country variance shows a linear increase as GDP per capita increases. 
Nevertheless, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 4 is 
nested within the correlated equation model 5) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It 
implies that the correlated variance model (model 5) is not necessarily more appropriate 
than the uncorrelated variance model (model 4). In addition, the likelihood ratio test 
(assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation 
model 5) is also not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). The two likelihood ratio tests 
demonstrate that the random effect of GDP per capita is not significant, and GDP per 
capita does not explain much between-country variance. 
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2.2.2.3 Random Coefficients of Polity Score and GDP Per Capita (Model 6) 
Model 6 allows both polity score and GDP per capita to vary across nations. The 
fixed effects coefficients remain the same as those in model 1. Neither of those is 
individually significant. The intercept variance is 0.053. The random coefficient of polity 
score is approximate to zero, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.004. 
Although the likelihood ratio tests of the previous models indicate that polity score and 
GDP per capita do not explain much between-country variance, the random coefficients 
of polity score and GDP per capita in model 6 indicate that GDP per capita probably 
explains more variance across countries than polity score. 
2.3 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF POLITY SCORE DUMMIES 
It seems that level of democracy does not explain much of between-country 
variance on retrospective national economic evaluation, given that the random coefficient 
of polity score is approximate to zero and the intercept variance is the same as that in the 
random intercept model in model 1. Because this research surmises level of democracy 
can impose strong influence on retrospective national economic evaluation, I wonder 
whether countries with higher levels of democracy exhibit more variance than those with 
lower levels. Although the likelihood ratio tests indicate that polity score does not explain 
much between-country variance, figure 2.2 shows that the between-country variance as a 
function of polity score increase steeply as polity score increases. It is highly possible that 
between-country variance may be different in countries with higher levels of democracy. 
In order to explore this effect, random coefficients on a subset of polity score dummies 
are estimated. The subset of polity score dummies includes polity 5 (score: 10), polity 4 
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(score: 6~9), polity 3 (score: 1~5), polity 2 (score: -5~0), and polity 1 (score: -10~6).11 
Three models are interpreted. The first is a random intercept model with polity dummies 
in the fixed effects. The second adds the random coefficients of polity 5. The third adds 
the random coefficients of polity 5 along with correlated variance. 
2.3.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of Polity Dummies 
Model 1 in table 2.3 presents the random intercept model on a subset of polity 
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as in the random intercept model in 
table 2.2. Polity 2 (closed anocracy) is the only polity dummy that is individually 
significant. The intercept variance is 0.245, and the likelihood ratio statistic with a 
corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is between-country variance across 
countries. 
2.3.2 Random Coefficients of Polity 5 Only  
The random coefficient model for polity 5 estimates whether between-country 
variance is the same for polities 1 through 4 but different for polity 5. Although the fixed 
effects coefficients in model 2 are almost the same as those in model 1, with the 
exception of talk about politics and the three polity dummies, the intercept variance is 
0.256, and the random coefficient of polity 5 is 0.257. The likelihood ratio test -- 
assuming the intercept-only equation is nested within the intercept-slope equation -- 
shows that the random coefficient for polity 5 is significant (p = 0.0001 < .05). 
2.3.3 Random Slope Model with Correlated Variance 
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects 
coefficients are the same as those in model 2. The intercept variance and random 
                                                          
11 The regime types are categorized by Polity Score: Full democracy (10), Democracy (6-9), Open 
Anocracy (1 to 5), Closed Anocracy (-5~0), and Autocracy (-10 to -6). 
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coefficient for polity 5 are the same as for model 2. The covariance between the intercept 
and polity 5 random effects is 0.0001. Although the likelihood ratio test (assuming the 
uncorrelated model 2 is nested within the correlated model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 
> .05), the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted model 1 is nested within the 
unrestricted model 3) is significant (p = .0004 < .05). This reinforces the fact that the 
random effect for polity 5 is significant. In other words, there is country-variation in the 
difference between polity 5 and the other four polity dummies. The between-country 
variance is estimated as follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢11𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢11𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢11𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗
2  
                      = 0.256 + 0.0002𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + 0.257𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗
2  
Because polity 5 is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of 
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country 
variances: 
  0.256                                               for polity 1 to polity 4 (polity 5 = 0) 
             0.256 + 0.0002 + 0.257 = 0.5132   for polity 5 (polity 5 = 1) 
The variance in polity 5 is more than twice as much as that in polities 1 through 4. 
This indicates that consolidated democracies can produce a more substantial effect on 
retrospective national economic evaluation than countries that are not fully democratic. 
2.4 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF GDP PER CAPITA DUMMIES 
Although the likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect of GDP per 
capita in general is not significant, I still wonder which level of economic development 
can best explain between-country variance. Similar to the hypothesis of the influence of 
level of democracy, it surmises that level of economic development can impose a 
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stronger influence on retrospective national economic evaluation. The plot of the 
between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita in figure 2.3 shows a linear 
increase so I wonder whether countries with higher levels of economic development 
demonstrate more variance than those with lower levels. In order to explore this effect, 
the random coefficients on a subset of GDP per capita dummies (GDPH: high income, 
GDPM: middle income, and GDPL: low income) are estimated.12 The random intercept 
model with GDP per capita dummies in the fixed effects is estimated first. The second 
model adds random coefficient of GDPH (high income), and the third presents random 
coefficient of GDPH along with correlated variance. Given that the covariance between 
the intercept and GDPH random effects is very small and close to zero (model 3 in table 
2.4), the fourth model (random coefficient of GDPM) and the fifth model (random 
coefficient of GDPM along with correlated variance) are estimated in order to determine 
whether GDPH or GDPM explains more between-country variance. 
2.4.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the GDP per Capita Dummies 
Model 1 in table 2.4 is a random intercept model on a subset of GDP per capita 
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in the random intercept 
model in table 2.2. When compared with the random intercept model in table 2.2, adding 
GDP per capita dummies reduces the intercept variance from 0.291 to 0.284. The 
likelihood ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is 
between-country variance across countries. 
2.4.2 Random Coefficients of GDPH Only and Model with Correlated Variance 
The random coefficient model for GDPH can estimate whether between-country 
variance is the same for GDPM and GDPL but different for GDPH. The fixed effects 
                                                          
12 Please refer to table 1.1 for income category. 
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coefficients and intercept variance in model 2 are the same as those in model 1. The 
random slope model with correlated variance in model 3 shows a result similar to that in 
models 1 and 2. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept variances in models 1 through 
3 are nearly the same. The covariance between the intercept and GDPH random effects 
approximates zero. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2 
is nested within the correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). Also, 
the likelihood ratio test -- assuming the random intercept equation (the restricted model in 
model 1) is nested within the intercept-coefficient equation with correlated variance (the 
unrestricted equation in model 3) -- shows that the random effect for GDPH is also not 
significant (p = 1.000 > .05). In other words, GDPH may not explain much between-
country variance. 
2.4.3 Random Coefficients of GDPM Only and Model with Correlated Variance 
Because GDPH does not explain much between-country variance, I estimate 
whether GDPM accounts for more between-country variance than GDPH. Model 4 
presents a random coefficient model for GDPM. The fixed effects coefficients are the 
same as those in the random intercept equation in model 1 with the exception of the 
coefficient of GDPM. The intercept variance decreases from 0.284 to 0.150; the random 
coefficient of GDPM is 0.409.  
Model 5 allows the random intercept and slope to co-vary. The fixed effects 
coefficients remain the same as those in the previous models in table 2.4; only the fixed 
effect coefficient of GDPM changes. The intercept variance increase from 0.150 in model 
4 to 0.193, and the random coefficient of GDPM reduces from 0.409 to 0.138. The 
covariance between the intercept and GDPM random effects is 0.082. The likelihood 
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ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated model 4 is nested within the correlated model 5) 
shows that the random coefficient for GDPM is significant (p = .0000 < .05). In addition, 
the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the 
unrestricted equation model 5 is also significant (p = .0000 < .05). Therefore, the two 
likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect for GDPM is indeed significant, 
and there is country-variation in the difference between GDPM and other two GDP 
dummies (GDPH and GDPL). The between-country variance is estimated as follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢10𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢10𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢10𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗
2  
               = 0.193 + 0.164𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 0.138𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗
2  
Because GDPM is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of 
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country 
variances: 
0.193                      for GDPL and GDPH (GDPM = 0) 
            0.193 + 0.164 + 0.138 = 0.495    for GDPM (GDPM = 1) 
The variance in GDPM is more than two times as much as in GDPL and GDPH. 
This indicates that countries with middle GDP per capita can produce a more substantial 
effect on retrospective national economic evaluation than countries with high or low GDP 
per capita. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The ordered logit models of retrospective national economic evaluation in each 
country demonstrate that the effect of information sources on retrospective national 
economic evaluation varies strongly across countries. It is significant in some countries, 
but the relationship may be positive or negative. In other countries, the effect is not 
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significant. Retrospective pocketbook evaluation is the only mutually significant variable 
in all countries. It is therefore challenging to formulate a general explanation of the effect 
of information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation. Multilevel models 
can explore whether level of democracy and level of economic development account for 
the between-country variance. 
The random intercept model in table 2.2 indicates that there is between-country 
variance in national retrospective evaluation. For the fixed effects, all models show that 
retrospective and prospective pocketbook evaluations, the media consumption, and 
talking about politics with others are individually significant. The random slope models 
for polity score and GDP per capita demonstrate that neither can explain much of the 
between-country variance. However, the random coefficient models on a subset of polity 
score and GDP per capita dummies can explore whether countries with higher levels of 
democracy or economic development produce more substantial effects on retrospective 
national economic evaluation than countries with lower levels of democracy or economic 
development. For level of democracy, consolidated countries have the most substantive 
effect on retrospective national economic evaluation. This corroborates the assumption 
that countries with higher level of democracy can impose a stronger influence on national 
economic evaluation. For level of economic development, countries with high GDP per 
capita does not have stronger effect on retrospective national economic evaluation than 
countries with lower GDP per capita. Particularly, countries with medium GDP per capita 
produce on retrospective national economic evaluation. Are these finding the same as 
those in prospective national economic evaluation? The next chapter is going to explore 
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and substantiate the effect of information sources on prospective national economic 
evaluation in comparative perspective. 
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Table 2.1. Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Costa 
Rica 
Chile Ecuador El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras 
Variable           
Retrospective 
Pocketbook 
.99(.09)*** .67(.07)*** .42(.06)*** .78(.08)*** .51(.07)*** 1.03(.08)*** 1.04(.08)*** .66(.08)*** .56(.10)*** .74(.08)*** 
Prospective 
Pocketbook 
.32(.10)** .01(.06) .31(.07)*** .12(.06)# .39(.07)*** .51(.08)*** .08(.07) .23(.07)** .03(.08) .20(.07)** 
Media -.02(.06) -.02(.05) -.02(.05) .04(.05) -.005(.07) .16(.07)* .11(.06)# .12(.07)# -.17(.07)* -.11(.06)# 
Talk -.10(.11) -.21(.11)# .28(.11)** -.22(.13) .15(.13) -.19(.14) -.09(.12) .08(.12) -.34(.17)* -.19(.14) 
Education .03(.10) -.10(.08) -.01(.07) .26(.10)** .07(.11) .07(.10) .08(.10) .002(.08) -.12(.14) -.34(.12)** 
Political Interest -.25(.17) -.14(.14) -.07(.11) -.06(.13) -.22(.15) -.33(.18)# .31(.16)# -.11(.13) .05(.15) -.33(.14)* 
Edu*Interest -.02(.05) .01(.03) -.001(.04) -.04(.04) .001(.05) .01(.04) -.07(.04) .01(.04) -.03(.06) .08(.05) 
N of Obs 1,040 1,103 1,072 1,072 839 1,080 1,115 765 663 792 
Log Likelihood -1081.62 -1470.28 -1426.19 -1367.65 -1034.46 -1189.10 -1319.35 -1022.08 -806.65 -989.69 
LR chi2 207.77 111.14 108.16 183.42 150.67 319.02 212.60 128.69 66.52 194.44 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .0876 .0364 .0365 .0628 .0679 .1183 .0746 .0592 .0396 .0894 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 2.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Benin Botswana Cape Verde 
Variable           
Retro 
Pocketbook 
.57(.07)*** .73(.08)*** .59(.08)*** .84(.11)*** .66(.07)*** 1.14(.08)*** .87(.07)*** 3.37(.14)*** 1.45(.09)*** 2.19(.10)*** 
Pros 
Pocketbook 
.36(.07)*** .18(.07)** .18(.07)* .24(.11)* .33(.07)*** .29(.07)*** .34(.06)*** -.09(.07) .12(.06)* .15(.09)# 
Media -.06(.07) .01(.06) -.01(.07) -.06(.09) -.09(.06) .18(.06)** -.03(.06) -.05(.08) .002(.05) -.07(.05) 
Talk .01(.10) -.19(.12) -.26(.11)* .07(.16) .03(.11) -.07(.10) -.01(.08) -.22(.14) .06(.09) -.01(.09) 
Education .05(.06) -.05(.09) -.15(.11) -.04(.10) .04(10) .15(.08)* -.14(.07)* -.26(.11)* -.09(.09) .04(.08) 
Political 
Interest 
.15(.12) -.13(.13) -.25(.18) -.25(.20) -.06(.18) .11(.14) -.19(.12) -.14(.10) -.03(.12) .05(.09) 
Edu*Interest -.03(.04) .04(.04) .05(.05) .05(.05) -.0002(.04) -.06(.04) .02(.03) .11(.05)* .02(.04) .01(.04) 
N of Obs 1,133 722 821 547 1,064 1,074 996 846 980 1,067 
Log 
Likelihood 
-1397.63 -930.93 -989.72 -704.21 -1323.02 -1290.38 -1270.65 -613.13 -1104.01 -1088.17 
LR chi2 121.45 148.52 88.7 87.84 171.94 339.58 310.97 1217.40 388.46 660.71 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .0416 .0739 .0429 .0587 .0610 .1163 .1090 .4982 .1496 .2329 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 2.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country Ghana Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal 
Variable           
Retro 
Pocketbook 
2.89(.12)*** 2.15(.09)*** 1.29(.08)*** 1.80(.09)*** 1.53(.07)*** 1.88(.08)*** 1.15(.09)*** 1.22(.08)*** 1.31(.05)*** 2.28(.11)*** 
Pros 
Pocketbook 
.21(.07)** .06(.06) .12(.06)* .34(.07)*** -.03(.05) -.03(.06) .20(.08)* .21(.08)** -.05(.04) .33(.10)** 
Media -.03(.06) -.03(.05) -.03(.08) .17(.06)** -.14(.08)# -.03(.05) -.17(.06)** -.27(.05)*** -.02(.04) -.07(.06) 
Talk .06(.12) .15(.11) .23(.10)* -.17(.11) .10(.09) -.07(.09) -.04(.11) -.14(.09) .03(.07) .06(.10) 
Education .06(.12) -.14(.08)# -.34(.15)* -.08(.08) .09(.13) .06(.13) .03(.12) .08(.11) -.10(.05)* -.28(.10)** 
Political 
Interest 
-.05(.13) -.16(.11) -.26(.13)# .08(.11) -.05(.10) .18(.07)* .04(.11) .58(.17)** .04(.08) .02(.09) 
Edu*Interest -.03(.05) .06(.04)# .11(.06)* .002(.04) -.02(.05) -.01(.05) .06(.05) -.08(.05)# .01(.02) .08(.04)# 
N of Obs 963 1,074 853 1,173 894 1,097 777 1,063 2,182 952 
Log 
Likelihood 
-733.33 -1094.04 -985.45 -1209.99 -1008.85 -1102.87 -877.41 -1241.86 -2692.70 -871.83 
LR chi2 1143.70 826.97 318.74 676.62 657.71 767.21 236.09 437.44 955.61 679.59 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .4381 .2743 .1392 .2185 .2458 .2581 .1186 .1497 .1507 .2804 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 2.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country South Africa Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 
Variable      
Retrospective  
Pocketbook 
1.90(.07)*** 1.54(.10)*** 1.55(.06)*** 1.46(.08)*** 3.69(.16)*** 
Prospective 
Pocketbook 
.21(.05)*** .17(.07)* .09(.04)* .04(.06) -.25(.09)** 
Media .001(.04) -.15(.07)* -.07(.05) -.12(.05)* -.16(.08)* 
Talk .27(.70)*** -.10(.10) .14(.08)# .01(.11) .17(.16) 
Education -.10(.06)# -.28(.17) -.06(.07) -.01(.08) .02(.12) 
Political Interest -.04(.10) -.14(.16) -.05(.09) .17(.13) .09(.21) 
Edu*Interest .03(.03) .15(.07)* .02(.03) -.05(.04) -.11(.06)# 
N of Obs 2,132 771 2,042 1,054 1,007 
Log Likelihood -2228.04 -834.34 -2236.62 -1275.31 -468.25 
LR chi2 1347.09 363.78 993.88 440.30 1329.14 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .2321 .179 .1818 .1472 .5867 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 2.2. Multilevel Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Individual-Level       
Retro Pocketbook 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 
Pros Pocketbook .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** .12(.01)*** .12(.01)*** .12(.01)*** .13(.01)*** 
Media -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** 
Talk .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** 
Education -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) 
Political Interest .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) 
Political Sophistication -.002(.01) -.002(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.002(.01) 
Country-Level       
Polity Score - 2.46e-28 .09 - - 2.63e-33 
GDP per capita - - - .313 .978 .004 
Random Effect  (N=36,825)       
Variance Component .291 .291 .024 1.43e-28 .006 .053 
Covariance - - -.05 - -.077 - 
Log Likelihood -43970.02 -43970.02 -43997.53 -44022.54 -44041.85 -43969.48 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Figure 2.1. The Effect of Media on Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
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Figure 2.2. Between-Country Variance As A Function of Polity Score 
 
Figure 2.3. Between-Country Variance As A Function of GDP per capita 
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Table 2.3. Random Coefficients On A Subset of Polity Score Dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual-Level    
Retro Pocketbook 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 
Pros Pocketbook .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** 
Media -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** 
Talk .06(.02)*** .07(.02)*** .06(.02)*** 
Education -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) 
Political Interest .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) 
Political Sophistication -.002(.01) -.002(.01) -.002(.01) 
Polity 2 -1.27(.61)* -1.26(.62)* -1.26(.62)* 
Polity 3 -.94(.50)# -.94(.51)# -.94(.51)# 
Polity 4 -.46(.37) -.45(.37) -.45(.37) 
Polity 5 -.66(.46) -.36(.36) -.36(.36) 
Country-Level    
Polity 5 - .257 .257 
Random Effect 
(N=36,825) 
   
Variance Component .245 .256 .256 
Covariance - - .0001 
Log Likelihood -43967.06 -43959.24 -43959.24 
Prob .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2. Polity 1 was dropped automatically because of collinearity. 
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Table 2.4. Random Coefficient On A Subset of GDP Per Capita Dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Individual-Level      
Retro Pocketbook 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 
Pros Pocketbook .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** 
Media -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** 
Talk .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** 
Education -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) 
Political Interest .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) 
Political          
Sophistication 
-.002(.01) -.002(.01) -.002(.01) -.002(.01) -.002(.01) 
GDP Medium -.18(.18) -.18(.18) -.22(.21) -.02(.19) -.09(.14) 
Country-Level      
GDP High - 1 .180 - - 
GDP Medium - - - .409 .138 
Random Effect 
(N=36,825) 
     
Variance         
Component 
.284 .284 .284 .150 .193 
Covariance - - -2.18e-06 - .082 
Log Likelihood -43969.56 -43969.56 -43969.56 -43968.64 -43953.52 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2. GDPH and GDPL are dropped automatically because of collinearity. 
 
 58 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON PROSPECTIVE 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EVALUATION 
The multilevel models in chapter 2 demonstrate that consolidated democracies 
and countries with middle income level produce the most substantial effect on 
retrospective national economic evaluation. This chapter explores the effect of 
information sources on prospective national economic evaluation in comparative 
perspective, also by using multilevel modeling. I wonder whether consolidated 
democracies and countries with middle income have the strongest effect on prospective 
national economic evaluation. First, I run single-level ordered logit models of prospective 
national economic evaluation for each country in order to discover differences among 
countries. I then run multilevel ordered logit models. Two-level random intercept and 
two-level random slope models are estimated and interpreted to see the country-level 
effect. The models analyze the effect of information sources on prospective national 
economic evaluation depending on level of democracy and level of economic 
development. The third and the fourth parts of the chapter further analyze two-level 
random slope models, and level of democracy and level of economic development will be 
explored respectively. As in the analysis of retrospective national economic evaluation, a 
subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies are used to estimate what levels 
explain the between-country variance. Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the 
effect of information sources on prospective national economic evaluation.
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3.1 SINGLE-LEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS IN EACH COUNTRY 
Table 3.1 presents ordered logit models of the effect of information sources on 
prospective national economic evaluation for each country.13 The media effect on 
prospective national economic evaluation is statistically significant in only seven 
countries (Chile, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The 
coefficients are negative except in Chile. In other words, watching more television can 
lead respondents to believe national economic condition will be worse in the future. In 
other countries, the media effect on prospective national economic evaluation is not 
significant. Coefficients are positive in some countries and negative in others. Talk about 
politics with others is not statistically significant except in Paraguay, Uruguay, and South 
Africa. The relationship is positively correlated in South Africa and negatively correlated 
in Paraguay and Uruguay. In around two-thirds of the countries, retrospective pocketbook 
evaluation is positively correlated with prospective national economic evaluation.  
When people believe they have personally become better off over the past one 
year, they are more likely to evaluate prospective national economic condition positively. 
Compared with retrospective pocketbook evaluation, prospective pocketbook evaluation 
has a more substantial effect on prospective national economic evaluation; it is significant 
in all countries. When people believe they will personally become better off in the future, 
they are more likely to believe national economic condition will also be better in the 
future. The other three variables -- education, political interest, and political 
sophistication -- are less influential. 
                                                          
13 The same as retrospective national economic evaluation, there are 23 countries (districts) that are not 
included in the single-level ordered logit models in table 3.1 because of missing values in some variables. 
Please refer to footnote 1 in chapter 2 for names of the countries that are not included in the single-level 
ordered logit models. 
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 With the exception of prospective pocketbook evaluation, which has the most 
substantive effect on prospective national economic evaluation, the effect of information 
sources is quite different across countries. As with the effect of information sources on 
retrospective national economic evaluation, it is difficult to develop a nomothetic rule 
about the effect of information sources on prospective national economic evaluation 
when only the ordered logit models for each country are estimated. I wonder whether 
level of democracy and level of economic development can account for these differences 
across countries, as is evident in multilevel models of retrospective national economic 
evaluation. Multilevel models of prospective national economic evaluation are estimated 
as follows. 
3.2 MULTILEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS 
Table 3.2 presents multilevel models of prospective national economic evaluation. 
I run one random intercept model (model 1) and five random slope models (models 2 
through 6). The interpretation of the six multilevel models is as follows. 
3.2.1 Random Intercept Model 
Model 1 is a random intercept model that allows the model intercept to vary 
randomly across countries. For fixed effects coefficients, both retrospective and 
prospective pocketbook evaluation, media consumption, talking about politics with others, 
and education are individually significant. When respondents positively evaluate their 
personal economic evaluation in the past and in the future, they are more likely to believe 
national economic condition will be better in the future. The coefficient of prospective 
pocketbook evaluation indicates that prospective pocketbook evaluation produces a 
stronger effect on prospective national economic evaluation than retrospective 
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pocketbook evaluation. The more time respondents spend watching television, the more 
negatively they tend to view prospective national economic condition. 
Figure 3.1 presents the effects of media consumption on prospective national 
economic evaluation by each country on fixed effect. More media consumption does not 
increase the probability of positive prospective national economic evaluation. In contrast 
to media consumption, talking more about politics with others can lead to positive 
prospective national economic evaluation. The intercept variance is 0.385. The likelihood 
ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that between-country 
variance is significant. 
3.2.2 Random Slope Models (Models 2 through 6) 
The random intercept model in model 1 shows significant between-country 
variance in prospective national economic evaluation. Models 2 through 6 are random 
slope models that allow the effects of level of democracy (polity score) and level of 
economic development (GDP per capita) to vary across nations. Models 3 and 5 allow the 
random intercepts and slopes to co-vary (as opposed to the default, in which they are 
uncorrelated). 
3.2.2.1 Random Coefficients of Polity Score (Models 2 and 3) 
Model 2 is a random slope model that allows polity score to vary across countries. 
There is no difference between the fixed effects coefficients and standard errors in 
models 1 and 2. The intercept variance in model 2 decreases from 0.385 to 0.372, and the 
random coefficient of polity score is 0.0002. However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming 
the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 
2) is not significant (p = 0.9386 > .05). The random slope model is not necessarily more 
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appropriate than the random intercept model. In this sense, the random coefficient of 
polity score is not significant and that the polity score explains little between-country 
variance. 
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. Most of the fixed 
effects coefficients are the same as those in model 2. The coefficients of media 
consumption and political interest change slightly, but only media consumption is 
individually significant. Although the coefficient of education remains the same as in 
models 1 and 2, it only becomes significant at the .10 level (p= .055 < .10). The intercept 
variance decreases significantly, from 0.372 to 0.028. The random coefficient of polity 
score is 0.061, and the covariance between intercept and polity score random effect is -
0.041. The between-country variance as a function of polity score is as follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢8𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢8𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢8𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2  
                     = 0.028 − 0.082 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 0.061 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2  
Figure 3.2 shows the graph of the between-country variance as a function of 
polity score. The plot is quite similar to that in retrospective national economic evaluation. 
The between-country variance increases rapidly as a function of polity score. However, 
the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2 is nested within the 
correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). That implies that the 
correlated variance model (model 3) is not necessarily more appropriate than the 
uncorrelated variance model (model 2). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the 
restricted model 1 is nested within the unrestricted model 3) is also not significant (p = 
1.000 > .05). The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect for polity 
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score is not significant. Therefore, polity score in general does not account much for 
between-country variance. 
3.2.2.2 Random Coefficients of GDP per Capita (Models 4 and 5) 
Model 4 is a random slope model that allows GDP per capita to vary across 
countries. Compared with model 1, only fixed effects coefficients of media consumption 
and political interest change. The intercept variance in model 4 decreases from 0.385 to 
nearly zero, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.044. 
Model 5 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects 
coefficients are the same as those in model 4. The intercept variance (0.099) in model 5 is 
greater than that in model 4, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita increases from 
0.044 to 0.891. The between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita is as 
follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢9𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢9𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢9𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗
2  
                 = 0.099 − 0.596 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 0.891 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗
2  
Figure 3.3 is the between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita. The 
same as that in retrospective national economic evaluation, the between-country variance 
shows a linear increase as GDP per capita increases. The likelihood ratio test (assuming 
the uncorrelated equation model 4 is nested within the correlated equation model 5) is not 
significant at .05 (p = 1.000 > .05). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the 
restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation model 5) is also not 
significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It is evident that the random effect for GDP per capita is not 
significant, and GDP per capita does not explain much between-country variance. 
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3.2.2.3 Random Coefficients of Polity Score and GDP per Capita (Model 6) 
 Model 6 allows both polity score and GDP per capita to vary across nations. The 
fixed effects coefficients remain the same as those in model 1. The intercept variance 
decreases from 0.385 to 0.140. The random coefficient of polity score is 0.116 and the 
random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.115. However, the likelihood ratio test 
(assuming the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope 
equation model 6) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). In order to explore which levels of 
democracy and economic development explain more between-country variance, I now 
estimate the random coefficients on a subset of the polity score and GDP per capita 
dummies. 
3.3 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF POLITY SCORE DUMMIES 
As with retrospective national economic evaluation, level of democracy does not 
explain much between-country variance on prospective national economic evaluation, 
given that none of the three likelihood ratio tests are significant. Despite this, this section 
explores whether countries with higher levels of democracy exhibit more variance than 
those with lower levels. In order to explore this effect, the random coefficients on a 
subset of polity score dummies are estimated. The subset of the polity score dummies is 
the same as in the retrospective national economic evaluation.14 Three models are 
interpreted. The first is a random intercept model with polity dummies in the fixed effects. 
The second adds the random coefficients of polity 5, and the third adds the random 
coefficients of polity 5 along with correlated variance. 
  
                                                          
14 Please refer to footnote 2 in chapter 2 for the subset of polity score dummies. 
 65 
 
3.3.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of Polity Dummies 
Model 1 in table 3.3 is a random intercept model on a subset of polity dummies. 
The fixed effects coefficients are the same as in the random intercept model in table 3.2 
with the exception of political interest. Polity 2 (closed anocracy) is the only polity 
dummy that is individually significant. The intercept variance is 0.324, and the likelihood 
ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that the between-country 
variance is significant. 
3.3.2 Random Coefficients of Polity 5 Only  
The random coefficient model for polity 5 estimates whether between-country 
variance is the same for polities 1 through 4 but different for polity 5. Although the fixed 
effects coefficients in model 2 are the same as in model 1, with the exception of political 
interest. The random coefficient of intercept is 0.299, and the random coefficient of polity 
5 is 0.305. The likelihood ratio test -- assuming the intercept-only equation (model 1) is 
nested within the intercept-slope equation (model 2) -- shows that the random coefficient 
for polity 5 is significant (p = 0.0010 < .05). 
3.3.3 Random Slope Model with Correlated Variance 
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects 
coefficients are the same as in model 2. The intercept variance and random coefficient of 
polity 5 are the same as in model 2. The covariance between the intercept and polity 5 
random effects is 0.00007. Although the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated 
model 2 is nested within the correlated model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05), the 
likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the 
unrestricted equation model 3) is significant (p= .0044 < .05). This substantiates the idea 
 66 
 
that the random effect for polity 5 is significant. In other words, there is country-variation 
in the difference between polity 5 and other four polity dummies. The between-country 
variance is estimated as follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢11𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢11𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢11𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗
2  
                                 = 0.299 + 0.00014𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + 0.305𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗
2  
Because polity 5 is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of 
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country 
variances: 
   0.299                                 for polity 1 to polity 4 (polity 5 = 0) 
              0.299 +0.00014 + 0.305 = 0.604        for polity 5 (polity 5 = 1) 
The variance in polity 5 is almost twice as much as that in polities 1 through 4. 
This indicates that consolidated democracies can produce a more substantial effect on 
prospective national economic evaluation than countries that are not fully democratic. 
3.4 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF GDP PER CAPITA DUMMIES 
The random coefficients of GDP per capita in models 4 and 5 in table 3.2 show 
that GDP per capita cannot explain the between-country variance according to the 
likelihood ratio test. Similar to the hypothesis of the influence of level of democracy, it 
surmises that level of economic development imposes a stronger influence on national 
economic evaluation. I wonder whether countries with higher levels of economic 
development can demonstrate more variance than those with lower levels. In order to 
explore this effect, the random coefficients on a subset of GDP per capita dummies are 
estimated.15 The random intercept model with GDP per capita dummies in the fixed 
                                                          
15 Please refer to table 1.1 for income category. 
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effects is estimated first. The second model adds random coefficient of GDPH (high 
income), and the third presents random coefficient of GDPH along with correlated 
variance. Given that the covariance between the intercept and GDPH random effects is 
very small and close to zero (model 3 in table 3.4), the fourth model (random coefficient 
of GDPM) and the fifth model (random coefficient of GDPM with correlated variance) 
are estimated in order to determine whether GDPH or GDPM explains more between-
country variance. 
3.4.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the GDP per capita Dummies 
Model 1 in table 3.4 is a random intercept model on a subset of GDP per capita 
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in the random intercept 
model (model 1) in table 3.2 with the exception of a slight change in the media 
consumption coefficient. The intercept variance is 0.376. The likelihood ratio statistic 
with a p-value of .000 indicates that between-country variance is significant. 
3.4.2 Random Coefficients of GDPH Only and Model with Correlated Variance 
The random coefficient model for GDPH estimates whether between-country 
variance is the same for GDPM and GDPL but different for GDPH. The fixed effects 
coefficients and intercept variance in model 2 are the same as those in model 1. The 
random slope model with correlated variance in model 3 shows results similar to those in 
model 1 and 2. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept variances are the same. The 
covariance between the intercept and GDPH random effects approximates zero. The 
likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2 is nested within the 
correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). Moreover, the likelihood 
ratio test -- assuming the intercept-only equation (the restricted equation in mode1) is 
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nested within the intercept-slope equation with correlated variance (the unrestricted 
equation in model 3) -- shows that the random coefficient for GDPH is also not 
significant (p = 1.000 > .05). The two likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random 
effect for GDPH is not significant. In other words, countries with a high level of 
economic development (GDPH) may not exhibit much between-country variance. 
3.4.3 Random Coefficients of GDPM Only and Model with Correlated Variance 
Because GDPH does not explain much between-country variance, I estimate 
whether GDPM accounts more between-country variance than GDPH. Model 4 is a 
random coefficient model for GDPM. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those 
in the random intercept model in model 1 with the exception of the coefficients of media 
and GDPM. The intercept variance decreases from 0.376 to 0.267; the random coefficient 
of GDPM is 0.552. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept equation 
model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 4) is significant (p = .000 
< .05). 
Model 5 allows the random intercept and slope to co-vary. The fixed effects 
coefficients remain the same as those in model 4 in table 3.4. The intercept variance 
increases from 0.267 to 0.273, and the random coefficient of GDPM also rises from 0.552 
to 0.757. The covariance between the intercept and GDPM random effects is -0.121. 
Although the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 4 is nested 
within the correlated equation model 5) shows that the random coefficient for GDPM is 
not significant (p = 0.9132 > .05), the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted 
equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation model 5) is significant (p 
= .0000 < .05). Therefore, likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that there is country-
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variation in the difference between GDPM and other two GDP dummies (GDPH and 
GDPL). The between-country variance is estimated as follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢9𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢9𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢9𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗
2  
                     = 0.273 − 0.242𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 0.757𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗
2  
Because GDPM is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of 
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country 
variances: 
0.273                         for GDPL and GDPH (GDPM = 0) 
            0.273-0.242 + 0.757 = 0.788      for GDPM (GDPM = 1) 
The variance in GDPM is nearly three times as much as that in GDPL and GDPH. 
This indicates that countries with middle GDP per capita can produce a more substantial 
effect prospective national economic evaluation than countries with high or low GDP per 
capita. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The ordered logit models of prospective national economic evaluation in each 
country demonstrate that the effect of information sources on prospective national 
economic evaluation is quite different across countries. The media effect is significant in 
only seven countries. With the exception of the positive relationship in Chile, increased 
media consumption leads respondents to believe that national economic condition will be 
worse in the future. Talking about politics with others does not influence prospective 
national economic evaluation in most of the countries. Prospective pocketbook evaluation 
is the only mutually significant variable in all countries. When people believe they will be 
personally better off in the future, they are more likely to believe national economic 
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condition will be better in the future. It is therefore challenging to formulate a general 
explanation of the effect of information sources on prospective national economic 
evaluation. Multilevel models can explore whether level of democracy and level of 
economic development account for the between-country variances. 
The random intercept model in table 3.2 indicates that there is between-country 
variance in the effect of information sources on prospective national economic evaluation. 
For the fixed effects, all models demonstrate that retrospective and prospective 
pocketbook evaluations, the media consumption, talking about politics, and education are 
individually significant. The random coefficient models for polity score and GDP per 
capita show that neither can explain much of the between-country variance. 
 However, the random coefficient models on a subset of polity score and GDP per 
capita dummies can explore whether countries with higher levels of democracy and 
economic development can produce more substantial effects on prospective national 
economic evaluation than those with lower level of democracy or lower level of 
economic development. For level of democracy, consolidated democracies have the most 
substantive effect on prospective national economic evaluation. For level of economic 
development, countries with medium GDP per capita produce the strongest effect on 
prospective national economic evaluation. These results are the same as those in the 
retrospective national economic evaluation. Therefore, it is evident that consolidated 
democracy and countries with middle income level have the most substantial effect on 
both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations. Do consolidated 
democracy and countries with middle income level have the same impact on voter choice? 
The next chapter proceeds to confirm these effects.
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Table 3.1. Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Chile Ecuador El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras 
Variable Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro 
Pocketbook 
-.16(.10) .11(.07) .11(.06)# .32(.08)*** .22(.07)** .34(.08)*** .25(.07)** .37(.08)*** -.04(.10) .56(.08)*** 
Prospective 
Pocketbook 
2.33(.13)*** 1.15(.07)*** 1.09(.08)*** .85(.07)*** .67(.07)*** 1.16(.09)*** .87(.08)*** .72(.08)*** .55(.09)*** .60(.08)*** 
Media .04(.08) -.02(.05) .04(.05) .08(.05) .07(.07) .15(.07)* .002(.06) .07(.07) -.08(.07) -.005(.06) 
Talk -.09(.13) .04(.11) .13(.11) -.22(.14) -.03(.13) .13(.14) .18(.12) -.05(.13) .03(.19) -.25(.14)# 
Education -.04(.12) -.14(.09) .02(.07) .02(.10) -.16(.10) .19(.11)# .05(.10) -.05(.09) -.05(.14) -.14(.12) 
Political 
Interest 
-.24(.20) -.23(.15) -.10(.11) -.49(.14)*** -.55(.16)*** -.05(.18) .05(.17) -.24(.14)# -.23(.15) -.37(.14)** 
Edu*Interest .04(.06) .04(.04) -.04(.04) .05(.04) .07(.05) -.04(.04) -.04(.04) .01(.04) -.01(.06) .05(.05) 
N of Obs 993 1,072 1,025 1,023 803 1,036 1,073 683 589 723 
Log 
Likelihood 
-716.36 -1305.33 -1236.57 -1304.20 -1070.88 -1136.23 -1273.41 -920.87 -766.28 -920.22 
LR chi2 387.58 306.83 264.13 289.07 163.96 315.84 166.38 157.72 47.65 219.91 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .21 .11 .10 .10 .07 .12 .06 .08 .03 .11 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 3.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Benin Botswana Cape Verde 
Variable Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro 
Pocketbook 
.25(.08)** .21(.08)** .14(.08) .05(.12) .31(.07)*** .25(.07)*** .33(.07)*** .15(.09) .06(.08) .30(.10)** 
Pros 
Pocketbook 
.76(.07)*** .94(.08)*** .85(.08)*** 2.14(.16)*** 1.00(.07)*** 1.36(.09)*** 1.06(.07)*** 4.54(.20)*** 1.80(.09)*** 3.48(.15)*** 
Media .003(.07) .005(.06) -.08(.07) .06(.10) -.02(.06) .05(.06) .04(.06) .02(.10) -.05(.05) -.13(.07)# 
Talk -.08(.10) -.12(.13) -.03(.12) -.49(.20)* .15(.11) -.33(.10)** .03(.08) -.03(.19) -.10(.09) .005(.12) 
Education .03(.07) -.14(.10) -.39(.11)*** -.10(.13) -.08(.10) .05(.08) -.02(.07) .09(.14) -.07(.09) -.09(.10) 
Political 
Interest 
-.06(.12) -.29(.14)* -.61(.19)** -.51(.24)* -.26(.19) -.23(.14) -.07(.12) .03(.13) .07(.12) .11(.12) 
Edu*Interest .01(.04) .07(.04) .15(.05)** .02(.06) .03(.05) .02(.04) -.03(.03) -.09(.06) .01(.04) .03(.05) 
N of Obs 1,103 668 783 528 1,021 1,038 938 818 939 1,085 
Log 
Likelihood 
-1409.66 -876.01 -1016.14 -423.21 -1260.88 -1155.30 -1232.27 -376.00 -1027.38 -578.34 
LR chi2 162.88 227.08 153.76 244.31 302.14 357.97 413.28 1518.08 669.80 853.38 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .05 .11 .07 .22 .11 .13 .14 .67 .25 .42 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 3.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country Ghana Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal 
Variable Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro 
Pocketbook 
.18(.09)* .27(.07)*** .07(.07) .19(.09)* -.03(.06) 
 
.15(.07)* .18(.09)* .21(.08)** .06(.04) .28(.10)** 
Prospective 
Pocketbook 
3.96(.16)*** 2.53(.10)*** 1.46(.08)*** 2.91(.12)*** 2.02(.09)*** 2.69(.12)*** 1.81(.11)*** 1.26(.08)*** 1.71(.06)*** 2.99(.15)*** 
Media .08(.07) -.07(.06) -.16(.08)* .09(.07) .03(.09) -.04(.06) -.17(.07)* -.28(.05)*** -.05(.04) -.14(.07)# 
Talk -.07(.15) -.01(.12) .04(.11) .15(.13) .08(.10) .004(.11) -.01(.13) -.10(.10) .08(.07) .10(.12) 
Education -.001(.14) -.06(.09) -.08(.14) -.09(.10) -.19(.15) -.16(.16) .06(.13) .09(.11) -.06(.05) -.51(.13)*** 
Political 
Interest 
-.25(.15) .02(.12) .23(.14) -.03(.14) -.13(.10) .23(.09)** .02(.12) .41(.17)* .04(.09) -.06(.12) 
Edu*Interest .04(.06) .02(.04) .01(.06) .01(.05) .07(.06) .04(.06) .03(.06) -.07(.05) .004(.02) .08(.05)# 
N of Obs 926 1,036 759 1,133 858 1,084 755 1,071 2,131 938 
Log Likelihood -517.76 -906.61 -899.25 -787.45 -783.29 -704.12 -715.73 -1180.99 -2340.91 -584.18 
LR chi2 1550.23 1125.94 441.72 919.44 964.08 905.25 384.98 418.19 1523.49 652.26 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .60 .38 .20 .37 .38 .39 .21 .15 .25 .36 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 3.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
Country South Africa Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 
Variable Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro 
Pocketbook 
.16(.06)** .05(.08) .12(.05)* .10(.07) -.01(.09) 
Prospective 
Pocketbook 
2.60(.08)*** 2.48(.12)*** 2.07(.07)*** 1.35(.07)*** 2.88(.14)*** 
Media -.05(.04) -.03(.08) -.18(.05)** -.13(.05)* -.17(.08)* 
Talk .22(.08)** -.02(.11) .12(.09) .01(.12) .18(.16) 
Education -.04(.06) -.07(.19) -.15(.08)* .05(.08) -.14(.13) 
Political Interest .11(.11) .10(.18) -.02(.10) .20(.14) -.22(.22) 
Edu*Interest .01(.03) .04(.08) .02(.03) -.07(.04)# .05(.06) 
N of Obs 2,095 708 1,957 1,013 1,005 
Log Likelihood -1773.75 -646.36 -1889.45 -1275.22 -459.61 
LR chi2 1954.37 659.63 1452.65 488.92 818.66 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .36 .34 .28 .16 .47 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Figure 3.1 The Effect of Media on Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country 
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Figure 3.2. Between-Country Variance as A Function of Polity Score 
 
Figure 3.3. Between-Country Variance as A Function of GDP per capita 
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Table 3.2. Multilevel Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Individual-Level Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro         
Pocketbook 
.15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** 
Pros Pocketbook 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 
Media -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.02(.01)* -.02(.01)** -.02(.01)* -.03(.01)** 
Talk .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** 
Education -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)# -.03(.01)# -.03(.01)# -.03(.01)* 
Political Interest .001(.02) .001(.02) .002(.02) .002(.02) .002(.02) .001(.02) 
Political 
Sophistication 
-.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) 
Country-Level       
Polity Score - .0002 .061 - - .116 
GDP per capita - - - .044 .891 .115 
Random Effect 
(N=35,410) 
      
Variance 
Component 
.385 .372 .028 8.21e-29 .099 .140 
Covariance - - -.041 - -.298  
Log Likelihood -38662.10 -38662.10 -38679.47 -38678.15 -38726.19 -38702.40 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 3.3. Random Coefficients on A Subset of Polity Score Dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual-Level Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro Pocketbook .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** 
Pros Pocketbook 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 
Media -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* 
Talk .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** 
Education -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* 
Political Interest -.0001(.02) .0001(.02) .0001(.02) 
Political Sophistication -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) 
Polity 2 -1.69(.70)* -1.69(.68)* -1.69(.68)* 
Polity 3 -.75(.57) -.75(.55) -.75(.55) 
Polity 4 -.43(.42) -.43(.40) -.43(.40) 
Polity 5 -.49(.52) -.45(.39) -.45(.39) 
Country-Level    
Polity 5 - .305 .305 
Random Effect 
(N=35,410) 
   
Variance Component .324 .299 .299 
Covariance - - .00007 
Log Likelihood -38659.14 -38653.71 -38653.71 
Prob .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 3.4. Random Coefficients on A Subset of GDP Per Capita Dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Individual-Level Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro Pocketbook .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** .15(.01)*** 
Pros Pocketbook 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 1.67(.01)*** 
Media -.02(.01)* -.02(.01)* -.02(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* 
Talk .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** .09(.02)*** 
Education -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* -.03(.01)* 
Political Interest .001(.02) .001(.02) .001(.02) .001(.02) .001(.02) 
Political 
Sophistication 
-.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.003(.01) 
GDPM -.19(.21) -.19(.21) -.19(.21) -.24(.15) -.24(.16) 
Country-Level      
GDPH - 1 .013 - - 
GDPM - - - .552 .757 
Random Effect 
(N=35,410) 
     
Variance 
Component 
.376 .376 .376 .267 .273 
Covariance - - 3.03e-08 - -.121 
Log Likelihood -38661.71 -38661.71 -38661.71 -38637.22 -38637.21 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON VOTER CHOICE 
The previous two chapters explore the effect of information sources on 
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations in comparative perspective 
using multilevel models. They demonstrate that consolidated democracies (polity score 
10) and countries with middle income (GDP per capita between USD 1,000~9,999) have 
the strongest effect on both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations. 
This chapter continues to explore the effect of information sources on voter choice, and 
seeks to substantiate whether countries with consolidated democracy and countries with 
middle income produce the strongest effect on voter choice. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I run single-level logit models of voter 
choice for each country by using 2010 Latino Barometro national surveys to discover the 
differences among countries. I then run multilevel logit models. Two-level random 
intercept and two-level random slope models are estimated and interpreted to see the 
country-level effect. The models analyze the effect of information sources on voter 
choice depending on level of democracy and level of economic development. 
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Since I use Latino Barometro national surveys to estimate the effect of information 
sources on voter choice, polity score and GDP per capita for some countries may be 
different from those in Latino Barometro.16 The third and the fourth parts of the chapter 
further analyze the two-level random slope models further, and level of democracy and 
level of economic development are explored respectively. As with retrospective and 
prospective national economic evaluation, a subset of polity score and GDP per capita 
dummies are used to estimate what levels explain between-country variance more than 
others. Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the effect of information sources on 
voter choice. 
4.1 SINGLE-LEVEL LOGIT MODELS IN EACH COUNTRY 
Table 4.1 presents ordered logit models of the effect of information sources on 
voter choice for each country. The media effect on voter choice is statistically significant 
in only three countries: Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Honduras. The coefficients are negative 
in Bolivia and Costa Rica but positive in Honduras. In other words, in Bolivia and Costa 
Rica, watching more television leads respondents to vote for the opposition party; in 
Honduras respondents who spend more time watching television are more likely to vote 
for the incumbent party. In other countries, the media effect on voter choice is not 
significant. The coefficients are positive in some countries and negative in others. Talk 
about politics with others is not statistically significant except in Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, 
talking about politics with others frequently leads voters to cast votes for the incumbent.  
For variables of economic evaluation, retrospective pocketbook evaluation is 
significant only in Panama, but the relationship is negative. When people in Panama 
                                                          
16 The polity score for some countries are different in Global Barometer and Latino Barometro because 
surveys were conducted in different years, such as the polity scores of Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela 
and the GDP per capita in Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Please refer to table 1.1 and 1.2. 
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believe they have become personally better off over the past year, they are more likely to 
support the opposition party. Prospective pocketbook evaluation is influential only in 
Peru. When people in Peru believe they will become personally better off in the future, 
they are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. Retrospective national economic 
evaluation is significant only in Bolivia and Venezuela. Therefore, the better the national 
economic condition was in the past, the more likely voters will cast votes for the 
incumbent. Prospective national economic evaluation is influential only in Uruguay and 
Dominican Republic, and the relationship is positive. Party identification is the only 
significant variable in all countries. Voters are more likely to vote for the parties to which 
they think they are the closet. The other three variables -- education, political interest, and 
political sophistication (the interaction between education and political interest) -- are less 
influential. 
With the exception of party identification, which has the most substantive effect 
on voter choice, the effect of information sources on voter choice is quite different and 
not so influential across countries. As with the effect of information sources on both 
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation, it is difficult to develop a 
nomothetic rule about the effect of information sources on voter choice when only the 
logit models for each country are estimated. I wonder whether level of democracy and 
level of economic development can account for these differences across countries, as is 
evident in multilevel ordered logit models for retrospective and prospective national 
economic evaluation. The multilevel logit models for voter choice are estimated as 
follows. 
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4.2 MULTILEVEL LOGIT MODELS 
Table 4.2 presents multilevel models of voter choice. I run one random intercept 
model (model 1) and five random slope models (models 2 through 6). The interpretation 
of the six multilevel models is as follows. 
4.2.1 Random Intercept Model 
Model 1 is a random intercept model, which allows the model intercept to vary 
randomly across countries. For fixed effects coefficients, both retrospective and 
prospective national economic evaluation and party identification are individually 
significant. When respondents positively evaluate national economic condition in the past 
and in the future, they are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. However, media 
does not influence voter choice. Figure 4.1 indicates that more media consumption does 
not increase the probability of voting for the incumbent party. The intercept variance is 
0.687. The likelihood ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that 
there is between-country variance on voter choice, and it is essential to run multilevel 
logit models to estimate this effect. 
4.2.2 Random Slope Models (Models 2 through 6) 
The random intercept model in model 1 shows significant between-country 
variance in voter choice. Models 2 through 6 are random slope models, which allow the 
effects of level of democracy (polity score) and level of economic development (GDP per 
capita) to vary across nations. Models 3 and 5 allow the random intercepts and slopes to 
co-vary (as opposed to the default, in which they are uncorrelated). 
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4.2.2.1 Random Coefficients of Polity Score (Models 2 and 3) 
Model 2 is a random slope model that allows polity score to vary across countries. 
There is no difference in the fixed effects coefficients except for talk about politics. The 
intercept variance in model 2 decreases significantly and approximates zero, and the 
random coefficient of polity score is 0.012. However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming 
the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 
2) is not significant (p = 0.5074 > .05). It indicates that polity score explains little 
between-country variance. 
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. Most of the fixed 
effects coefficients are the same as those in model 2, with the exception of education. The 
intercept variance is 0.035. The random coefficient of polity score is 0.07, and the 
covariance between intercept and polity score random effect is 0.016. The between-
country variance as a function of polity score is as follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢11𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢11𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢11𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2  
                 = 0.035 + 0.032 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 0.007 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2  
Figure 4.2 shows the graph of the between-country variance as a function of 
polity score. The between-country variance shows a linear increase as polity score 
increases. However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming that the uncorrelated equation 
model 2 is nested within the correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 0.6599 
> .05). It implies that the correlated variance model (model 3) is not necessarily more 
appropriate than the uncorrelated variance model (model 2). Moreover, the likelihood 
ratio test (assuming the restricted model 1 is nested within the unrestricted model 3) is 
also not significant (p = 0.7287 > .05). The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that 
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the random effect for polity score is not significant. Therefore, polity score in general 
does not account much for between-country variance. 
4.2.2.2 Random Coefficients of GDP per Capita (Models 4 and 5) 
Model 4 is a random slope model that allows GDP per capita to vary across 
countries. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept variance are the same as those in 
model 1. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept equation model 1 is 
nested within the random slope equation model 4) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It 
implies that the random slope model, which allows GDP per capita to vary across 
countries, is not necessarily more appropriate than the random intercept model. 
Model 5 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects 
coefficients remain the same as those in model 4. The intercept variance in model 5 
(173.73) is much greater than that in model 4, and the random coefficient of GDP per 
capita is 2.16. The between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita is as 
follows: 
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢12𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗) = var(𝑢0𝑗) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗𝑢12𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢12𝑗)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗
2  
                 = 173.73 − 38.76 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 2.16 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗
2  
Figure 4.3 is the between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita. The 
between-country variance shows a little like U-shape as the GDP per capita increases. 
However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 4 is nested 
within the correlated equation model 5) is not significant (p = 0.1770 > .05). Moreover, 
the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the 
unrestricted equation model 5) is also not significant (p = 0.402 > .05). This demonstrates 
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that the random effect for GDP per capita is not significant, and GDP per capita does not 
explain much between-country variance. 
4.2.2.3 Random Coefficients of Polity Score and GDP per Capita (Model 6) 
 Model 6 allows both polity score and GDP per capita to vary across nations. As in 
models 2 through model 5, the fixed effects coefficients remain the same as in model 1, 
with the exception of talk about politics. The intercept variance approximates to zero. The 
random coefficient of polity score is .012, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita 
approximates zero. In addition, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept 
equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 6) is not significant 
(p = 0.8028 > .05). Therefore, the random slope model is not more appropriate than the 
random intercept model. Although table 4.2 indicates that polity score and GDP per 
capita do not explain much between-country variance, I still would like to explore which 
levels of democracy and economic development explain more between-country variance. 
The random coefficients on a subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies are 
estimated in the next two sections. 
4.3 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF POLITY SCORE DUMMIES 
As with retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation, level of 
democracy in general does not explain much between-country variance on voter choice 
given that none of the three likelihood ratio tests are significant. Despite this, this section 
seeks to discover whether countries with higher levels of democracy exhibit more 
between-country variance than those with lower levels. I wonder whether countries with 
higher levels produce the strongest effect on voter choice, as is evident in estimations of 
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation. In order to explore this effect, 
 87 
 
random coefficients on a subset of the polity score dummies are estimated.17 Five models 
are interpreted. The first is the random intercept model with polity dummies in the fixed 
effects. The second adds the random coefficients of polity 3, and the third adds the 
random coefficients of polity 3 along with correlated variance. The fourth and the fifth 
models estimate the random coefficient models of polity2 and polity1. 
4.3.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the Polity Dummies 
Model 1 in table 4.3 is a random intercept model on a subset of the polity 
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as in the random intercept model in 
table 4.2. The intercept variance is 0.542, and the likelihood ratio statistic with a 
corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is between-country variance. 
4.3.2 Random Coefficients of Polity 3 Only 
The random coefficient model for polity 3 estimates whether between-country 
variance is the same for polities 1 and 2 but different for polity 3. Although the fixed 
effects coefficients in model 2 are the same as those in model 1, with the exception of 
polity1 dummy, the intercept variance is 0.470, and the random coefficient of polity 3 is 
0.222. The likelihood ratio test -- assuming the intercept-only equation (model 1) is 
nested within the intercept-slope equation (model 2) -- is not significant (p = 0.6004 
> .05). That indicates that the random coefficient model for polity 3 is not more 
appropriate than the random intercept model. 
  
                                                          
17 Polity scores in Latin America range from 1 in Venezuela to 10 in Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay; 
therefore, the subset of polity score dummies is different than that for voter choice: polity3 (score: 9-10), 
polity2 (score: 7-8), and polity1 (score: 1-5). Please refer to table 1.2 for the polity score in Latin American 
countries. 
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4.3.3 Random Slope Model with Correlated Variance 
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects 
coefficients are the same as in model 1 and 2. The intercept variance of polity 3 is the 
same as that of model 2, and the random coefficient of polity 3 increases from 0.222 to 
0.613. The covariance between the intercept and polity 3 random effects is -0.195. 
However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated model 2 is nested within the 
correlated model 3) is not significant (p = 1.0000 > .05), and the likelihood ratio test 
(assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation 
model 3) is also not significant (p = 0.8718 > .05). This substantiates the idea that the 
random effect for polity 3 is not significant. In other words, there is no country-variation 
in the difference between polity 3 and other two dummies. 
4.3.4 Random Coefficient of Polity 2 and Polity 1 Only 
Because there is no between-country variance in the difference between polity 3 
and other two polity dummies, I seek to substantiate whether polity 2 or polity 1 explains 
more between-country variance. Models 4 and 5 are random coefficient models of polity 
2 and polity 1. The fixed effects coefficients of the two models are the same as those in 
the random intercept model (model 1) with the exception of constant term. The intercept 
variance in the two models is the same as that in model 1. In other words, the intercept 
variance does not change. In addition, both of the random coefficients of polity 2 and 
polity 1 approximate zero. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept 
equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 4) is not significant 
(p = 0.9999 >.05). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept 
equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 5) has the same result 
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(p = 0.9999 > .05). It is evident that neither polity 2 nor polity 1 explains more between-
country variance than polity 3. 
4.4 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF GDP PER CAPITA DUMMIES 
The random coefficients of GDP per capita in models 4 and 5 in table 4.2 show 
that GDP per capita does not explain the between-country variance according to the 
likelihood ratio tests. As with the hypothesis on the influence of level of democracy, it 
surmises that level of economic development can impose a stronger influence on voter 
choice. I wonder whether countries with higher levels of economic development exhibit 
more variance than those with lower levels. In order to explore this effect, the random 
coefficients on a subset of the GDP per capita dummies are estimated.18 The random 
intercept model with GDP per capita dummies in the fixed effects is estimated first. The 
second model adds random coefficient of GDPH (high income), and the third adds 
random coefficient of GDPH along with correlated variance. In order to substantiate 
whether countries with middle level of economic development can have a greater effect 
on voter choice, a fourth model (random coefficient of GDPMU), a fifth model (random 
coefficient of GDPMU with correlated variance), a sixed model (random coefficient of 
GDPML), and a seventh model (random coefficient of GDPML with correlated variance) 
are estimated to determine whether GDPH, GDPMU, or GDPML explains more between-
country variance. 
  
                                                          
18 The subset of GDP per capita here is different from those in the national economic evaluations. Because 
there is no country whose GDP per capita is below $1000 (low income category) in Latin America, the 
subset of GDP per capita dummies in this chapter is high income (H: GDP per capita >= $10,000), upper 
middle income (UM: GDP per capita $5,000~9,999), and lower middle income (LM: GDP per capita: 
$1000~4,999). Please refer to table 1.2 for the income categories of Latin American countries. 
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4.4.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the GDP per capita Dummies 
Model 1 in table 4.4 is a random intercept model on a subset of the GDP per 
capita dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in the random 
intercept model (model 1) in table 4.2, with the exception of a slight change in 
coefficients of talk about politics and education. Compared with the intercept variance of 
model 1 in table 4.2, the intercept variance of model 1 here decreases from 0.687 to 0.646. 
In other words, the addition of the subset of GDP per capita dummies decrease a little bit 
between-country variance. 
4.4.2 Random Coefficients of GDPH Only and Model with Correlated Variance 
Model 2 in table 4.4 is a random coefficient model for GDPH, which estimates 
whether between-country variance is the same for GDPMU and GDPML but different for 
GDPH. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in model 1. The intercept 
variance is 0.637, and the random effect coefficient of GDPH is 0.040. However, the 
likelihood ratio test (assuming the intercept-only equation model 1 is nested within the 
intercept-slope equation model 2) is not significant (p = 0.943 > .05). That demonstrates 
that the random slope equation model 2 is not necessarily better than random intercept 
equation model 1. 
The random coefficient model for GDPH with correlated variance in model 3 
shows a similar result as that for model 2. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept 
variances are the same, and the random effect coefficient of GDPH is 1.7. The covariance 
between the intercept and GDPH random effects is -0.832. The likelihood ratio test 
(assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2 is nested within the correlated equation 
model 3) is not significant (p = 0.999> .05). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test  -- 
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assuming the intercept-only equation (the restricted equation in mode1) is nested within 
the intercept-slope equation with correlated variance (the unrestricted equation in model 3) 
-- shows that the random coefficient for GDPH is also not significant (p = 0.9974 > .05). 
The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect for GDPH is not 
significant. In other words, countries with high levels of economic development (GDPH) 
do not exhibit much between-country variance. 
4.4.3 Random Coefficients of GDPMU Only and Model with Correlated Variance 
Because GDPH does not explain much between-country variance, I estimate 
whether GDPMU accounts for more between-country variance than GDPH. Model 4 in 
table 4.4 is a random coefficient model for GDPMU. The fixed effects coefficients and 
intercept variance are the same as those in the random intercept equation model 1; the 
random coefficient of GDPMU approximates zero. The likelihood ratio test (assuming 
the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 
4) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). That indicates that the random coefficient model 
for GDPMU is not necessarily more appropriate than the random intercept model. 
Model 5 allows the random intercept and slope to co-vary. The fixed effects 
coefficients remain the same as those in model 4, with the exception of a slight change in 
retrospective pocketbook evaluation. The intercept variance is 0.794, and the random 
coefficient of GDPMU is 0.137. The covariance between the intercept and GDPMU 
random effects is -0.263. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation 
model 4 is nested within the correlated equation model 5) shows that the random 
coefficient for GDPMU is not significant (p = 0.3749 > .05). Moreover, the likelihood 
ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted 
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equation model 5) is also not significant (p = 0.6745 > .05). The three likelihood ratio 
tests demonstrate that GDPMU is not significant, and the between-country variance of 
GDPMU is not different from those of GDPH and GDPML. 
4.4.4 Random Coefficients of GDPML Only and Model with Correlated Variance 
Although the random coefficient models for GDPH and GDPMU described above 
indicate that the between-country variance is not different for GDPH and GDPMU, I seek 
to verify whether GDPML can explain more between-country variance than GDPH and 
GDPMU. In other words, I surmise that between-country variance is the same for GDPH 
and GDPMU but different for GDPML. 
Model 6 is a random coefficient model for GDPML. The fixed effect coefficients 
are almost the same as those in the random intercept equation in model 1, with the 
exception of a slight change in talk about politics. The intercept variance decreases from 
0.646 to 0.506, and the random effect coefficient of GDPML is 0.354. The likelihood 
ratio test (assuming the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random 
slope equation model 6) is not significant (p = 0.4569 > .05). That implies that the 
random coefficient model for GDPML is not necessarily better than the random intercept 
model, as is evident in the random coefficient models for GDPH and GDPMU. 
Model 7 is a random coefficient model for GDPML with correlated variance. The 
fixed effects coefficients and intercept variance are the same as those in model 6. The 
random coefficient of GDPML increases from 0.354 to 0.873. The covariance between 
the intercept and GDPML random effects is -0.259. The likelihood ratio test (assuming 
the uncorrelated equation model 6 is nested within the correlated equation model 7) is not 
significant (p = 1.0000 > .05); moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted 
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equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation model 7) is also not 
significant (p = 0.7583> .05). The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that GDPML is 
not significant and the between-country variance of GDPML is not different from those 
of GDPH and GDPMU. 
The subset of GDP per capita dummies further demonstrates that GDP per capita 
does not explain much between-country variance. In other words, the between-country 
variance is the same for all GDP per capita dummies. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The logit models of voter choice in each country demonstrate that the effect of 
information sources on voter choice is quite different across countries. However, the 
effect of information sources is not as influential as it is in national economic evaluation. 
The media effect only works in three countries, and talking about politics with others is 
significant in only one. For pocketbook and sociotropic voting, they are only effective in 
one or two countries. Although the effect of information sources on voter choice is not 
significant in most of countries, it is still somewhat difficult to formulate a general 
explanation of the effect of information sources on voter choice. Multilevel logit models 
explore whether level of democracy and level of economic development accounts for the 
between-country variance. 
The random intercept model in table 4.2 indicates that there is between-country 
variance on voter choice. However, the random slope models and those with correlated 
variance demonstrate that neither polity score nor GDP per capita can explain between-
country variance. In other words, level of democracy and level of economic development 
have little effect on voter choice. 
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The random coefficient models on a subset of polity score and GDP per capita 
dummies explore whether countries with higher levels of democracy and economic 
development produce more substantial effects on voter choice than those with lower 
levels. In contrast to the previous two chapters, in which consolidated democracies and 
countries with middle income have the strongest effect on national economic evaluations, 
here, none of the polity dummies and GDP per capita dummies can have more between-
country variance than the others. In other words, level of democracy and level of 
economic development have little effect on voter choice. It is evident that level of 
democracy and level of economic development influence the two national economic 
evaluations but have no influence on voter choice. How do those effects manifest 
themselves in a case study of two countries? The comparative case study of Mexico and 
Taiwan given in the next chapter further explore the effect of information sources on 
economic voting.        
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Table 4.1. Logit Models of Voter Choice, by Country 
Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Chile Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Variable Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retrospective 
Pocketbook 
.29(.24) .85(.52)# .04(.20) .21(.19) .03(.21) -.66(.48) .13(35) -.17(.41) -.17(.32) .16(.17) 
Prospective 
Pocketbook 
-.21(.26) 1.01(.55)# .17(.21) -.17(.19) .04(.19) .52(.41) .27(.29) .40(.34) .21(.31) -.003(.16) 
Retrospective 
Evaluation 
.24(.23) 1.57(.67)* .40(.24)# -.26(.16) -.19(.19) .45(.47) .44(.27) .05(.31) .29(.32) -.08(.14) 
Prospective 
Evaluation 
.34(.26) .69(.64) .09(.22) .33(.17)# .11(.18) -.26(.50) .08(.29) .41(37) .01(.28) .01(.14) 
Media -.06(.06) -.76(.33)* -.09(.05) .01(.06) -.16(.06)** .10(.13) .11(.09) -.07(.11) .-.04(.12) .12(.05)* 
Talk .01(.15) -.57(.49) .01(.13) .01(.16) -.08(.17) .27(.27) -.13(.18) .15(.21) -.50(.27)# -.06(.11) 
Education -.22(.16) -1.36(.50)** -.21(.14) .19(.15) .0004(.13) -.26(.29) -.02(.17) -.03(.22) .27(.21) .02(.13) 
Political 
Interest 
-.31(.44) -.59(.97) .27(.29) .58(.36) .57(.36) -.91(.82) -.33(.45) -.43(.46) -.03(.51) -.47(.24)# 
Edu*Interest .08(.11) .54(.29)# -.002(.09) -.14(.10) .01(.11) .19(.21) -.03(.13) .10(.17) -.07(.16) .10(.08) 
Party ID 2.88(.29)*** 8.68(2.53)** 3.32(.34)*** 3.27(.24)*** 3.48(.33)*** 4.83(.56)*** 4.59(.59)*** 5.24(.59)*** 4.15(.52)*** 2.87(.25)*** 
Constant .67(.63) 7.90(2.81)** .60(.55) -.69(.54) .28(.48) -2.32(1.16)* .84(.71) -.55(.82) -.56(.72) .97(.41)* 
N of Obs 400 268 469 632 443 514 452 455 306 481 
Log 
Likelihood 
-136.81 -23.41 -161.04 -172.84 -132.15 -56.11 -101.10 -62.27 -50.39 -177.18 
LR chi2 237.87 243.11 289.86 523.96 316.35 418.93 336.53 499.56 276.73 298.74 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .465 .839 .474 .603 .545 .789 .625 .801 .733 .457 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
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Table 4.1. (continued) Logit Models of Voter Choice, by Country 
Country Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Dominican 
Republic 
Variable Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro 
Pocketbook 
-.20(.20) .65(.50) -.53(.26)* .02(.25) .02(.49) .17(.26) -.07(.49) -.27(.27) 
Pros 
Pocketbook 
-.08(.22) -.53(.39) .24(.24) .33(.29) 1.47(.49)** -.22(.29) .30(.41) .15(.24) 
Retrospective 
Evaluation 
.19(.19) .54(.43) .28(.21) .42(.24)# .93(.57) .14(.26) .94(.35)** .18(.26) 
Prospective 
Evaluation 
.10(.20) -.67(.42) .37(.23) -.17(.26) -.49(.42) .96(.28)** .42(.40) .55(.25)* 
Media -.002(.07) -.32(.17)# -.01(.08) .0002(.07) .02(.14) -.05(.07) -.11(.13) .15(.10) 
Talk .42(.22)# .94(.42)* .15(.17) -.06(.20) -.33(.38) .14(.14) .003(.29) -.40(.23)# 
Education .21(.15) -.40(.31) -.12(.18) -.21(.16) -.41(.28) .14(.22) .20(.27) -.02(.17) 
Political 
Interest 
.26(.37) -.21(.79) .08(.36) .09(.33) -1.64(1.13) .65(.46) .84(1.02) .28(.40) 
Edu*Interest -.15(.11) .26(.24) -.02(.11) .03(.10) .31(.26) -.16(.14) -.12(.24) -.02(.12) 
Party ID 4.40(.44)*** 8.11(1.22)*** 2.78(.25)*** 2.71(.21)*** 6.07(1.06)*** 3.21(.25)*** 5.99(.84)*** 3.79(.30)*** 
Constant -1.47(.54)** -1.71(.89)# -.01(.70) -.39(.56) -1.33(1.20) -.46(.82) -1.63(1.39) .05(.82) 
N of Obs 581 401 379 477 222 644 604 649 
Log 
Likelihood 
-117.66 -34.21 -109.39 -123.52 -34.54 -138.31 -42.77 -95.19 
LR chi2 479.02 476.24 306.60 360.20 170.21 527.62 719.98 708.03 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .671 .874 .584 .593 .711 .656 .894 .788 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
 
  
  
9
7 
 
Figure 4.1. The Effect of Media on Voter Choice, by Country
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Figure 4.2 Between-Country Variance As A Function of Polity Score 
 
Figure 4.3 Between-Country Variance As A Function of GDP per capita 
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Table 4.2. Multilevel Models of Voter Choice 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Individual-Level Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro Pocketbook .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) 
Pros Pocketbook .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# 
Retro Evaluation .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** 
Pros Evaluation .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** 
Media -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Talk -.01(.04) -.01(.04) -.01(.04) -.005(.04) -.005(.04) -.01(.04) 
Education -.07(.04)# -.07(.04)# -.06(.04)# -.07(.04)# -.07(.04)# -.07(.04)# 
Political Interest .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) 
Political 
Sophistication 
.002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) 
Party ID 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 
Constant -.04(.24) .01(.21) .03(.23) -.04(.24) -.07(.20) .01(.21) 
Country-Level       
Polity Score - .012 .007 - - .012 
GDP per capita - - - 6.33e-12 2.16 2.87e-15 
Random Effect 
(N=8,377) 
      
Variance 
Component 
.687 4.71e-11 .035 .687 173.73 1.65e-08 
Covariance - - .016 - -19.38 - 
Log Likelihood -1993.44 -1993.22 -1993.12 -1993.44 -1992.53 -1993.22 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
  
  
1
0
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Table 4.3 Random Coefficients On A Subset of Polity Score Dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Individual-Level Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro Pocketbook .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) 
Pros Pocketbook .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# 
Retro Evaluation .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** 
Pros Evaluation .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** 
Media -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Talk -.01(.04) -.01(.04) -.01(.04) -.01(.04) -.01(.04) 
Education -.07(.04)# -.07(.04)# -.07(.04)# -.07(.04)# -.07(.04)# 
Political Interest .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) 
Political 
Sophistication 
.002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) 
Party ID 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 
Polity 1 1.04(.62)# 1.05(.61)# 1.05(.61)# 1.04(.62)# 1.04(.62)# 
Polity 2 .74(.39)# .74(.42)# .74(.42)# .74(.39)# .74(.39)# 
Constant -.57(.34)# -.57(.38) -.57(.38) -.56(.34)# -.56(.34)# 
Country-Level      
Polity 1 - - - - 1.56e-10 
Polity 2 - - - 7.91e-14 - 
Polity 3 - .222 .613 - - 
Random Effect 
(N=8,377) 
     
Variance 
Component 
.542 .470 .470 .542 .542 
Covariance - - -.195 - - 
Log Likelihood -1991.39 -1991.26 -1991.26 -1991.39 -1991.39 
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
  
1
0
1 
Table 4.4. Random Coefficient On A Subset of GDP Per Capita Dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Individual-Level Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) Coef.(SE) 
Retro Pocketbook .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) .01(.06) .02(.06) .02(.06) 
Pros Pocketbook .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# .11(.06)# 
Retro Evaluation .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** .21(.05)*** 
Pros Evaluation .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** .20(.05)*** 
Media -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Talk -.004(.04) -.004(.04) -.004(.04) -.004(.04) -.004(.04) -.005(.04) -.005(.04) 
Education -.06(.04)# -.06(.04)# -.06(.04)# -.06(.04)# -.06(.04)# -.06(.04)# -.06(.04)# 
Political Interest .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) .04(.09) 
Political 
Sophistication 
.002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) .002(.03) 
Party ID 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)*** 
GDPH -.45(.52) -.45(.52) -.45(.52) -.45(.52) -.45(.57) -.45(.51) -.45(.51) 
GDPMU -.38(.44) -.38(.44) -.38(.44) -.38(.44) -.38(.43) -.38(.45) -.38(.45) 
Constant .21(.34) .21(.34) .21(.34) .21(.34) .21(.37) .21(.38) .21(.38) 
Country-Level        
GDPH - .040 1.70 - - - - 
GDPMU - - - 1.49e-14 .137 - - 
GDPML - - - - - .354 .873 
Random Effect 
(N=8,377) 
       
Variance Component .646 .637 .637 .646 .794 .506 .506 
Covariance - - -.832 - -.263 - -.259 
Log Likelihood -1992.92 -1992.92 -1992.92 -1992.92 -1992.53 -1992.65  -1992.65    
Prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001
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CHAPTER 5 
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF MEXICO AND TAIWAN 
The previous chapters explore the effect of information sources (especially the 
media) on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation and their 
subsequent voter choice in comparative perspectives. It is evident that level of democracy 
and level of economy can impact retrospective and prospective national economic 
evaluations differently across nations. Consolidated democracies and countries with 
middle income have the strongest effect on retrospective and prospective national 
economic evaluations. However, level of democracy and level of economic development 
does not influence voter choice. In this sense, the cross-national analyses have reached 
some generalizable explanations of the effect of information sources on economic voting. 
However, the cross-national analyses may have overlooked country-specific knowledge 
about the effect of information sources on national economic evaluation and its 
subsequent voter choice, which is possibly different from those of cross-national analyses. 
In order to explore the depth of the effect of information sources on economic voting and 
substantiate findings in cross-national analysis, a comparative case study is essential in 
this study. 
Although the effect of information sources is demonstrated to influence national 
economic evaluation in cross-national analyses, it is still difficult to explain why more 
media consumption can lead to either positive or negative national economic evaluation.
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In order to explore the relationship between media effect, economic evaluations, and 
voter choice in detail and more precisely, a comparative case study is essential; the 
measure of media consumption in a comparative case study is different from that in a 
cross-national analysis. In addition to hours or days of media consumption, the choice of 
television channels or programs is available in both Mexico Panel Studies and Taiwan 
TEDS surveys. The choice of television channels or programs is used in lieu of the 
amount of media consumption to measure the media effect in comparative case study. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will analyze the importance of 
comparative case studies. The comparative case study, which aims at a middle ground 
between generality and accuracy, cannot only contribute to theory building but also to the 
discovery of context-specific knowledge with depth (Sartori, 1970; Ragin, 2000). The 
Mexico and Taiwan cases are the two comparative case studies I offer. I will also explain 
why I choose those two cases for analysis. The Mexico and Taiwan cases are in the 
second and the third sections, respectively. The fourth section is the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
5.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
Some scholars contend that political science should seek to establish universally 
applicable general laws to avoid small-n problems (Lijphart, 1975). Through comparing 
wide ranges of cases, generality can be reached (Przeworksi and Teune, 1982). In this 
sense, chapters 2 to 4 in my dissertation aims at exploring whether there is a general 
explanation of the media effect on economic voting across countries. Cross-national 
analyses can provide nomothetic explanations about it globally.   
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The advantages of cross-national analysis are that it can produce a generalized 
theory across nations and achieve parsimony and breadth of the theory; however, the 
disadvantages are that it overlooks the complexity of context-specific knowledge and it is 
difficult to achieve the depth desired of the study. In this vein, there is a trade-off 
between generality and accuracy. Take my dissertation, for example: I can derive the 
general explanations of the media effect on economic voting from cross-national analyses, 
but I may ignore the country-specific knowledge about it which can possibly be different 
from the general explanations. To compensate for this weakness, I use the case study 
approach and compare the findings with those in cross-national analyses. I conduct a 
comparative case study to explore how the media effect influences economic voting in 
my two comparative cases, Taiwan and Mexico. 
The case studies center on a particular region in order to reference the deep and 
country-specific knowledge about the region. Although it has been criticized that too 
many emphases on cases studies may be deleterious to general theory building, I argue 
that case studies have the following two strengths. The first is that, while case studies 
may suffer from the loss of some parsimony, scholars can attain more specific 
understanding of what is going on in a particular country or region and can develop ideas 
on why the development of this country is different from other countries in the world. 
Take Taiwan, for example: national identity is always the most important determinant for 
voter choice (Hsieh and Jang, 2009). Economic evaluation seems to play a minor role on 
voter choice even if it is often not statistically significant. In this sense, case-oriented 
study focuses on the complexity of social phenomena (Ragin, 2000). The second strength 
of case study is that it can contribute to general theory building as well. Many important 
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theories come from case studies, such as Putnam’s (1993) theory on civil culture/social 
capital (from Italy), Juan Linz and Stephan’s (1996) theories on democratic transitions 
(from Spain), and Skocpol’s (1979) theory on revolutions (from France, Russia, and 
China), etc. Case studies that center on country-specific phenomena may also contribute 
to general theory building as well, as is evident in large-n studies (Lijphart, 1971).   
As mentioned above, there is a trade-off between a general theory and case study. 
While pursuing generality, the general theory is developed but accuracy may be lost. 
While centering on case study, researchers can gain country-specific knowledge but it is 
probably difficult to develop generalizable conclusions if the context-specific knowledge 
is too specific to be generalizable. Therefore, scholars such as Sartori (1970) and Ragin 
(2000) propose a middle-ground path between generality and accuracy. They claim that 
the similar causal factors may generate outcomes differently in different contexts (Ibid.). 
The comparative case study (small-n study) used in my research (Mexico and Taiwan) 
aims at a middle-ground path (Coppedge, 1999). 
I am going to compare the media effect on economic voting in Mexico and 
Taiwan.  There are several reasons to choose these two nations. First, both had one 
dominant party systems before 2000 and have experienced at least two changes of party 
in government and in opposition. I would like to explore whether one dominant party 
systems in the two countries before and after 2000 (similar causal factors) may influence 
economic voting differently under different political cleavages (Mexico’s right vs. left; 
Taiwan’s national identity: unification, independence, and status quo). The comparative 
case study of Taiwan and Mexico allows me to center on a middle-ground path between 
generality and accuracy. 
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The second reason to choose Mexico and Taiwan for comparative case study is 
that one dominant party regimes may have restricted press freedoms. In Taiwan, three 
main TV stations were dominated by the ruling party -- KMT -- before 2000, and the 
majority of voters recognized that. The attribute agenda-setting effect was not significant 
in the TV news channels (McCombs, 2004). McCombs (2004) argues that the attribute 
agenda-setting effect can only take place wherever the political system and media 
institution are open and free. In other words, mass media may not have any influence on 
people’s national economic evaluations when political and media systems are not well-
established. In Mexico, the opposition parties had limited access to mass media before 
2000 as well; the expenditure of advertising for campaign was too expensive for 
opposition parties to afford. In addition, the law for free public media time in 1990 
regulated that free media time for each party was proportional to its electoral strength. 
Therefore, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had more free media time 
than other opposition parties (Greene, 2002). It is evident that the media system is not 
open and free in one-dominant party regimes and the opposition parties’ access to the 
media are not as equal as the dominant parties’. By comparing Mexico with Taiwan, the 
general rule of media effects on economic voting may be established.  
The third reason for comparative case study of Taiwan and Mexico are that the 
two cases may be able to test the theories produced in cross-national analyses. Testing the 
theory is one of the important strengths of case study (Eckstein, 1975). Both countries 
have had one-party dominance before and at least two changes of party in government 
and in opposition; in other words, they have experienced different levels of democracy. 
Moreover, the two countries have different levels of economic prosperity. The low level 
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of democracy in the one dominant party regimes, high level of democracy after regime 
transition, and different level of economic prosperity in the two countries can help verify 
whether level of democracy and level of economic prosperity can impact the effect of 
information sources on economic voting.  
 Since it is difficult to provide detailed and substantial explanations of the media 
effects on economic voting in cross-national analyses, the comparative case study may be 
helpful to explore the media effect on economic voting. The comparative case study, 
which centers on the middle-ground path, can not only resolve trade-offs between 
generality and accuracy but also substantiate cross-national large-N studies. From the 
experiences of Taiwan and Mexico before 2000, I surmise that the effect of information 
sources may not have influenced economic voting since the political system and media 
institution were not open and free. In contrast, media consumption may have influenced 
economic voting especially when the high level of democracy is reached. 
5.2 MEXICO CASE 
Mexico is a third-wave democracy which has experienced one-party dominance 
and two changes of party in government and in opposition. The specific experiences of 
Mexico allows political scientists to research elections in different stages and types of 
democratization (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). The Mexico case proceeds as follows. The 
first section is the overview of political development in Mexico before 2000. In the 
authoritarian regime, not only the ruling party PRI remaining in power for several 
decades but also the evolution of opposition parties -- the PAN (National Action Party) 
and the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) -- are essential for the subsequent 
regime transition. The second, third, fourth, and fifth sections are the 1997 Mexico City 
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election and three Mexican presidential elections from 2000 to 2012. The sixth section is 
the conclusion of the Mexico case study. I will compare the effect of information sources 
on economic voting before and after 2000. 
5.2.1 The Dominance of Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Before 2000 
The PRI had been the dominant party which won every national and presidential 
elections with large margins since 1929 (Gomez and Wilson, 2006; Greene, 2007). It is 
said that the PRI retained its one-party dominance by electoral fraud and abuse of power. 
Greene (2007) developed a theory of resource asymmetries between the dominant party 
and opposition parties which explained the durability of the one dominant party system 
and its breakdown. He claimed that the PRI used patronage from public resources to 
retain its electoral competitiveness, and thus the resources disadvantages of opposition 
parties made them uncompetitive (Greene, 2007). 
Not until 1988 did the situation change. Although the PRI still won the presidency, 
the opposition parties won 48% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which was the 
highest in history (Dominguez and McCann, 1996). The change can be attributed to the 
increased demand for democracy by the mass public in the late 1980s (Mainwaring, 
1992). This substantiates the causes of democratization from the cultural perspective, 
which claims that civic culture facilitates democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963, 1980; 
Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1998; Diamond, 1999; Norris, 1999). In addition to the oldest 
right-wing opposition party PAN, the left-wing party PRD was established right after the 
1988 election. The PRI’s party strength mainly focused on rural areas and the less 
educated. The PAN’s electoral strength was based on urban areas with the better-
educated, manufacturing-sector employees, and Catholics, especially in the north and 
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center-west. The PAN-PRI competition centers on the north and the center-west, and the 
PRD-PRI competition focuses on the south (Klesner, 2004). The PRI, PAN, and PRD 
have been the three main parties in the Mexican political system since then. 
The 1991 national election rejuvenated PRI’s one-party dominance. Although the 
consumer price index dropped from 159.2% in 1987 to 18.9% in 1991, voters were 
satisfied with economic policies and free-trade treaties by the Salinas administration. In 
addition, neither retrospective nor prospective economic evaluations were associated with 
voter choice. Partisanship was an important factor influencing the 1991 election 
(Dominguez and McCann, 1996). Although the economic condition remained in bad 
shape during the 1994 presidential election, candidate evaluation and party loyalty were 
more important factors than economic evaluation and demographic factors. In particular, 
the high turnout rate (75%) and the greater legitimacy of the 1994 election than in 1988 
had led pundits to predict that Mexico would democratize in the near future (Ibid.) 
The PRI lost their majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in the 
1997 congressional election as well as the mayoralty of Mexico City. Although the 
economy was still in bad shape, national economic evaluation did not affect voter choice 
(Gomez and Wilson, 2006). In particular, Gomez and Wilson (2006) find that people with 
a high level of political sophistication were more likely to engage in pocketbook voting 
than the least sophisticated people. Mongenstern and Zechmeister (2001) also discovered 
that risk-acceptant individuals were more likely to cast a vote for PAN or PRD when they 
thought national economic condition was not good. In contrast, risk-averse individuals 
still voted for the ruling PRI even though they thought the national economic condition 
was worse in the last year because they were less likely to vote for opposition parties, 
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which had less experiences in office. Despite the fact that scholars can find what kind of 
people were likely to engage in economic voting, it seems that economic issues were not 
the dominant factor in the 1997 national elections. Rather, democratization issues 
dominated the 1997 national elections. Vote share of the PAN and PRD increased. In 
particular, the election was handled for the first time by the independent institute Federal 
Electoral Institute (IFE). In this vein, the election was regarded as an open, free, and fair 
one and facilitated the democratization of Mexico (Klesner, 1997). 
It is evident that economic voting was not salient in Mexico before 2000. As 
mentioned above, the opposition parties’ access to the media is quite limited due to the 
regulation of free media time and the high expenditure of campaign advertising. Can this 
imply that the media has no effect on economic voting before 2000? The 1997 Mexico 
City election survey data may substantiate the media effect on economic voting. 
5.2.2 The 1997 Mexico City Election 
Mexico City is the government of the Federal District in Mexico. The 1997 
election was the first direct election in Mexico City. The PRD candidate Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas won the mayoral election, and this was the first time that the mayor was not a 
member of the ruling PRI. The strongest parties in Mexico City were PRD and PRI; the 
PRD-PRI competition became significant in 1997 (Klesner, 2004). There were three 
major candidates (the PRI’s Alfredo del Mazo Gonzalez, the PAN’s Carlos Castillo 
Peraza, and the PRD’s Cuauhtemoc Cardenas) and five minor candidates.19 Only three 
main candidates are included in the analysis. 
                                                          
19 The five minor candidates were Pedro Ferriz Santacruz in Party of the Cardenist Front of National 
Reconstruction (Partido Frente Cardenista de Reconstruccion Nacional, PFCRN), Francisco Gonzalez 
Gomez in Workers’ Party (Partido del Trabajo, PT), Jorge Gonzalez Torres in Green Party of Mexico 
(Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico, PVEM), Manuel Hernandez Flores in Popular Socialist Party 
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Table 5.1 shows that there were about two-thirds of the respondents (66.76%) 
thought the national economic condition was worse in the last one or two years, and 
45.51% of the voters evaluated the prospective national economy negatively. For voter 
choice, neither retrospective nor prospective national economic evaluations were 
associated with voter choice (Table 5.4). The media did not affect either people’s 
retrospective or prospective national economic evaluations (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3), and 
the media did not influence voter choice (Table 5.4). Party identification was the only 
important determinant on voter choice. Those who felt close to PRD were more likely to 
vote for Cardenas. The analysis of the 1997 Mexico City election demonstrated that the 
media might not influence economic voting given that the media and political systems 
had not been open and free entirely.  
5.2.3 The 2000 Presidential Election 
The 2000 presidential election is a milestone in the democratization of Mexico. It 
not only ended the PRI’s one-party dominance that had lasted for seven decades but also 
invigorated multiparty competition. The economic condition had improved since 1997, 
and President Zedillo had a high approval rating because of his performance in regard to 
the economy. Table 5.1 shows that 23.81% of the respondents thought the economy had 
gotten somewhat or much better in Zedillo’s administration. Despite the economic 
prosperity in Zedillo’s administration, the economy was not associated with voter choice. 
Although the PRI candidate Francisco Labastida’s campaign strategies focused on 
economy, his campaign messages seemed quite paradoxical to the public-to praise 
Zedillo’s economic performance on the one hand and to keep himself from neoliberal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Partido Popular Socialista, PPS), and Baltazar Ignacio Valadez Montoya in Mexican Democratic Party 
(Partido Democrata Mexicano, PDM)(Grayson, 1997).  
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policy on the other hand. The ambiguity of Labastida’s position on the economic policy 
had benefited the PAN candidate Vicente Fox (Bruhn, 2004). In contrast to Labastida, 
Fox’s main campaign strategy was to center on Mexico’s democracy. Therefore, the 
demand for regime change was the dominant issue in the campaign. (Beatriz Magaloni 
and Alejandro Poire, 2004; Bruhn, 2004; Hart, 2013). Because of these factors, I surmise 
that there might not have been economic voting in 2000 presidential election. 
Generally speaking, voters who were exposed to Television Azteca were more 
likely to vote for the PAN and those who watched Televisa tend to support the PRI. 
However, table 5.4 demonstrates that exposure to Televisa showed no significant 
distinction between Fox and Labastida in 2000. This result conforms to Lawson’s finding 
(Lawson, 2004). In particular, Lawson and McCann(2005) discover that there was more 
negative coverage of news about the PRD candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in the first 
half of the campaign (Feb. ─ Apr.) on Televisa, but there was more positive coverage in 
the second half (May ─ Jun.). This had influenced voter choice (Ibid.). 
Since the presidential campaign did not center on economic issues, there were 
fewer economic messages than regime change messages. Economic issues only consisted 
of 12% of the TV advertisements in the campaign (Hart, 2013). Table 5.2 shows that the 
media did not influence people’s retrospective national economic evaluation in 2000. 
Also none of the economic evaluations (pocketbook and sociotropic) affected voter 
choice (Table 5.4). Exposure to Televisa enhanced the probability to cast votes for 
Cardenas and other candidates (except Fox) although it is barely significant at .10 level. 
This result also substantiates Lawson and McCann’s (2005) finding that there was more 
positive coverage of Cardenas on Televisa in the second half of the campaign. Party 
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identification was the strong determinant on voter choice. In this vein, the media did not 
have influence on economic voting in the 2000 presidential election. 
5.2.4 The 2006 Presidential Election 
The 2006 presidential election was the closest and most competitive election in 
Mexican history. Felipe Calderon (PAN) defeated Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador 
(AMLO) by only 0.58% of the margin in the presidential election. Despite the 
controversy after the election, more than four-fifths of Mexican voters thought 
democracy was important to them, and three-fourths agreed that democracy was the best 
form of governance. In this sense, the presidential election enhanced the legitimacy of 
democracy and can be regarded as part of an extended and continuous process of 
democratization since 2000 (Lawson, 2009; Camp, 2009). 
In contrast to the 2000 presidential election in which democracy was the main 
issue, the dominant issue in 2006 was the economy (Bruhn, 2009; Moreno, 2009; Hart, 
2013). Both Calderon and Obrador thought priming the economy was essential and could 
be an advantage to their own campaigns (Bruhn, 2009). In the last three years of Fox’s 
administration, the economy had grown more rapidly than the first half of his term. 
Compared with 2000 in which only 23.81% of the respondents retrospectively evaluated 
national economic condition positively, two-fifths of voters thought the national economy 
had improved in Fox’s administration. However, Obrador condemned Fox’s neoliberal 
economic policies and appealed to policy changes. Calderon contended that policy 
changes were risky (Ibid.). Thanks to the rapid economic growth during Fox’s 
administration in the last couple of years, Calderon benefited from Fox’s performance. 
Calderon centered his campaign on the economy. He emphasized the importance of 
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economic stability and the extension of Fox’s economic policies if he won the presidency. 
His campaign strategies successfully activated those who positively evaluated national 
economic condition in the last years to cast votes for him (Moreno, 2009). 
Table 5.2, Table 5.3, and Table 5.4 show that the media did not have significant 
influence on either economic condition or voter choice. The results produced from third-
wave panel data were different from that of Hart’s findings, which claimed that the 
candidate can activate the economic vote via economic campaign advertisements (Hart 
2013). Hart mainly focused on the influence of exposure to economic campaign 
advertising on economic voting. In addition, he discovered that there was rarely 
economic news on both TV Azteca and Televisa and thus economic news had no effect 
on economic voting (Ibid.). In my analysis, media consumption is the dummy variable 
(TV Azteca=1 and Televisa=0 in 2006). According to Hart’s findings, it may be difficult 
for the media in general to prime economic voting. In this vein, it is the economic 
campaign advertising and not economic TV news that activated economic voting in the 
2006 presidential campaign.  
In addition, retrospective pocketbook evaluation was highly associated with 
retrospective economic evaluations, prospective economic evaluations, and voter choice. 
Those who thought their personal economic condition was better in the last few years 
were likely to vote for Calderon. Prospective pocketbook voting is not significant here. 
However, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni’s (2009) discovered that the two social 
policy programs (Oportunidades and Seguro Popular) proposed by the PAN successfully 
attracted the poor who had originally planned to vote for the left. Although prospective 
pocketbook voting as a whole was not associated with voter choice, it matters to those 
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who were poor and attracted by the PAN’s two social policy programs. Party 
identification was also an important predictor of voter choice, as is evident in Moreno’s 
(2009) work. 
5.2.5 The 2012 Presidential Election 
The PRI returned to the presidency in 2012 after they were defeated in 2000, and 
this was the second change of party in government and in opposition in Mexico’s history. 
The PRI candidate Pena Nieto won by 38.2% of the votes and defeated AMLO (31.6% of 
the votes) and the PAN female candidate Josefina Vazquez Mota (25.4% of the votes) 
(Lawson, 2015). Different from the 2000 and 2006 presidential campaigns, which 
centered on regime change and the economy respectively, the 2012 presidential campaign 
mainly focused on the personal competence of the candidates, although quite a few 
Mexican voters thought economic growth, jobs, crime, and public securities were the 
most important problems facing the country (Bruhn, 2015).  
Compared with 2006 in which 11.56% of people thought national economic 
condition was worse in the last year, the percentage of people who evaluated the national 
economy negatively in the last year doubled in 2012 (Table 5.1). Moreover, 46.44% of 
the respondents pessimistically evaluated national economy in the next year. Because the 
economy in the U.S. was not in good shape, Mexico’s exports were heavily affected, 
which resulted in economic recession (Lawson, 2015). Moreover, around 40% of the 
people thought that only PRI could handle the economy well. The legacy of the PRI’s 
one-party dominance benefited Nieto’s campaign and PRI legislative candidates 
(McCann, 2015; Dominguez, 2015).  
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Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 demonstrate that the media did not influence either 
retrospective or prospective national economic evaluations in 2012. Table 5.4 shows that 
the media can have significant influences on voter choice. Those who watched TV 
Azteca (the same coding as that of 2006) were more likely to cast their votes for the PAN 
candidate Mota; in contrast, those who watched Televisa tended to vote for Nieto or 
AMLO. Actually, at least half of television viewers supported Nieto (Lawson, 2015; 
Diaz-Dominguez and Moreno, 2015). Television contributed to Nieto’s victory because 
the media portrayed him as a young and reformed PRI candidate. His campaign centered 
on both his achievement as a governor and a competent candidate (Bruhn, 2015; Lawson, 
2015). In addition to the role of the media, the electoral reform benefited Nieto as well. 
Mexico reformed the electoral laws in 2007 in order to shorten campaigns to 90 days and 
reduce media effects, as were evident in 2000 and 2006 (Dominguez and Lawson, 2004; 
Dominguez et al., 2009; Bruhn, 2015; Magar, 2015). The reforms succeeded in the 2012 
presidential election. In contrast to 2000 and 2006 in which the leading candidates in the 
beginning of the campaign were different from those on Election Day, Nieto was the lead 
in the beginning of the campaign and won the presidency in the long run. 
In addition to the traditional media, the role of social media (i.e., Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.) played a significant role in the 2012 presidential election (Camp, 2013; 
Bruhn, 2015; Diaz-Dominguez and Moreno, 2015). The politicized student movement 
known as #YoSoy132 demonstrated its importance because the movement mainly used 
social media to mobilize voters.20 About 64% of voters regarded television as their main 
                                                          
20 On May 11th, 2012, a group of students showed up and protested against biased media coverage when 
Neito visited Ibero-American University in western Mexico City. This is the so-called #YoSoy132 
movement, which was mainly anti-PRI protests and later became supporters for AMLO. Although some 
street protests and public meetings were organized, the movement mainly relied on internet and social 
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source of political information, while 10% of them chose the internet (Camp, 2013). 
Generally speaking, young, highly educated, and leftist voters tended to use the internet 
and social media to obtain political information. In addition, those who positively 
evaluated the movement were more likely to vote for AMLO (Diaz-Dominguez and 
Moreno, 2015). 
The PRI returned to the presidency in 2012. Power was handed over peacefully in 
2000 and 2012, and the constitutional democracy was more successful than ever in 2012 
(Dominguez, 2015). It is evident that democracy in Mexico has strengthened after it 
experienced two changes of party in government and in opposition.  
5.3.7 Conclusion of the Mexico Case 
The Mexico case demonstrates that neither retrospective economic evaluation nor 
prospective economic evaluation were influenced by the media. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 
interpret the media effect on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation 
more clearly. The y-axis represents the change in the probability of “much better” of the 
evaluation due to a change in in the media, which appears on the x-axis. The solid line is 
the estimated change in the probability of “much better” in the evaluation. The gray zones 
represent the 95% confidence interval for the effect. Neither the upward nor downward 
sloping lines indicate the media had significant effect on retrospective and prospective 
national economic evaluations. However, the media did exert some influence on voter 
choice in 2000 and especially in 2012. Respondents who watched Televisa in 2000 were 
more likely to vote for Cardenas given that there was more positive coverage of Cardenas 
in the last half of the campaign season. The upward sloping line in Figure 5.3 can 
demonstrate this. In 2012, Azteca viewers tended to vote for Mota, whether the choice 
                                                                                                                                                                             
media to mobilize young voters (Diaz-Dominguez and Moreno, 2015). 
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was between Mota and Nieto or between Mota and Obrador. Figure 5.3 shows that the 
media has substantive effect on voter choice in 2012, especially the upward sloping line 
represents that watching Azteca was more likely to vote for Mota. The media in general 
did not have an effect in 2006. It is evident that the media affected voter choice in 2000 
and 2012, but it might not activate economic voting. 
In addition to the media effect, talk about politics with family and friends and 
political sophistication did not significantly influence economic evaluations and voter 
choice. The retrospective personal economic evaluation was highly associated with 
retrospective national economic evaluation; similarly, prospective personal economic 
evaluation strongly influence prospective national economic evaluation. However, 
pocketbook voting was only salient in the 2006 election; voters who thought they were 
personally better off in the last year and those who thought they would be personally 
better off in the future one year tended to support Calderon.  
For all other variables, ideology can occasionally affect economic evaluations, 
and it only influenced voter choice in 2006. Those who were ideologically right were 
more likely to vote for the right-wing party PAN. Education was not influential in 
economic evaluations, but it affected voter choice in 2006 and 2012. In 2006, those who 
were better-educated were more likely to support Calderon in the PAN. This conforms to 
the finding that supporters of the PAN are better-educated (Klesner, 2004). However, 
those who were better-educated tended to vote for PRI or PRD in 2012. The reason needs 
to be explored further. Finally, party identification is the strongest determinant of voter 
choice. 
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  Although the media exerted influence on voter choice in 2000 and 2012, it did not 
prime economic voting even after the political and media systems became open, free, and 
well-established. 
5.3 TAIWAN CASE 
Like Mexico, Taiwan is not only a third-wave democracy but it also has 
experienced one-party dominance and three changes of parties in government and in 
opposition (including 2016). The Taiwan case proceeds as follows. The first part is the 
overview of political development in Taiwan before 2000. The Kuomintang (KMT) 
retained one-party dominance until the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the 
presidency in 2000. The second to the sixth parts are the five presidential elections from 
1996 to 2012. The seventh part is the conclusion of the Taiwan case.  
5.3.1 Introduction of Taiwan Politics and the Dominance of KMT Before 2000 
Between the end of World War II and 2000, Taiwan was governed by the 
Nationalist Party (or KMT). Although there were two opposition parties, they were not 
politically viable. A group called Tangwai (means “outside the party”) appeared in the 
middle of the 1970s and became a powerful opposition. The Tangwai transformed into 
the DPP in September 1986 shortly before the lift of martial law. Although the KMT 
faced competition since martial law was lifted, the KMT could still retained one-party 
dominance (Chu, 2010).  From the late 1980s and through the early 1990s, there was a 
two-party system and the strength of the KMT was greater than that of the DPP.  
  Nonetheless, the social base of the KMT had weakened gradually since the young 
Turks within the KMT withdrew from the party and formed the New Party (NP) in 1993.  
The formation of the NP led to party fragmentation in Taiwan. Later on, a number of new 
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parties such as the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), the People First Party (PFP), and 
the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) appeared in the political arena consecutively. The 
effective number of legislative parties in Taiwan gradually rose from two in 1992 to three 
and half in the early 2000s. However, the KMT and the DPP, especially the KMT, 
became the two major parties in Taiwan again after the legislative election in January 
2008. KMT won around three-fourths of the legislative seats, and the effective number of 
legislative parties decreased to less than two (Hsieh and Jang, 2009).   
Despite the party fragmentation, there are two main political camps in Taiwan’s 
political scene. The first is the pan-blue camp which consists of the KMT, the New Party 
(NP), and the People First Party (PFP, which split from KMT in 2000). The second is the 
pan-green camp which is composed of the DPP, the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), 
the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, split from KMT in 2001), and New Power Party 
(established in 2015). Parties within each camp often cooperate with each other in 
Legislative Yuan or elections against parties in the other camp. 
The freedom of the media was restricted in authoritarian regimes such as Taiwan 
and Mexico before 2000 (McCombs, 2004; Greene, 2007). Three main TV stations (TTV, 
CTV, CTS) were dominated by the KMT before regime change. After 2000, more 
television stations showed up. Some are pro-KMT (blue camp) or pro-DPP (green) camp 
(Lo et al., 1998; Lo and Huang, 2000; Lo, 2013). In addition, the economy had grown 
rapidly and prosperously under the dominant KMT-led economic policies (Choi, 2010). 
Are there any differences in the media effect on economic voting between a one 
dominant party regime and a competitive democratic regime? I would like to compare the 
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media’s effect on economic voting in different presidential elections, from the one 
dominant party regime in 1996 to the democratic regime after 2000. 
5.3.2 The 1996 Presidential Election 
The 1996 presidential election was a milestone in the democratization of Taiwan 
because it was the first popular presidential election in the country’s history. There were 
four presidential candidates in the election: the KMT’s incumbent, Teng-hui Lee; the 
DPP’s Ming-min Peng; independent Yang-kang Lin (who withdrew from the KMT); and 
independent Li-an Chen (who also withdrew from the KMT). The incumbent president 
Teng-hui Lee won the election with 54% of the popular vote. Research demonstrated that 
two-thirds of DPP identifiers showed support for Teng-hui Lee and that the so-called 
“Teng-hui Lee complex” was influential in the presidential campaign (Yu, 1996). Table 
5.5 shows that about two-thirds of respondents thought that the national economic 
condition was much worse or somewhat worse over the past year. Although the economy 
was still quite prosperous before the presidential election in general, the economic growth 
became slower than previous years in which the economy grew rapidly (Choi, 2010). 
Despite the economic downturn before the election, there were no significant effects in 
economic voting. In particular, national identity was the dominant determinant on voter 
choice (Wu, 2001; Choi, 2010). Those were evident in the voter choice in the 1996 
presidential election in table 5.8. In the voter choice between Peng and Lee, those who 
thought Taiwan should be unified with China were more likely to vote for Lee, and those 
who thought Taiwan should declare independence from China tended to vote for Peng. In 
voter choice between Lin and Lee, national identity is not statistically significant; those 
who supported unification were more likely to vote for Lin than Lee given that Lin was a 
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firm supporter of unification and Lee’s position on unification or independence was 
ambiguous (Tsai, 2005; Choi, 2010; Chang and Huang, 2011).  
As table 5.6 and 5.7 show, the media (newspaper) (pan-blue = 1, pan-green = 0) 
influenced retrospective national economic evaluation; but it did not influence 
prospective national economic evaluation. When people read more pro-blue newspapers, 
they were more likely to think national economic condition was worse in the last one year. 
Table 5.8 indicates that the media barely influenced voter choice between Lee and Peng 
at 0.10 level. People who read pan-blue newspaper were more likely to vote for Lee.  
5.3.3 The 2000 Presidential Election 
          The 2000 presidential election was another important milestone in Taiwan’s history. 
It ended the one-party dominance of the KMT over the past five decades. Although the 
DPP’s candidate Shui-bian Chen won the presidency, he received only 39.3% of the 
popular vote, and the KMT remained in the majority in the Legislative Yuan until the 
2001 legislative election. The other two main candidates -- the KMT’s Chan Lien and the 
independent James Soong (who withdrew from the KMT) received 23.1% and 36.8% of 
the vote respectively. The split of the KMT and the Chung Hsing Bills Finance scandal 
involving James Soong during the campaign led to the victory of Chen (Chu, 2001; Hsu, 
2001; Yu, 2001; Chang and Huang, 2011; Chang, 2012). Economic growth was even 
lower in 2000 than in 1996. In other words, the economic condition was even worse in 
2000 than that in 1996.  
As table 5.5 shows, 62% of the respondents negatively evaluated the national 
economic condition over the past year. However, the economic downtown could not 
account for the KMT’s defeat. In table 5.8, retrospective national economic evaluation 
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was significant in voter choice between Lien and Soong, and prospective national 
economic evaluation was significant between Lien and Chen. Those who positively 
evaluated the national economic condition in the last one year were more likely to reward 
the KMT’s Lien; those who were optimistic the future prospects of the national economy 
were more likely to vote for Chen.  
As in 1996, the economy was not the dominant determinant of voter choice. 
Rather, national identity was the most significant factor (Wu, 2001; Zhang, 2010). 
Although all three main candidates’ positions on national identity emphasized the status 
quo, there were still some differences on the meaning of status quo, on policies regarding 
the cross-strait relationship, and regarding definitions of the state. Those nuances made 
national identity the main issue in the 2000 presidential campaign (Chang and Huang, 
2011). Both Soong and Lien asserted that Chen would announce Taiwan independence 
after he won the presidency, although Chen promised he would not (Lee, 2000; Chen, 
2000; Chang and Huang, 2011). Moreover, Lien also criticized Soong’s policies 
regarding the cross-strait relationship, which seemed to surrender Taiwan to Mainland 
China (Pu, 2000; Chang and Huang, 2011). As table 5.8 shows, those who were pro-
unification were more likely to cast votes for Soong over Lien given that Song was a firm 
supporter of unification. However, national identity was not significant between Chen 
and Lien. Those who voted for Chen were probably engaged in strategic voting to prevent 
Soong from being elected by deserting the hopeless candidate Lien (Chang and Huang, 
2011).21 
                                                          
21 After the 1996 presidential election, Teng-hui Lee’s position on national identity changed from pro-
unification toward pro-independence. He proposed “Two State Theory” which defined cross-strait 
relationship was the special relationship between two nations (Taiwan vs. China). His KMT membership 
was suspended by the KMT after the 2000 presidential election because he was suspected to assist Chen 
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As tables 5.6 and 5.7 show, the media (pan-blue = 1, pan-green = 0) did not affect 
either retrospective or prospective national economic evaluation in 2000. Nevertheless, 
the media influenced voter choice both between Lien and Soong and between Lien and 
Chen. Those who watched pan-blue TV stations were more likely to vote for Lien both 
between Lien and Soong and between Lien and Chen. 
5.3.4 The 2004 Presidential Election 
        There were only two presidential candidates that represented pan-blue and pan-
green camps in the 2004 presidential election. The KMT candidate Chan Lien led the 
pan-blue ticket again. The leader of the PFP, James Soong, cooperated with the KMT and 
was the vice-presidential candidate of the KMT.22 The incumbent President Shui-bian 
Chen, seeking reelection, represented the pan-green camp. Despite extraordinary 
economic recession and political chaos during Chen’s first administration, he won the 
presidency by a bare margin of 0.22% (Choi, 2010).  
Similar to the situation in the 2000 election, national identity, not the economy, 
dominated the campaign (Choi, 2010; Chang, 2010; Chang and Huang, 2011). In both the 
pan-blue and pan-green camps, issues of national identity were not too much different 
from in 2000. The pan-blue camp emphasized the importance of the status quo and 
argued for reconciliation between Taiwan and China. It also attacked Chen’s intention to 
declare Taiwan independent again. Although pan-green camp claimed the status quo as 
well, they asserted that the cross-relationship was a special relationship between two 
nations. In other words, both camps had different definitions of the status quo (Chang and 
Huang, 2011). As table 5.8 shows, retrospective national economic evaluation did not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and abandon Lien secretly (Chang and Huang, 2011). 
22 James Soong established the PFP shortly after the 2000 presidential election and was the leader of the 
PFP. 
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influence voter choice; rather, national identity was influential. Although table 5.5 shows 
that there was 34.89% of the respondents thought national economy was worse in the last 
one year, a majority of voters seemed to attribute the economic downturn to a global 
economic recession, as claimed by the DPP, rather than mismanagement in Chen’s 
administration (Chuang, 2008). Those who were pro-unification or who preferred the 
status quo tended to vote for Lien; those who were pro-independence were more likely to 
vote for Chen. In particular, prospective national economic evaluation affected voter 
choice. Those who thought national economic conditions would be better in the future 
were more likely to cast votes for Chen.  
       In table 5.6 and 5.7, neither retrospective nor prospective national economic 
evaluation was influenced by the media (newspaper) (pan-blue = 0, pan-green = 1) in 
2004. The media (newspaper) did not influence voter choice either (see table 5.8). In this 
sense, the media effect on economic voting was not significant in 2004.  
5.3.5 The 2008 Presidential Election 
        The 2008 presidential election is another significant milestone in Taiwan’s history. 
There were only two presidential candidates; one was the KMT’s Ying-jeou Ma and the 
other the DPP’s Frank Hsieh. Ying-jeou Ma won the presidency with 58.45% of the vote. 
Taiwan experienced a second change of party in government and in opposition in 2008 
and nearly approached the stage of democratic consolidation (Liu, Cheng, and Chen, 
2009).  
       A total of 66.67% of voters thought national economic conditions were worse, 
and only 3.07% thought they were better over the past year (see table 5.5). Actually the 
global financial tsunami (or global credit crunch) that happened in 2007-2008 had caused 
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an economic depression in Taiwan. GDP growth was 4.4% in 2007, but decreasing 
exports reduced GDP growth to 0.12% in 2008. The unemployment rate was below 4% in 
2007, but it had risen to 5.75% in 2008 (Niou and Lacy, 2012). Although two-thirds of 
the voters (66.67%) evaluated the national economy over the past year negatively and 
both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations were individually 
significant, national identity had the larger substantive effect on voter choice according to 
the predicted probability.23 Similar to the previous presidential elections, national identity 
was the dominant determinant of voter choice (Ibid.). Those who were pro-independence 
were more likely to vote for Hsieh, and those who were pro-unification or who favored 
the status quo tended to vote for Ma. 
       Media consumption (pan-blue = 0, pan-green = 1) affected both national 
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations (table 5.6 and 5.7). Those 
who watched pan-green television channels were more likely to evaluate both 
retrospective and prospective national economic conditions positively. In contrast, pan-
blue TV station viewers tended to evaluate negatively. In addition, the media influenced 
voter choice as well (see table 5.8). Those who watched pan-blue TV stations were more 
likely to vote for Ma; the pan-green TV station viewers tended to cast votes for Hsieh.  
5.3.6 The 2012 Presidential Election 
        There were three presidential candidates in 2012 presidential election. The 
incumbent Ying-jeou Ma ran for reelection. The DPP candidate was the chairman, Miss 
                                                          
23  There is a problem of endogeneity between retrospective national economic evaluation and voter choice. 
The survey was conducted after President Ying-jeou Ma assumed the presidency and the respondents had 
known who the new president was. Voters might think national economic condition was better in the last 
year if their ideal candidate was elected; they might evaluated national economic condition in the last year 
negatively if their favorite candidate was defeated. Therefore, the statistical result seemed to contradict the 
theory: those who thought national economic condition was better in the last year were more likely to vote 
for Ying-jeou Ma (Wu and Lin, 2012). 
 127 
Ing-wen Tsai, and James Soong led the PFP ticket. Although the global credit crunch had 
affected national economic conditions in Ying-jeou Ma’s first term and people were not 
satisfied with his overall performance, he won reelection with 51.6% of the vote while 
Ing-wen Tsai received 45.63% and James Soong only 2.77% (Cheng, 2014). 24 The 
candidate factor, including candidate image and past performance, was the important 
factor on voter choice. The empirical data demonstrated that Ma’s candidate image was 
more favored by voters than Tsai’s, and his cross-strait policies were evaluated positively. 
In contrast, voters thought Tsai did not have many political experience and she was 
heavily influenced by the DPP’s image of corruption (Ibid.). 
         A total of 43.82% of respondents evaluated national economic conditions over the 
past year negatively (table 5.5). However, table 5.8 shows that retrospective national 
economic evaluation was not influential on voter choice; only prospective national 
economic evaluation was significant. Neither retrospective nor prospective pocketbook 
voting was significant. Again, national identity was the important determinant on voter 
choice in addition to party identification. People who preferred the status quo or 
unification were more likely to cast votes for Ma.  
         The media (pan-blue = 1, pan-green = 0) could influence both retrospective and 
prospective national economic evaluations (table 5.6 and 5.7). Watching pan-blue 
television stations was more likely to the positive evaluation of retrospective and 
prospective national economic conditions; in contrast, pan-green channel viewers tended 
to evaluate both retrospective and prospective national economic conditions negatively. 
Moreover, the media could also influence voter choice (see table 5.8). Voters who 
                                                          
24 James Soong’s votes were few and was dropped in the statistical analysis. 
 128 
watched pan-blue television stations were more likely to vote for Ma, and those who 
watched pan-green television stations tended to vote for Tsai.  
5.3.7 Conclusion of the Taiwan Case  
The media effect did not exert significant influence on retrospective national 
economic evaluation in 2000 and 2004 presidential election. The effect turned out to be 
influential in 1996, 2008, and 2012. While watching the TV stations that were favorable 
to the ruling party (the DPP in 2008 and the KMT in 2012), respondents were more likely 
to think national economic conditions were better over the past year. The downward 
sloping line in 2008 and upward sloping line in 2012 in figure 5.4 can indicate this. In 
prospective economic evaluation, the media effect exerted influence in 2008 and 2012. 
While viewing the TV stations favorable to the ruling party, voters were more likely to 
think national economic condition would be better one year from the present. The same 
as retrospective national economic evaluation, the downward sloping line in 2008 and 
upward sloping line in 2012 in figure 5.5 can demonstrate the effects. For voter choice, 
the media effect exerted influence in 2000, 2008, and 2012. While watching pro-ruling 
party TV stations (the KMT in 2000 and 2012, and the DPP in 2008), respondents tended 
to vote for the ruling party’s candidate and vice versa. The downward sloping line in 
2000 and the upward sloping line in 2008 and 2012 in figure 5.6 substantiate that those 
who viewed pro-ruling party TV channels were more likely to cast their votes for the 
ruling party. The results confirm that the choice of media (especially TV news channels) 
is highly associated with voter choice (Lo, 2013). Although the media system and 
political system were nearly competitive in 1996 and 2000 and the media effect might 
matter occasionally, the media effect on economic voting was most significant in 2008 
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and 2012, in which Taiwan had experienced two changes of party in government and in 
opposition. The media effect on economic voting in Taiwan substantiates that the 
attribute agenda-setting effect and its consequence could have substantial effect in 
entirely open and free political and media systems. 
In addition to the media effect, both the retrospective and prospective pocketbook 
evaluations can strongly affect both retrospective and prospective national economic 
evaluations and it has produced the strongest influence while holding other variables 
constant. However, none of presidential elections showed that pocketbook voting was 
significant. Moreover, retrospective national economic evaluation was not significant in 
presidential elections in 2004 and 2012. Prospective national economic evaluation was 
significant from 1996 to 2012. Party identification is the second influential determinant 
on both economic evaluations. Voters were more likely to evaluate national economic 
evaluation positively if the party they felt closet to was the ruling party; they tended to 
evaluate national economy negatively if they were supporters of the opposition party. 
Party identification is the most significant factor on voter choice. In particular, national 
identity is the second significant determinant on voter choice. Except in 2004, the 
predicted probability showed that national identity was more influential than either 
retrospective or prospective national economic evaluation. This conforms to the study of 
economic voting in Taiwan that national identity has been the most important 
determinant on voter choice. 
  For all other variables, education is not always significant in both national 
economic evaluations and voter choice. Political sophistication did not influence either 
economic evaluations or voter choice. One of the reasons may be that the items of 
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political sophistication in Taiwan were very easy for respondents to answer correctly and 
it is difficult to explore the importance of it (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). Talk about 
politics only showed influences on retrospective national economic evaluation in 2000 
and 2004 elections. It was not influential either on prospective national economic 
evaluation or voter choice. It implies that discussion about politics with others may 
sometimes impact retrospective national economic evaluation.  
 In conclusion, the media effect on economic voting was most influential in 2008 
and 2012, when the political and media systems were well established. What one needs to 
pay attention to is that the question of the media in 1996 and 2004 were newspapers and 
the others were TV stations. Wang (2013) examined Taiwan Social Change Survey 
(TSCS) data from 1993 to 2003 and found that people’s patterns of media use were 
changing. The use of traditional media (newspapers, radio, and magazines) was declining 
and the use of TV and internet were increasing. As there were fewer and fewer people 
reading hard copies of newspapers and more people reading online newspapers and 
watching TV, does this trend really have impact on economic voting? Or do different 
types of media have different influence on economic voting? This question deserves 
further exploration in the future. 
5.4 CONCLUSION OF COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
 Both Mexico and Taiwan have had similar trajectories of democratization: the 
dominant ruling party in power for decades and experiencing at least two changes of 
party in government and in opposition. Nevertheless, the media effects on economic 
voting are different. In Mexico, the media affected voter choice in 2000 and 2012, but it 
influenced neither retrospective nor prospective national economic evaluations even 
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during the time when the media and political systems were open and free. Therefore, the 
media effect on economic voting is not that significant in Mexico. In Taiwan, the media 
influenced voter choice in 2000, 2008, and 2012. The media also affected both 
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations in 2008 and 2012. In this 
sense, the media activated economic voting especially in 2008 and 2012 when the media 
and the political systems were well-established. The media effect on national economic 
evaluation is more influential in Taiwan than in Mexico, given that Taiwan has a higher 
level of democracy (the polity score of Mexico and Taiwan are 8 and 10 in 2012 
respectively). The comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan substantiates that 
consolidated democracies can have stronger effect on national economic evaluation than 
those with lower level of democracy. However, the comparative case study does not 
conform to the finding that countries with middle income have the strongest effect on 
national economic evaluation given that Mexico belongs to the middle income group. 
Although level of democracy and level of economic development do not have effect on 
voter choice, the 2012 presidential elections in both countries show that media can affect 
voter choice, especially in the situation when the political system and media system had 
become more open and free. 
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Table 5.1. The Breakdown of the Retrospective and Prospective National Economic Evaluation in Mexico (1997-2012)  
Year 1997 2000 2006 2012 
 Retrospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective 
Much  
worse 
144(39.56%) - 128(11.08%) - 103(5.34%) 74(4.15%) 16(1.49%) 56(5.62%) 
Somewhat  
worse 
99(27.2%) 157(45.51%) 230(19.91%) - 120(6.22%) 135(7.57%) 233(21.76%) 407(40.82%) 
The same 64(17.58%) 126(36.52%) 522(45.19%) - 911(47.2%) 916(51.37%) 431(40.24%) 309(30.99%) 
Somewhat 
better 
42(11.54%) 62(17.97%) 259(22.42%) - 640(33.16%) 535(30.01%) 223(20.82%) 170(17.05%) 
Much 
better 
15(4.12%) - 16(1.39%) - 156(8.08%) 123(6.90%) 168(15.69%) 55(5.52%) 
Total 364(100%) 345(100%) 1,155(100%) - 1930(100%) 1,783(100%) 1,071(100%) 997(100%) 
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Table 5.2. The Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective Economic Evaluation in Mexico Elections (1997-2012) 
Year 1997 2000 2006 2012 
Variable Coef.(SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ 
Retro Pocketbook .57(.14)*** .11(.05) 1.04(.09)*** .08(.02) 1.87(.12)*** .36(.05) 1.45(.09)*** .56(.04) 
Pros Pocketbook .08(.20)  -  .19(.10)* .01(.01) -.03(.08)  
Talk .02(.13)  .05(.06)  .0001(.07)  -.09(.06)  
Media .21(.32)  .03(.14)  -.17(.15)  .03(.08)  
Ideology .18(.08)* .04(.02) .002(.02)  .13(.04)** .02(.01) -.05(.05)  
Education .03(.15)  .06(.07)  -.10(.08)  .05(.06)  
PRI -1.10(.57)# -.02(.01) .84(.25)** .01(.01) -.42(.23)# -.01(.003) .02(.19)  
PAN -.35(.51)  .47(.23)* .01(.003) .77(.21)*** .02(.01) -.73(.21)** -.05(.01) 
PRD -.49(.40)  .14(.29)  -.91(.21)*** -.01(.004) .09(.21)  
Sophistication -  -.07(.08)  .06(.10) - -  
N of Obs 170 768 806 831 
Log Likelihood -226.79 -919.01 -734.65 -964.50 
LR chi2 30.90 188.29 558.65 367.5 
Prob .0003 .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .064 .093 .2755 .16 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001; Predicted probability and standard error (SE) 
2. The choice of the congressional candidate of the party was used for party identification in 1997. 
3. Questions of prospective personal economic evaluation was not asked in 2000 election. 
4. Questions of political sophistication were not asked in the 1997 and 2012 elections. 
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Figure 5.1. The Effect of the Media on Retrospective National Economic Evaluation in Mexico’s Elections (1997-2012) 
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Table 5.3 The Ordered Logit Models of Prospective Economic Evaluation in Mexico Elections (1997-2012) 
Year 1997 2006 2012 
Variable Coef.(SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ 
Retro Pocketbook .14(.14)  .37(.10)*** .03(.01) -.06(.08)  
Pros Pocketbook 1.52(.25)*** .32(.05) 1.86(.11)*** .33(.04) -2.79(.13)*** -.70(.05) 
Talk -.03(.14)  -.10(.07)  -.04(.07)  
Media -.45(.35)  -.18(.16)  -.005(.09)  
Ideology -.03(.09)  .11(.05)* .01(.01) -.07(.05)  
Education -.31(.16)# -.18(.10) -.16(.08)# -.01(.01) .13(.07)# .002(.001) 
PRI -.19(.63)  .003(.23)  -.73(.22)** -.003(.001) 
PAN -.25(.58)  .30(.21)  .06(.23)  
PRD -.20(.45)  -.20(.21)  .10(.23)  
Sophistication -  .10(.10)  -  
N of Obs 166 783 805 
Log Likelihood -148.40 -747.51 -681.56 
LR chi2 49.83 465.73 841.42 
Prob .000 .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .1437 .238 .38 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE) 
3. Questions of political sophistication were not asked in the 1997 and 2012 elections. 
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Figure 5.2. The Effect of the Media on Prospective National Economic Evaluation in Mexico’s Elections (1997-2012) 
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Table 5.4 The Voter Choice of Mexico Elections (1997-2012) 
Year 1997(Baseline: Peraza of PAN) 2000 (Baseline: Labstida of PRI) 
Candidates Cardenas (PRD) Gonzalez (PRI) Fox (PAN) Cardenas (PRD) & others 
Variables Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ 
Sociotropic -.32(.32)  .07(.53)  .17(.17)  .18(.24)  
Prospective .27(.51)  -.002(.67)  -  -  
Talk .39(.33)  .10(.51)  -.17(.12)  -.29(.17)# -.04(.05) 
Media -.74(.78)  -.04(1.21)  .48(.32)  .75(.43)# .02(.03) 
Ideology -.27(.22)  .60(.39)  .01(.05)  -.06(.06)  
Retro Pocketbook .53(.37)  .88(.68)  -.21(.17)  -.18(.24)  
Pros Pocketbook -.15(.55)  -.96(.79)  -  -  
Education -.14(.37)  -.27(.61)  .24(.14)# .13(.10) .11(.20)  
Sophistication -  -  -.13(.17)  -.06(.24)  
PRI 20.69(20148)  23.91(20148)  -3.56(.53)*** -.06(.09) -3.94(.69)*** -.03(.04) 
PAN -1.73(1.12)  -.99(1.57)  1.71(.51)** .48(.05) -.87(.66)  
PRD 2.59(1.12)* .27(.16) -15.56(1261)  14.08(585.39)  16.69(585.39)  
Constant 1.58(1.83)  -1.45(2.91)  .80(.63)  .68(.79)  
N of obs 163 747 
Log Likelihood -67.97 -542.95 
LR chi2 226.00 776.76 
Prob .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .6244 .42 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE) 
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Table 5.4. (continued) The Voter Choice of Mexico Elections (1997-2012) 
Year 2006 (Baseline: Calderon of PAN) 2012 (Baseline: Mota of PAN) 
Candidates Madrazo (PRI) Obrador (PRD) Nieto (PRI) Obrador (PRD) 
Variables Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ Coef. (SE) △ 
Sociotropic -.28(.31)  -.15(.26)  .04(.23)  .58(.23)* .42(.13) 
Prospective -.54(.30)# -.08(.11) -.48(.27)# -.30(.21) -.27(.32)  .83(.33)* .74(.12) 
Talk -.19(.19)  .21(.16)  .14(.17)  .14(.18)  
Media -.07(.40)  .001(.35)  -.53(.23)* -.001(.09) -.73(.24)** -.14(.08) 
Ideology -.26(.12)* -.0004(.05) -.43(.11)*** -.48(.12) .11(.13)  -.16(.13)  
 Retro Pocketbook -.71(.33)* -.05(.10) -.90(.28)** -.58(.17) .44(.24)# .45(.15) -.09(.25)  
Pros Pocketbook .17(.28)  .30(.27)  .10(.35)  .59(.35)# .40(.18) 
Education .13(.22)  -.39(.19)* -.36(.15) .39(.16)* .09(.14) .42(.17)* .09(.13) 
Sophistication -.41(.26)  .23(.23)  -  -  
PRI 3.24(.49)*** .62(.10) -1.08(.53)* -.49(.08) 3.71(.55)*** .58(.05) 1.17(.63)# -.34(.07) 
PAN -2.02(.64)** -.04(.04) -2.65(.40)*** -.50(.07) -3.28(.49)*** -.39(.08) -2.66(.46)*** -.12(.08) 
PRD .63(1.31)  4.3(.80)*** -.11(.04) 2.10(1.10)# -.46(.07) 5.15(1.06)*** .67(.06) 
Constant -.24(.72)  2.13(.63)** .68(.05) -1.43(.65)*  -.98(.65)  
N of obs 624 679 
Log Likelihood -235.13 -268.03 
LR chi2 807.15 914.19 
Prob .000 .000 
Pseudo R2 .63 .63 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE) 
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Figure 5.3. The Effect of the Media on Voter Choice in Mexico’s Elections (1997-2012) 
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Figure 5.3. (continued) The Effect of the Media on Voter Choice in Mexico’s Elections (1997-2012) 
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Table 5.5. The Breakdown of the Retrospective and Prospective National Economic Evaluation in Taiwan (1996-2012) 
Year 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 Retrospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective 
Much 
Worse 
401(30.97%) 34(3.95%) 180(13.3%) 50(4.49%) - - - - - - 
Somewhat 
Worse 
465(35.91%) 122(14.19%) 668(48.72%) 338(30.37%) 607(34.89%) 362(25.07%) 1,218(66.67%) 585(38.29%) 777(43.82%) 459(30%) 
The Same 294(22.7%) 289(33.6%) 327(23.85%) 411(36.93%) 670(38.51%) 687(47.58%) 553(30.27%) 563(36.85%) 684(38.58%) 738(48.24%) 
Somewhat 
better 
114(8.8%) 385(44.77%) 168(12.25%) 301(27.04%) 463(26.61%) 395(27.35%) 56(3.07%) 380(24.87%) 312(17.6%) 333(21.76%) 
Much 
Better 
21(1.62%) 30(3.49%) 28(2.04%) 13(1.17%) - - - - - - 
Total 1,295(100%) 860(100%) 1,371(100%) 1,113(100%) 1,740(100%) 1,444(100%) 1,827(100%) 1,528(100%) 1,773(100%) 1,530(100%) 
Note: In 2004 and 2008 survey data, there are only three choices in the economic evaluation: worse, the same, and better. 
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Table 5.6. The Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective Economic Evaluation in Taiwan Presidential Elections (1996-2012) 
Year 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Variables Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ 
Education -.12(.12)  .22(.06)*** .013(.004) .21(.102)* .104(.047) .08(.09)  .11(.08)  
Retro 
Pocketbook 
.17(.12)  - - 1.46(.134)*** .552(.044) 1.11(.13)*** .08(.02) 1.21(.11)*** .34(.04) 
Pros Pocketbook 1.42(.14)*** .20(.05) - - -  .25(.08)** .01(.003) -.13(.08)  
Media -.42(.19)* -.01(.01) -.02(.06)  .166(.147)  -.36(.16)* -.01(.003) .65(.15)*** .07(.02) 
Sophistication -.10(.14)  - - .044(.066)  .12(.07)# .01(.004) .01(.07)  
Talk  .08(.10)  -.23(.11)* -.01(.003) .169(.076)* .095(.043) -.14(.08)# -.01(.005) -.01(.07)  
Party ID .05(.09)  -.10(.05)# -.01(.003) .520(.087)*** .195(.033) -.48(.09)*** -.02(.005) .64(.08)*** .15(.02) 
N of obs 545  1,319  895  1,327  1,300  
Log likelihood -607.45  -1706.31  -856.78  -873.59  -1168.612  
LR chi2 132.27  17.02  245.13  253.88  388.20  
Prob .000  .0019  .000  .000  .000  
Pseudo R2 .0982  .005  .1251  .1269  .1424  
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE) 
3. Questions about the retrospective/prospective pocketbook evaluations and political sophistication in 2000 were not asked. 
4. Newspapers are used in lieu of TV station in 1996 and 2004. 
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Figure 5.4. The Effect of the Media on Retrospective National Economic Evaluation in 
Taiwan Elections (1996-2012) 
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Table 5.7. The Ordered Logit Models of Prospective Economic Evaluation in Taiwan Presidential Elections (1996-2012) 
Year 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Variables Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ 
Education -.19(.10)# -.01(.01) .20(.07)** .01(.003) .123(.112)  .28(.09)** .10(.03) .05(.08)  
Retro 
Pocketbook 
.90(.12)*** .08(.03) -  1.126(.134)*** .419(.048) .60(.11)*** .20(.04) .88(.11)*** .29(.04) 
Pros  
Pocketbook 
.17(.12)  -  -  .57(.07)*** .15(.02) -.26(.08)** -.08(.02) 
Media -.16(.17)  -.02(.07)  .225(.158)  -.36(.15)* -.05(.02) .33(.15)* .05(.02) 
Sophistication -.11(.12)  -  -.069(.071)  .06(.07)  -.09(.07)  
Talk  -.17(.09)# -.01(.005) -.08(.12)  .0413(.082)  -.001(.07)  -.10(.07)  
Party ID .07(.08)  -.33(.06)*** -.01(.003) .927(.097)*** .332(.033) -1.06(.08)*** -.29(.02) .63(.08)*** .18(.02) 
N of obs 643  1,069  782  1,215  1,197  
Log 
likelihood 
-797.58  -1339.13  -712.33  -1052.63  -1124.94  
LR chi2 86.88  43.88  245.89  524.68  265.06  
Prob .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  
Pseudo R2 .0517  .016  .1472  .1995  .1054  
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2.  △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE) 
3.  Questions about the pocketbook evaluation and political sophistication in 2000 were not asked 
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Figure 5.5. The Effect of the Media on Prospective National Economic Evaluation in 
Taiwan Elections (1996-2012) 
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Table 5.8. The Voter Choice in Taiwan Elections (1996-2012) 
Year  1996 (Baseline: Lee)   2000 (Baseline: Lien)  
Variables Lee/Peng 
 
▲ Lee/Lin 
 
▲ Lien/Soong 
 
▲ Lien/Chen 
 
▲ 
Retro Pocketbook -.28(.29)  -.14(.28)  -  -  
Pros Pocketbook .08(.30)  .37(.31)  -  -  
Retrospective -.13(.26)  -.53(.22)* -.08(.04) -.24(.12)* -.23(.10) .03(.15)  
Prospective -.31(.26)  -.45(.21)* -.11(.07) .22(.13)# .01(.11) .42(.15)** .23(.10) 
Education .70(.29)* .04(.02) .76(.29)** .07(.04) .11(.14)  -.33(.16)* -.25(.10) 
Sophistication .16(.36)  .14(.35)  -  -  
Media -.70(.42)# -.03(.02) .25(.51)  -.87(.34)* -.06(.06) -1.09(.35)** -.11(.06) 
Talk .05(.26)  -.04(.23)  -.22(.22)  .18(.27)  
Party ID -2.07(.33)*** -.49(.08) 1.65(.31)*** .36(.07) .55(.12)*** .74(.04) -2.33(.22)*** -90(.02) 
National Identity -.20(.10)* -.07(.05) .14(.09)  .33(.13)** .34(.10) -.08(.15)  
Constant -2.31(.91)*  -6.68(1.15)***  .02(.51)  2.12(.54)***  
N of obs 395    788    
Log Likelihood -288.71    -521.58    
LR chi2 284.83    615.11    
Prob .000    .000    
Pseudo R2 .3303    .3709    
  
1
4
7 
Table 5.8. (continued) The Voter Choice in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 Presidential Election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. #p≦.10  *≦.05  **≦.01  ***≦.001 
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE) 
 
Year 2004 (Baseline: Lien) 2008 (Baseline: Ma) 2012 (Baseline: Tsai) 
Variables Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ Coef.(SE) △ 
Retro Pocketbook -.16(.35)  -.38(.34)  .28(.33)  
Pros Pocketbook -  .29(.19)  -.09(.21)  
Retrospective .15(.27)  -.72(.34)* -.16(.07) .09(.26)  
Prospective 1.01(.31)** .45(.12) -.56(.25)* -.17(.07) .71(.26)** .28(.10) 
Education -.56(.26)* -.37(.15) .25(.22)  -.09(.24)  
Sophistication -.26(.18)  .007(.16)  -.27(.18)  
Media .45(.36)  1.58(.31)*** .28(.06) 1.22(.34)*** .27(.08) 
Talk .04(.21)  .16(.20)  -.24(.20)  
Party ID 3.36(.31)*** .93(.02) 2.9(.23)*** .84(.03) 3.26(.24)*** .92(.02) 
National Identity -.19(.08)* -.41(.17) -.37(.07)*** -.52(.09) .17(.08)* .34(.14) 
Constant .83(.79)  -.10(.64)  -1.74(.73)*  
N of obs 609  944  932  
Log Likelihood -113.79  -162.13  -155.92  
LR chi2 616.63  934.53  943.61  
Prob .000  .000  .000  
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Figure 5.6. The Effect of the Media on Voter Choice in Taiwan Elections (1996-2012) 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This research explores the effect of information sources (media consumption and 
talking about politics with others) on people’s retrospective and prospective national 
economic evaluations and their subsequent voter choice in comparative perspective by 
using multilevel models. It substantiates whether level of democracy and level of 
economic development can influence economic voting. The purpose of this research is to 
establish a general rule on economic voting in comparative perspective. In this chapter I 
summarize the findings of the previous chapters and offers a substantive interpretation of 
the major contribution of this research. The chapter also analyzes the limitations of the 
research and provides suggestions for further work. First, I outline the major findings of 
the research from both cross-national analyses using multilevel models and the 
comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan. Second, I analyze the limitations of the 
research, such as the measurement of media consumption in both cross-national analysis 
and comparative case study, the problem of endogeneity, missing data, and survey data of 
state level. Finally, I present a research plan future work in this area, including 
suggestions for improving models. 
6.1 MAJOR FINDINGS OF THIS RESEARCH 
Fundamentally, this research explores whether there is a nomothetic explanation 
on economic voting. The effect of information 
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sources (especially the media) and the significance of economic voting is controversial 
and varied across countries. By using multilevel modeling, a general explanation of 
economic voting in comparative perspective can be established. The multilevel modeling 
accounts for the differences across countries. The goal is to verify whether level of 
democracy and level of economic development can explain the variation across countries. 
In other words, I wonder whether level of democracy and level of economic development 
can account for economic voting in comparative perspective. The comparative case study 
of Mexico and Taiwan substantiates the findings in cross-national analyses. The major 
findings are as follows.  
6.1.1 Effect of Information Sources on Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective 
Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of information sources on retrospective national 
economic evaluation by using multilevel ordered logit models. The single-level ordered 
logit models for each country show that media effect and talking about politics do not 
necessarily affect retrospective national economic evaluation. It is difficult to derive a 
general explanation of the effect of information sources on retrospective national 
economic evaluation if only ordered logit model are estimated. Although the multilevel 
models indicate that level of democracy and level of economic development do not 
explain much between-country variance on retrospective national economic evaluation, 
the subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies show that consolidated 
democracies (polity score: 10) and countries with middle income (GDP per capita: 
$1,000~9,999 USD) have the strongest impact on retrospective national economic 
evaluation. 
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Chapter 3 explores the effect of information sources on prospective national 
economic evaluation. The findings are basically the same as those for the retrospective 
national economic evaluation: the single-level ordered logit models for each country 
show that media effect and talking about politics with others do not necessarily influence 
prospective national economic evaluation. Level of democracy and level of economic 
development do not explain much between-country variance on prospective national 
economic evaluation. The subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies indicates 
that consolidated democracies and countries with middle income have the strongest 
impact on prospective national economic evaluation. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of information sources on voter choice. The logit 
models for each country indicate that media effect and talking about politics with others 
do not affect voter choice in most Latin American countries. In contrast to the findings on 
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations, level of democracy and 
level of economic development do not influence voter choice. The subset of polity score 
and GDP per capita dummies shows the same results. Therefore, level of the democracy 
and level of economic development do not exert influence on voter choice. 
6.1.2 Findings in the Comparative Case Study 
Chapter 5 presents a comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan, which is used 
to substantiate the findings in the cross-national analyses. Both countries experienced one 
dominant party system before 2000 and at least two changes of party in government and 
in opposition. In Taiwan, the media influenced both retrospective and prospective 
national economic evaluations in 2008 and 2012, when the media and political systems 
were much more open and free than before; however, the media affected neither 
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retrospective nor prospective national economic evaluation in Mexico. For voter choice, 
the media influenced voter choice in 2000, 2008, and 2012 in Taiwan; in Mexico, the 
media affected voter choice in 2000 and 2012. Compared with Mexico, whose polity 
score since 2000 is 8, Taiwan has a higher level of democracy (with a polity score of 10 
after 2005), and the media has a stronger effect on national economic evaluations. The 
Taiwan case substantiates the idea that countries with full democracy (or consolidated 
democracy) have a stronger effect on national economic evaluations than those with 
lower levels of democracy; however, the case of Mexico does not conform to the finding 
in cross-national analysis that countries with middle income have the strongest effect on 
national economic evaluation. 
6.1.3 Major Contributions to the information sources on Economic Voting 
From the cross-national analysis, it is evident that more media consumption can 
lead people to negatively evaluate national economic condition in the past and in the 
future. Also, pocketbook evaluation is highly correlated with sociotropic evaluation. 
Talking about politics with others leads to positive national economic evaluations. For 
voter choice, sociotropic evaluation is highly associated with voter choice. However, 
neither does media consumption nor talking about politics with others affect voter choice. 
In other words, the media consumption can influence national economic evaluations but 
not voter choice in comparative perspective. In my in-depth interviews in Taiwan in 2015, 
I interviewed a scholar whose expertise is political communication. The scholar 
mentioned that the media can affect people’s national economic evaluation, but it does 
not necessarily affect voter choice (Interviewee A in Appendix L). My finding 
corroborates to what the scholar alleges in my in-depth interview. 
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The multilevel models help to derive that level of democracy and level of 
economic development can account for the variation on both retrospective and 
prospective national economic evaluations. Consolidated democracies (polity score: 10) 
and countries with middle level income (GDP per capita: $1,000~$9,999) have the 
strongest impact on both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations. In 
contrast, level of democracy and level of economic development do not affect on voter 
choice. The Taiwan case substantiates that media consumption has a stronger influence 
on national economic evaluations in countries with consolidated democracy. Given that a 
general explanation about the effect of information sources on national economic 
evaluations does not exist, this research offers a nomothetic rule of the effect of 
information sources on national economic evaluations in comparative perspective. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
There are limitations in this research, including the measurement of media 
consumption in both cross-national analyses and comparative case study, the problem of 
endogeneity in the models, missing values, and survey data of state level. They are 
delineated as follows, and suggestions for solutions are provided. 
6.2.1 Measurement of Media Consumption 
The measurement of media consumption in cross-national analyses uses the 
frequency of respondents’ television consumption. Although Hetherington (1996) claims 
that more television consumption can lead to a more negative national economic 
evaluation, his assumption was based on negative coverage of economic news in George 
H. W. Bush’s U.S. presidential administration. Because more media consumption is more 
likely to result in negative national economic evaluation in most countries according to 
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cross-national analyses, it is not appropriate to directly claim that there is more negative 
coverage of economic news unless the content analysis can be done to confirm it. In 
addition, in two or three countries, more media consumption leads to positive national 
economic evaluation. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to explain why more media 
consumption can contribute to either positive or negative national economic evaluation 
since the amount of positive or negative of economic news coverage is unknown in each 
country. 
 In order to overcome this problem, I use a different measurement in the 
comparative case study. The variable asked respondents which television news channels 
or programs they usually watched, and the television news channels are categorized into 
two categories: pro-ruling-party channels and pro-opposition-party channels. The result 
shows that the choice of TV news channels is highly associated with voter choice (Lo, 
2013). However, Lawson et al. (2000), in the 2000 Panel Study project, mentioned that 
this kind of media measurement in the cross-sectional data is suspicious because viewers 
may self-select according to their preexisting partisan bias. For example, people who feel 
close to the KMT may choose to watch pro-blue camp channels in Taiwan. The panel 
data measures not only people’s choice of media and their vote choice when they have 
preexisting partisan bias but also people’s change of voter choice throughout the 
campaign depending on choice of media. Although panel data is available in the Mexico 
case, panel data that interviews the same respondents before and immediately after a 
particular election is not available in the Taiwan case. I hope this kind of panel data will 
be available in Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), at which time the 
media effect can be more appropriately measured. 
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6.2.2 Problem of Endogeneity 
As mentioned in the comparative case study of Taiwan case, there is a problem of 
endogeneity between retrospective national economic evaluation and voter choice. 
Except 1996 and 2012, in which the surveys were conducted before the new president 
assumed the presidency on May 20, all other surveys were executed after the new 
president’s inauguration. There is more of an endogeneity problem if the survey is not 
conducted immediately after the election, especially after the newly elected president 
assumes the presidency, because voters have different answers depending on whether 
their favorite candidate was elected (Wu and Lin, 2012). Fortunately, the presidential 
election survey in TEDS have been conducted right after the election since 2012. 
6.2.3 Missing Data 
There are lots of missing values in Global Barometer and Latino Barometro. 
Missing values not only exist in national surveys in developing countries but also in 
developed countries. That is the main reason why some East Asian countries are dropped 
automatically in multilevel models. To handle the missing data in the future, multiple 
imputation can be done to result in a valid statistical inference and heighten statistical 
significance (Rubin, 1987, 1996; Lawson and MacCann, 2000). 
6.2.4 Survey Data of State Level 
 Given that the survey data of 1997 Congressional election in Mexico is difficult to 
obtain, this research uses 1997 Mexico City Panel data in lieu of national election. 
Although the result shows that the information sources do not affect economic voting in 
1997, the election may not be comparable with national elections in 2000, 2006, and 2012 
for two reasons. First, the party strength in Mexico City is different from those in other 
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areas. The strongest parties in Mexico City were PRD and PRI, and the PRD-PRI 
competition was significant in 1997 (Klesner, 2004). Also, Cardenas won the mayoral 
election and it was the first time that the mayor was not from the ruling PRI. Given that 
PAN-PRI competition centers on the north and the center-west, and the PRD-PRI 
competition focuses on the south, using the state level analysis to derive the general 
explanation of economic in Mexico may not be appropriate. Second, national economic 
evaluation may not be associated with voter choice in Mexico City election. Voters may 
not attribute the national economic condition to incumbent PRI in state level elections 
such as Mexico City mayoral election since they are more likely to attribute national 
economic condition to the incumbent in national elections. In other words, they may still 
vote for the PRI candidate in mayor election even though they think national economy is 
in bad shape. In order to produce a more convincing result, the national election survey 
data is preferred if it is available. 
6.3 RESEARCH PLAN FOR THE EXTENSION OF THIS RESEARCH 
Suggestions for the extension of this research include measurement of the national 
level variables, in-depth interviews, and measurement of the media. 
In cross-national analyses, most random coefficient models only allow one 
variable to vary across nations. Although there are random coefficient models that allow 
both polity score and GDP per capita vary, random coefficient models with correlated 
variance should be done in the future to determine which model is more appropriate. In 
addition, this research contends that consolidated democracies and countries with middle 
income can impact national economic evaluations. Is this effect still significant in 
countries with both full democracy and middle income (e.g., Mongolia, Costa Rica, 
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Uruguay, and Cape Verde)? What is the effect in countries with high economic 
development but low democracy (e.g., Singapore, Kuwait) or countries with high 
democracy but low level of economic development, such as India? According to the 
random intercept models in Chapter 2, 3, and 4, there is between-country variance in the 
national economic evaluations and voter choice. However, polity score and GDP per 
capita cannot account for much between-country variance. Probably there are some other 
national variables which can better explain between-country variance on national 
economic evaluation and voter choice. How about the effect of other national level 
variables on economic voting such as political contexts and unemployment rate which 
can impact economic voting (Chang and Chang, 2006)? Although this research discovers 
that consolidated democracy can impose stronger influence on national economic 
evaluations, this research does not examine further whether the effect is the same in new 
democracies and old democracies. Are there any differences of the effect in new 
democracies and in old democracies? These questions deserve further exploration. 
Second, the comparative case study is important for exploring the casual 
relationship between the effects of information sources on economic voting. Although 
this research discovers that consolidated democracies and countries with middle income 
have the strongest effect on the effect of information sources on economic voting, the 
casual mechanism between information sources and economic voting is still vague. In-
depth interviews can help explore the reasons why this is so. In-depth interviews in 
Taiwan have been done, and in the future in-depth interviews in Mexico should also be 
done in order to obtain a more significant comparative case study (Please refer to 
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Appendix L and M for designation of interviewees in Taiwan and questions for in-depth 
interviews). 
In terms of the measurement of media consumption, content analysis should be 
done to explore the media effect in width and in depth. In addition to traditional media, 
social media now plays an important role in modern campaigns. How does social media 
influence economic voting? Which kind of media (traditional or social) is more important? 
It is essential to take both traditional media and social media into consideration in an 
extension of this project. 
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APPENDIX A: QUESETIONS OF GLOBAL BAROMETER 
1. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation  
(1) Latino Barometro (LB): Do you consider the current economic situation of the 
country to be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or 
much worse than 12 months ago? 
(2) Afro Barometer (AFRO): How do economic conditions in (country) now 
compare to one year ago? Are they much worse, worse, about the same, better, 
much better? 
(3) Asian Barometer (Asia): How would you describe the change in the economic 
condition of our country over the past five years? Much better, a little better, 
about the same, a little worse, much worse? 
(4) Arab Barometer (Arab): As compared to a few years ago, would you say the 
economic condition of [county name] has become much better, better, stayed 
the same, become worse, or much worse? 
Answer: 1 Very bad; 2 Bad; 3 So so (not good nor bad); 4 Good; 5 Very good 
2. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
(1) LB: And in the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the economic 
situation of your country will be much better, a little better, about the same, a 
little worse or much worse compared to the way it is now? 
(2) AFRO: What about in twelve month time? Do you expect economic 
conditions in (country) to be worse, the same, or better than they are now?
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(3) Asia: What do you think will be the state of our country’s economic condition 
five years from now? Much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, 
much worse. 
(4) Arab: Thinking about the next few years, do you think the economic condition 
of the country will become much better, better, remain the same, become 
worse, or much worse? 
Answer: 1 Much worse; 2 A little worse; 3 About the same; 4 A little better; 5 
Much better 
3. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
(1) LB: Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be 
much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 
12 months ago?  
(2) AFRO: When you look at your life today, how satisfied do you feel compared 
with five years ago? Much less satisfied, slightly less satisfied, about the same, 
slightly more satisfied, much more satisfied? 
(3) Asia: How would you compare the current economic condition of your family 
with what it was five years ago? Much better, a little better, about the same, a 
little worse, much worse? 
(4) Arab: As compared to a few years ago, how is the economic condition of your 
household today? Would you say it has become much better, better, remained 
the same, become worse, or much worse? 
Answer: 1 Much worse now; 2 A little worse now; 3 About the same; 4 A little 
better now; 5 Much better now 
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4. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
(1) LB: And in the next 12 months, do you think that your economic situation and 
that of your family will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little 
worse or much worse compared to the way it is now? 
(2) AFRO: When you look forward at your life’s prospects, how satisfied do you 
expect to be in one year’s time? Much less satisfied, slightly less satisfied, 
about the same, slightly more satisfied, much more satisfied? 
(3) Asia: What do you think the economic situation of your family will be five 
years from now? Much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, 
much worse? 
(4) Arab: What do you think will be the economic condition of your household in 
the coming few years? Would you say it will become much better, better, 
remain the same, become worse, or much worse? 
Answer: 1 Much worse now; 2 A little worse now; 3 About the same; 4 A little 
better now; 5 Much better now 
5. Media Consumption 
(1) LB: How many days during the last week did you watch the news on 
television? 
(2) AFRO: How often do you get news from television? Every day, a few times a 
week, a few times a month, less than once a month, never. 
(3) Asia: How often do you watch news about politics on television? Many times 
a day, once a day, several times a week, once or twice a week, not even once a 
week, practically never. 
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(4) Arab: How often do you watch news on TV? More than once a day, once a 
day, on most days, once in a while, never. 
Answer: 1 Daily; 2 Frequently; 3 Occasionally; 4 Rarely/Never 
6. Talk about Politics 
(1) LB: How frequently do you talk politics with friends? Very frequently, fairly 
frequently, occasionally or never. 
(2) AFRO: When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss 
political matters? Frequently, occasionally, never. 
(3) Asia: How often do you discuss politics in [organization or group]? Is it very 
often, often, sometimes, rarely, never? 
(4) Arab: How often do you discuss politics with your friends and colleagues? 
Very often, often, not so often, never. 
Answer: 1 Frequently; 2 Occasionally; 3 Never 
7. Political Interests 
(1) LB: How interested are you in politics? Very interested, fairly interested, a 
little interested, not at all interested. 
(2) AFRO: How interested are you in politics and government? Not interested, 
somewhat interested, very interested. 
(3) Asia: How interested would you say are in politics? Very interested, 
somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested. 
Answer: 1 Not at all interested; 2 Not very interested; 3 Somewhat interested; 4 
Very interested 
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8. Level of Education 
What is your highest level of education? 
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Complete primary; 4 Incomplete 
secondary; 5 Complete secondary; 6 Incomplete high school; 7 Complete high school; 
8 Other
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APPENDIX B: QUESETIONS OF LATINO BAROMETRO 
1. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation  
Do you consider the country’s present economic condition to be better, a little 
better, the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
2. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
And in the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the economic situation of 
your country will be much better, a little better, the same, a little worse or much worse 
than now? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
3. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be much 
better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
4. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
In the next 12 months, do you think your economic situation and that of your 
family will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse 
than now?
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Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
5. Political Interests 
How interested are you in politics? 
Answer: 1 Very interested; 2 Some interested; 3 Few interested; 4 Not at all 
interested 
6. Level of Education 
What is your highest level of education? 
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Complete primary; 4 Incomplete 
secondary; 5 Complete secondary; 6 Incomplete high school; 7 Complete high school 
7. Voter Choice 
If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for? 
 Answer: 1 the incumbent party; 2 the opposition party 
8. Party Identification 
Which political party do you feel closet to? 
Answer: 1 the incumbent party; 2 the opposition party 
(Note: This question was asked only if the answer of the preceding question is yes. 
The preceding question is “Is there any political party to which you feel closer to than the 
rest of the parties? Answer: 1 Yes; 2 No”) 
9. How do you inform yourself about politics? 
A With the family  1 Mention; 2 Not mention 
B Friends  1 Mention 2 Not mention 
C People I work with  1 Mention 2 Not mention 
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D People I study with 1 Mention 2 Not mention 
 (Note: The four alternatives are recoded as dummy variables and then added 
together to produce an ordinal variable of talking about politics. 0 = never; 
1=occasionally; 2=fairly frequently; 3 Very frequently) 
10. Media Consumption 
How many days in the last week you look political news on TV? 
Answer: ＿＿＿ (number of days) 
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS OF 1997 MEXICO PANEL STUDY 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
In the last two years, would you say that your personal financial situation has 
gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Somewhat worse; 4 Much worse; 5 
The same 
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think your personal economic 
situation will get better, get worse, or stay the same? 
Answer: 1 Better; 2 Worse; 3 The same 
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
In the last two years, would you say that the economic situation in the country has 
improved, worsened, or remained the same? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Somewhat worse; 4 Much worse; 5 
The same 
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think the country’s economy will get 
better, get worse, or stay the same? 
Answer: 1 Better; 2 Worse; 3 The same 
5. Media Consumption 
Which TV program do you usually watch on television?
 182 
 
Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L. Doriga, 
Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM, 
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7) 
(Note: I categorized the variable into two categories only) 
6. Talk about Politics 
A. How often do you talk about politics with family? 
B. How often do you talk about politics with friends? 
Answer: 1 Daily; 2 A few times a week; 3 Once a week; 4 Once a month; 5 Less 
than once a month 
(Note: I added the two variables – talking with family and talking with friends 
together to produce a new variable of talking about politics) 
7. Ideology 
In politics, people talk about “Left” and “Right. On a scale of 0 to 6, where 0 is 
“left” and 6 is “right”, where would you place yourself? 
Answer: ＿＿＿ (0:the leftest~6: the rightest) 
8. Level of Education 
Until what grade in school did you study? 
Answer: 1 None; 2 Primary; 3 Secondary/Terciary; 4 High school; 5 University or 
more 
9. Party Identification 
A. Did you vote for PRI for Congress? 
B. Did you vote for PAN for Congress? 
C. Did you vote for PRD for Congress? 
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Answer: 1 Yes; 2 No 
(Note: There is no question of party identification in the study therefore I choose 
vote choice for Congress in lieu of party identification.) 
10. Voter Choice 
Who did you for the mayor of Mexico City in July? 
Answer: 1 Carlos Castillo Peraza (PAN); 2 Cuauhtemoc Cardenas (PRD); 3 
Alfredo del Mazo Gonzalez (PRI); 4 Other/non-voter 
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONS OF 2000 MEXICO PANEL STUDY 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
In the last 12 months, would you say that your personal financial situation has 
gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 The same; 4 Somewhat worse; 5 
Much worse 
2. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
In the last 12 years, would you say that the national economy has gotten better, 
gotten worse, or stayed the same? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Somewhat worse; 4 Much worse; 5 
The same 
3. Media Consumption 
Do you watch any news program on television? 
Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L. Doriga, 
Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM, 
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7) 
(Note: I categorized the variable into two categories only) 
4. Talk about Politics 
How often do you talk about politics with other people: every day, a few times a 
week, a few times a month, rarely, or never?
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 Answer: 1 Every day; 2 A few times per week; 3 A few times per month; 4 Rarely; 
5 Never 
5. Ideology 
In politics, people talk about “Left” and “Right. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is 
“left” and 10 is “right”, where would you place yourself? 
Answer: ＿＿＿ (0:the leftest~10: the rightest) 
6. Level of Education 
Until what grade in school did you study? 
Answer: 1 No formal education; 2 Primary; 3 Secondary/vocation/equivalent; 4 
High school/equivalent; 5 College or more 
7. Political Sophistication 
A. Could you tell me the names of the three branches of government, or do you 
not recall right now? (Do not read) 
a. Executive    Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned 
b. Legislative  Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned 
c. Judicial        Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned 
B. Could you tell me how many members there are in the Chamber of Deputies, 
or do you not recall right now? 
Answer: ＿＿＿ (500 is the correct answer and all other answers are wrong; 1 
correct 0 wrong) 
 (Note: Factor analysis of the four questions were done and the first factor score 
was taken for analysis) 
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8. Party Identification 
With which party do you most identify? (Do not read) 
Answer: 1 PRI; 2 PAN; 3 PRD; 4 Other; 5 None; 9 DK/DA 
(Note: I generate three dummy variables for each party accordingly) 
9. Voter Choice 
Did you vote in the elections on the 2nd of July? (If “No”, go to question 17.) If 
yes, could you mark on this piece of paper who you voted for in the elections for 
President? (Hand Ballot and Box) 
Answer: 1 Fanscisco Labastida; 2 Vicente Fox; 3 Cuauhtemoc Cardenas; 4 
Manuel Camacho; 5 Porfirio Munoz Ledo; 6 Gilberto Rincon Gallardo; 7 Annulled; 8 
Did not vote; 9 DK/DA 
(Note: Choices of 4 to 6 are included together with Cardenas) 
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APPENDIX E: QUESTIONS OF 2006 MEXICO PANEL STUDY 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
 Since Fox became president, would you say your personal economic situation has 
gotten better, has gotten worse, or stayed the same? 
 Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A 
lot worse 
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
 Thinking of the next 12 months, do you think your personal economic situation 
will get better, get worse, or stay the same? 
 Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A 
lot worse 
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
Since Fox became president, would you say the national economy has gotten 
better, has gotten worse, or stayed the same? 
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A 
lot worse 
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
Thinking of the next 12 months, do you think the national economy will get better, 
get worse, or stay the same? 
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A 
lot worse
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5. Media Consumption 
Do you normally watch any news program on TV? (Yes) Which one? 
Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L. Doriga, 
Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM, 
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7) 
(Note: This is an open-ended question. I categorized all answers into two 
categories only) 
6. Talk about Politics 
How often do you talk about politics with other people? 
Answer: 1 Daily; 2 A few days a week; 3 A few days a month; 4 Rarely; 5 Never 
7. Ideology 
In politics, would you consider yourself on the left, on the right, or in the center? 
Answer: 1 Very on the left; 2 Somewhat on the left; 3 Center-left; 4 Center-center; 
5 Center-right; 6 Somewhat on the right; 7 Very on the right; 8 None; 9 DK/NA 
8. Level of Education 
Level of education achieved. 
Answer: 1 Has no schooling; 2 Incomplete elementary; 3 Complete elementary; 4 
Incomplete middle/technical; 5 Complete middle/technical; 6 Incomplete high; 7 
Complete high; 8 Incomplete college; 9 Complete college or more 
9. Political Sophistication 
Could you tell me the names of the three branches of government, or you do not 
remember right now? 
A. Executive Branch/president   Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned 
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B. Legislative Branch/ Congress   Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned 
C. Judicial Branch/Courts             Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned 
(Note: Factor analysis of the four questions were done and the first factor score 
was taken for analysis) 
10. Party Identification 
In general, would you say you identify with the PAN, the PRI or the PRD? Would 
you say you identity strongly with the (…) or only somewhat with the (…)? 
Answer: 1 Strong PAN; 2 Weak PAN; 3 Strong PRI; 4 Weak PRI; 5 Strong PRD; 
6 Weak PRD; 7 Other; 8 None; 9 DK/NA 
(Note: Strong and weak partisan for each party are recoded as the same category 
to produce three dummy variables for each party accordingly) 
11. Voter Choice 
There were presidential elections this past July 2nd. As you know, some people do 
not have time to vote, or are not interested. Did you or did you not vote in the elections 
this past July 2nd? 
Answer: 1 Did vote; 2 Did not vote; 3 DK/NA/Does not remember (If 1 is chosen, 
continue to ask voter choice; skip to other questions if 2 and 3 are chosen) 
11a. For the purposes of this survey, I will give you a sheet where you can mark how you 
voted on the last presidential elections, without my seeing you, and then deposit in in this 
bag. For whom did you vote for president? 
 Answer: 1 Felipe Calderon/PAN; 2 Roberto Madrazo/PRI; 3 Andres Manuel 
Lopez Obrador/PRD; 4 Roberto Campa/NA; 5 Patricia Mercado/ASDC; 6 Other; 7 
DK/NA
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APPENDIX F: QUESTIONS OF 2012 MEXICO PANEL STUDY 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
 In the last year, would you say that your personal economic situation has 
improved, worsened, or remained the same? 
 Answer: 1 Improved a lot; 2 Improved somewhat; 3 Same; 4 Worsened somewhat; 
5 Worsened a lot 
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
 Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think your personal economic 
situation will get better, get worse, or stay the same? 
 Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Stay the same; 4 Somewhat worse; 5 
A lot worse 
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
In the last year, would you say that the economic situation in the country has 
improved, worsened, or remained the same? 
Answer: 1 Improved a lot; 2 Improved somewhat; 3 Same; 4 Worsened somewhat; 
5 Worsened a lot 
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think the country’s economy will get 
better, get worse, or stay the same? 
 Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Stay the same; 4 Somewhat worse; 5 
A lot worse
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5. Media Consumption 
 Do you typically watch a television news program? (YES) Which ones? 
Answer: Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L. 
Doriga, Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM, 
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7) 
(Note: This is an open-ended question. I categorized all answers into two categories only) 
6. Talk about Politics 
 How often do you talk about politics with other people? 
 Answer: 1 Daily; 2 Several times a week; 3 Several times a month; 4 Rarely; 5 
Never 
7. Ideology 
 In politics, do you consider yourself to be on the left, the right, or in the center? 
 Answer: 1 Very left; 2 Somewhat left; 3 Center-left; 4 Center-center; 5 Center-
right; 6 Somewhat right; 7 Very right; 8 None; 9 DK/NA 
8. Level of Education 
 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Answer: 1 No formal education; 2 Incomplete primary school; 3 Complete 
primary school; 4 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 5 Complete 
secondary/technical school; 6 Incomplete preparatory equivalent; 7 Complete preparatory 
equivalent; 8 Incomplete university; 9 Complete university or more; 10 DK/NA 
9. Party Identification 
 Generally, do you identify with the PAN, PRI or PRD? Do you identify strongly 
or weakly? 
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 Answer: 1 Strong PAN; 2 Weak PAN; 3 Strong PRI; 4 Weak PRI; 5 Strong PRD; 
6 Weak PRD; 7 Other; 8 None; 9 DK/NA 
 (Note: Strong and weak partisan for each party are recoded as the same category 
to produce three dummy variables for each party accordingly) 
10. Voter Choice 
 Who [did you vote for/would you have voted for] as President of the country? Use 
this ballot to mark your response and then deposit here without showing me your 
selection. 
 Answer: 1 Josefina Vazquez Mota/PAN; 2 Enrique Pena Nieto/PRI option; 3 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador/PRD option; 4 Enrique Pena Nieto/PVEM option; 5 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador/PT option; 6 Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador/Mov. 
Ciudadano option; 7 Gabriel Quadri/Nueva Alianza; 8 Marked more than one option for 
different parties; 9 Marked more than one option for Pena Nieto; 10 Marked more than 
one option for AMLO; 11 Marked or crossed out entire ballot; 12 Left ballot blank; 13 
Said don’t plan to vote and left ballot blank; 99 Said don’t know and left ballot blank 
 (Note: Only Mota, Nieto, and AMLO are included in the analysis.)
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APPENDIX G: 1996 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
Do you consider your family economic situation to be much better, a little better, 
about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago? 
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that your family economic situation will be 
much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse compared to the 
way it is now? 
 Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be much better, 
a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago? 
 Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our 
country will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse 
compared to the way it is now?
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 Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
5. Media Consumption 
 Do you typically read newspapers? (YES) Which one? 
 Answer: 1 Pro-blue newspapers (China Times, China Times Express, United 
Daily News, United Evening News, Central Daily News, Commercial Times, The 
People’s Livelihood Newspaper, Economic Daily News, Youth Daily News, Great News, 
and China Daily News); 2 Pro-green newspapers (Independent Daily News, Independent 
Evening News, The Commons Daily, Taiwan Times, and Liberty Times) 
 (Note: There were not many pro-green TV stations before 2000 so I use the 
choice of newspaper for analysis. I categorize newspapers into two categories according 
to their partisan bias.) 
6. Talk about politics 
 How often do you talk about 1996 presidential election with family or friends? 
Very frequently, fairly frequently, occasionally or never? 
 Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Occasionally; 4 Never 
7. Level of Education 
 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Answer: 1 No formal education; 2 Primary school; 3 Secondary/technical school; 
4 High/technical school; 5 College; 6 University; 7 Graduate School; 8 Other. 
8. Political Sophistication 
 Could you answer the following question? 
 a. Who is the governor of Taiwan Province? 
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 b. Who is the president of the United States? 
 c. Who is the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party? 
 d. How many years of a legislative term? 
 e. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution? 
 (Note: These four items are open-ended questions. If answers are correct, it is 
coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is coded as 0. The factor analysis for the four items is 
done to take the first factor score.) 
9. Party Identification 
 a. Which party do you feel closet to? (If 4, 5, 98, and 95 are selected, go to b.) 
 Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 All of them; 5 None of them; 98 Do Not Know; 
95 Decline to answer 
 b. Do you feel yourself closer to KMT, DPP, NP, or none of them? 
 Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 None of them 
 (Note: The answer of item b. is combined with item a. and the party identification 
is recoded as an ordinal variable according to their position of national identity. E.g. 
DPP=0, KMT=1, NP=2) 
10. National Identity 
 About the cross-strait relationship, which one do you personally prefer?  
 Answer: 1 Unification ASAP; 2 Independence ASAP; 3 Status quo now and 
unification later; 4 Status quo now and independence later; 5 Status quo now and 
unification or independence later; 6 Status forever; 7 Other. 
 (Note: National identity is recoded as an ordinal variable from 0 independence 
ASAP to 5 Unification ASAP.) 
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11. Voter Choice 
 Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which 
candidate did you vote for? 
 Answer: 1 Li-an Chen (independent); 2 Teng-hui Lee (KMT); 3 Ming-min Peng 
(DPP); 4 Yang-kang Lin (independent). 
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APPENDIX H: 2000 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN 
1. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be much better, 
a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago? 
 Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
2. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our 
country will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse 
compared to the way it is now? 
 Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much 
worse 
3. Media Consumption 
 Which TV news station did you usually watch during presidential campaign? 
 Answer: 1 Taiwan Television; 2 China Television; 3 Chinese Television System; 
4 Formosa Television; 5 TVBS; 6 San-lih E-Television; 7 ETTV; 8 Chung-tien 
Television; 9 STV news; 10 Global TV; 11 Public Television Service; 12 Truth News 
Network (TNN); 13 Other; 14 Did not watch TV 
4. Talk about Politics 
 Did you talk about election with others during presidential campaign? 
 Answer: 1 Yes; 2 No
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5. Level of Education 
 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Primary school; 4 
Secondary/technical school; 5 Army/police secondary school; 6 High/technical school; 7 
Normal College; 8 College; 9 Army/police college; 10 Army/police University; 11 
University 12 Graduate School; 13 Other. 
6. Party Identification 
 Which party do you identify with? 
 Answer: 1 Strong KMT; 2 Strong DPP; 3 Strong NP; 4 Strong PFP; 5 strong 
(other party); 6 Weak KMT; 7 Weak DPP; 8 Weak NP; 9 Weak PFP; 10 Weak (other 
party); 11 None; 12 Do not know; 13 Decline to answer 
 (Note: Strong partisan and weak partisan of a certain party are combined together 
and is then recoded to produce a new ordinal variable. e.g. DPP=0, KMT=1, NP/PFP=2) 
7. National Identity 
 About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and 
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer?  
 Answer: 1 Strongly favor independence; 2 Fairly favor independence; 3 Favor 
independence; 4 Strongly favor unification; 5 Fairly favor unification; 6 Favor unification; 
7 Independence once status quo fails; 8 Unification once status quo fails; 9 Status quo; 10 
Neutral; 11 Do not know 
 (Note: National identity is recoded as an ordinal variable from 0 strongly favor 
independence to 8 strongly favor unification.) 
  
 199 
 
8. Voter Choice 
 Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which 
candidate did you vote for? 
 Answer: 1 James Soong; 2 Chan Lien; 3 Ao Li; 4 Hsin-liang Hsu; 5 Shui-bian 
Chen
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APPENDIX I: 2004 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
Do you consider your family economic situation to be better, about the same, or 
worse than 12 months ago? 
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
2. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be better, about 
the same, or worse than 12 months ago? 
 Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
3. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our 
country will be better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now? 
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
4. Media Consumption 
 Which newspaper did you usually read during presidential election? 
 Answer: 1 Pro-blue newspapers (China Times, China Times Express, United 
Daily News, United Evening News, Central Daily News, Commercial Times, The 
People’s Livelihood Newspaper, Economic Daily News, Youth Daily News, Great News, 
and China Daily News); 2 Pro-green newspapers (Independent Daily News, Independent 
Evening News, The Commons Daily, Taiwan Times, Taiwan Daily, and Liberty Times)
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 (Note: There was no question asking respondents which TV news station they 
usually watch during campaign. I use newspaper in lieu of TV station. I categorize 
newspapers into two categories according to their partisan bias.) 
5. Talk about Politics 
 How often do you talk about politics with other people? 
 Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Seldom; 4 Never 
6. Level of Education 
 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Incomplete primary 
school; 4 Primary school; 5 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 6 
Secondary/technical school; 7 Incomplete High/technical school; 8 High school; 9 
Incomplete College; 10 College; 11 Incomplete University 12 University; 13 Graduate 
school; 14 Japanese high school. 
7. Political Sophistication 
 Could you answer the following question? 
 a. Who is the President of the People’s Republic of China? 
 b. Who is the president of the United States? 
 c. How many years of a legislative term? 
 d. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution? 
 e. Who is the vice President of our country? 
 (Note: These five items are open-ended questions. If answers are correct, it is 
coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is coded as 0. The factor analysis for the five items is 
done to take the first factor score.) 
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8. Party Identification 
 There are several political parties in the political arena. Do you feel yourself 
closer to one party than the others? (YES, answer the following) Which one? (NO) Since 
you do not feel closer to any party, do you still feel a little bit closer to any party than 
else?(YES, answer the following) 
 Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 PFP; 5 Taiwan Independence Party; 6 TSU; 7 
Pan-blue; 8 Pan-green 
  (Note: The party identification is recoded as pan-blue-1, independent 0, pan-
green 1) 
9. National Identity 
 About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and 
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer (from 0 independence 
ASAP to 10 unification ASAP)?  
 Answer: ＿＿＿ (possible answer from 0 to 10) 
10. Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which candidate 
did you vote for? 
 Answer: 1 Shui-bian Chen; 2 Chan Lien; 3 Annulled; 91 Forgot; 95 Decline to 
answer; 98 Do not know
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APPENDIX J: 2008 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
Do you consider your family economic situation to be better, about the same, or 
worse than 12 months ago? 
Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that your family economic situation will be 
better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now? 
 Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be better, about 
the same, or worse than 12 months ago? 
 Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our 
country will be better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now? 
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
5. Media Consumption 
 Which TV news station did you usually watch during presidential campaign? 
 Answer: 1 Taiwan Television; 2 China Television; 3 Chinese Television System; 
4 Formosa Television; 5 TVBS; 6 San-lih E-Television; 7 ETTV;
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 8 Chung-tien Television; 9 Era news; 10 Gala Television; 11 USTV; 12 DaAi TV; 13 
Public Television Service; 14 Hakka TV; 15 Taiwan Indigenous Television (TITV); 16 
No Television; 17 Local TV channels; 18 NHK 
6. Talk about Politics 
 How often do you talk about politics with other people? 
 Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Seldom; 4 Never 
7. Level of Education 
 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Incomplete primary 
school; 4 Primary school; 5 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 6 
Secondary/technical school; 7 Incomplete High/technical school; 8 High school; 9 
Incomplete College; 10 College; 11 Incomplete University 12 University; 13 Graduate 
school. 
8. Political Sophistication 
 Could you answer the following question? 
 a. Who is the president of the United States? 
 b. Who is the prime minister of our country? 
 c. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution? 
 (Note: These three items are open-ended questions. If answers are correct, it is 
coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is coded as 0. The factor analysis for the three items is 
done to take the first factor score.) 
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9. Party Identification 
 There are several political parties in the political arena. Do you feel yourself 
closer to one party than the others? (YES, answer the following) Which one? (NO) Since 
you do not feel closer to any party, do you still feel a little bit closer to any party than 
else?(YES, answer the following) 
 Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 PFP; 5 TSU; 6 Green Party; 7 Red Party 
  (Note: The party identification is recoded as pan-blue-1, independent 0, pan-
green 1) 
10. National Identity 
 About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and 
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer (from 0 independence 
ASAP to 10 unification ASAP)?  
 Answer: ＿＿＿ (possible answer from 0 to 10) 
11. Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which candidate 
did you vote for? 
 Answer: 1 Frank Hsieh; 2 Ying-jeou Ma; 91 Forgot; 94 Annulled 95 Decline to 
answer; 98 Do not know
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APPENDIX K: 2012 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN 
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
Do you consider your family economic situation to be better, about the same, or 
worse than 12 months ago? 
Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that your family economic situation will be 
better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now? 
 Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation 
 Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be better, about 
the same, or worse than 12 months ago? 
 Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation 
 In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our 
country will be better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now? 
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse 
5. Media Consumption 
 Which TV news station did you usually watch during presidential campaign? 
 Answer: 1 Taiwan Television; 2 China Television; 3 Chinese Television System; 
4 Formosa Television; 5 TVBS; 6 San-lih E-Television; 7 ETTV;
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 8 Chung-tien Television; 9 Era news; 10 Gala Television; 11 USTV; 12 DaAi TV; 13 
Public Television Service; 15 Hakka TV; 17 Local TV channels; 18 Next TV; 19 NHK; 
22 EBC Financial News Channel; 23 VL Sports; 24 CSTV; 25 All of them except 
Formosa Television and San-lih E-Television. 
6. Talk about Politics 
 How often do you talk about politics with other people? 
 Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Seldom; 4 Never 
7. Level of Education 
 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Incomplete primary 
school; 4 Primary school; 5 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 6 
Secondary/technical school; 7 Incomplete High/technical school; 8 High school; 9 
Incomplete College; 10 College; 11 Incomplete University 12 University; 13 Graduate 
school. 
8. Political Sophistication 
 Could you answer the following question? 
 a. Who is the president of the United States? 
 b. Who is the prime minister of our country? 
 c. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution? 
 d. Who is the minister of Ministry of Finance in our country? 
 Answer: 1 Yi-huah Jiang; 2 Sean Chen; 3 Chi-kuo Mao; 4 Sush-der Lee 
 e. What is the unemployment rate of Taiwan by the end of 2011? 
 Answer: 1 2.3%; 2 4.3%; 3 6.3%; 4 8.3% 
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 f. Which party is the second largest party in the Legislature after the legislative 
election? 
 Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 PFP; 4 Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 
 g. Who is the Secretary-General of the United Nations? 
 Answer: 1 Kofi Annan; 2 Kurt Waldheim; 3 Ban Ki-moon; 4 Boutros Boutrous-
Ghali 
 (Note: The first three items are open-ended questions and the remaining items are 
multiple choice questions. If answers are correct, it is coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is 
coded as 0. The factor analysis for the seven items is done to take the first factor score.) 
9. Party Identification 
 There are several political parties in the political arena. Do you feel yourself 
closer to one party than the others? (YES, answer the following) Which one? (NO) Since 
you do not feel closer to any party, do you still feel a little bit closer to any party than 
else?(YES, answer the following) 
 Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 PFP; 5 TSU; 6 Green Party; 8 Communist Party 
  (Note: The party identification is recoded as pan-blue-1, independent 0, pan-
green 1) 
10. National Identity 
 About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and 
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer (from 0 independence 
ASAP to 10 unification ASAP)?  
 Answer: ＿＿＿ (possible answer from 0 to 10) 
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11. Did you vote in the presidential election on Jan. this year? (If Yes) Which candidate 
did you vote for? 
 Answer: 1 Ing-wen Tsai; 2 Ying-jeou Ma; 3 James Soong; 91 Forgot; 94 
Annulled; 95 Decline to answer; 98 Do not know
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APPENDIX L: DESIGNATION OF INTERVIEWEES IN TAIWAN 
Interviewee Position 
A Scholar in political communication 
B Former deputy minister in charge of 
mainland China affairs in Shui-bian 
Chen’s administration 
C Former Prime Minister in Ying-jeou Ma’s 
administration 
D Senior minister in Presidential office in 
Ying-jeou Ma’s administration 
E Scholar in political communication 
F Scholar in cross-strait relationship, 
economic voting, and national identity 
G Former deputy minister in charge of 
economic affairs in Ying-jeou Ma’s 
administration 
H Former research fellow in National 
Security Council in Shui-bian Chen’s 
administration 
I Former deputy minister in charge of 
mainland China affairs in Shui-bian 
Chen’s administration 
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APPENDIX M: QUESTIONS OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
1. According to the median voter theorem, the issue position of a party is close to the 
center in which most voters are located. Take cross-strait relationship for example, 
President Ying-jeou Ma’s asserted status quo and Ing-wen Tsai also claim the same 
position in 2015. However, President Shui-bian Chen (2000-2008) alleged Taiwan 
independence instead of the status quo in which the majority of voters favor. What is the 
incentives for him to allege this? How to explain the paradox? 
2. President Ying-jeou Ma centers on economic issues during the campaign in 2008 
presidential elections. Can the emphasis of economic issues be attributed to the economic 
recession? Or is it just an incentive to pacify the identity problem? How does the 
emphasis of the economy influence the presidential election? 
3. National identity has been usually the most important determinant on voter choice in 
Taiwan. It seems that economic evaluation is getting more and more important. Do you 
think economic voting will turn out to be significant eventually? Moreover, will its 
significance surpass national identity in the future? 
4. How do you think about the media effect on economic voting? Are there any 
differences before and after regime transition in 2000? Does the legacy of one party 
dominance influence economic voting? 
